Commentary

Volume Seventy-five, Number Six, June 1983

Bishops, Statesmen, and Other Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents

Albert Wohlstetter

Indicting American Jews
Lucy S. Dawidowicz

The Bulgarian Connection and the Media
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MOVIES:
The Politicized Oscar
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BOOKS:
Edward N. Luttwak
Jules Cohn
Chaim Raphael
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

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Letters from Readers

Doctors and Disease

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As one who is afflicted with a progressive, degenerative disease, multiple sclerosis, I anxiously read Kevin G. Barnhurst's "Living without Health" [April] as soon as the issue arrived. Mr. Barnhurst's is a common tale of woe, especially for those whose diseases have yet to be given a name. MS is different only because its symptoms are better known, though its etiology and treatment still elude medical science.

I was disappointed with Mr. Barnhurst's article, however, because it did not live up to its title. I expected to read about how people with chronic diseases, with their terrible pain and accompanying disability, cope with "life without health." But Mr. Barnhurst never really speaks to the point, an inquiry considerably more interesting and informative than the trials and tribulations of dealing with cold-hearted, questionably-competent physicians. For all his frustration and anger, I could not help wondering whether Mr. Barnhurst would have been more satisfied if they had said, "We're sorry, but we don't know what you have. Furthermore, we don't have the slightest idea what to do with it, so the best thing you can do is rest or pray or both." Or would Mr. Barnhurst, like the rest of us, have wanted, nay demanded, that they do something, almost anything? Is that not the sort of demand we make of incomplete medical science and its imperfect practitioners? If it is, then Mr. Barnhurst's anger is inexcusable: he should have realized that medical science is barely out of its infancy and physicians are pitifully human like the rest of us.

Mr. Barnhurst never explains what sustains him in the face of his disease, except to say, "Life is its own imperative." Here he misses the distinctive character of his own experience. It is more than just life that Mr. Barnhurst has chosen; it is an independent, productive life. He could as easily have opted not to pursue marriage, family, education, and a professional career. That would have been a story worth telling. Instead, we get the tale of symptoms and afflictions which no more interest me than mine would him. We are harangued about the limitations of the medical profession, which are more than familiar to us all, when we should have been told how life can go on when our very existence is suddenly rendered tentative. We are told scarcely anything about the support, or lack of it, which Mr. Barnhurst drew from his religion, when the choice for or against faith is certainly one of the most important for those chronically ill.

What sustains Mr. Barnhurst's marvelous and admirable ability to keep going remains a mystery to me. I would rather that he shared it with us all. Meanwhile, I would refer him to Anthony Trollope's *Small House at Allington*, where Lord De Guest is trying to buoy a downtrodden Johnny: "You know the story of the boy who would not cry though the wolf was gnawing beneath his frock. Most of us have some wolf to gnaw us somewhere; but we are generally gnawed beneath our clothes, so that the world shall not suspect. The man who goes around declaring himself to be miserable will not only be miserable but contemptible as well."

STEPHEN M. BARON
Syracuse, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

One cannot read Kevin G. Barnhurst's "Living without Health" without appreciating his physical and emotional suffering as poignantly described in his moving prose. We were disappointed, however, to note Mr. Barnhurst's consistently illogical attacks on physicians, attacks which throughout the article seem to be unsubstantiated generalizations, non sequiturs, irrelevant, etc. A few representative examples will illustrate the problem:

Mr. Barnhurst cites La Rochefoucauld, "We have all of us sufficient fortitude to bear the misfortune of others." The obvious implication is that physicians who have not suffered cannot appreciate their patients' suffering. He then lists innumerable transgressions of physicians which presumably have ensued from this lack of suffering, almost as if suffering constituted a rite of passage for becoming a humane and competent physician. A physician who has had personal involvement with disease may well be able to empathize with an ill

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patient; however, such personal experience is simply not necessary for the development of the proper attitude of detached concern on the part of the physician. Such an attitude implies neither paralyzing sympathy nor the callous indifference which Mr. Barnhurst imputes to the unsuffering physician.

He also argues that "Most doctors share a distorted, comic view of the human body," as evidenced by their "jokes about intimate bodily processes. . . ." But virtually all people have humor . . . about their own profession—doctors, morticians, lawyers, insurance agents, even college professors like Mr. Barnhurst. This does not mean that they lack genuine concern. For most, such humor is a release necessitated perhaps by the very sensibilities Mr. Barnhurst doubts. Disease and suffering are not funny, and humor is rarely appropriate in the physician/patient relationship, but Mr. Barnhurst . . . surely would not want a doctor without a sense of humor.

He observes further that "I didn't know that lupus was the latest fad diagnosis. . . . I didn't know physicians followed fads." The implication is that diagnoses are sociologically based, though Mr. Barnhurst offers not one word of evidence for this assumption. In fact, there may be some truth in this for all professions, even scientific ones (Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* makes this point). . . . But in this instance, we have only Mr Barnhurst's unsubstantiated accusation.

Mr. Barnhurst reviles the doctors who care for him, taking their often ineffective or counterproductive treatment as evidence not only of their incompetence, but also of physicians' general incompetence and arrogant disregard of the patient's observations. Leaving aside the unwarranted generalizing from Mr. Barnhurst's particular experiences, even in his own case he points out that "medical history has recorded only three hundred cases like mine." Why then would he expect smooth diagnosis, therapy, and prognosis?

Many of Mr. Barnhurst's points specifically regarding the quality of his care are also oversimplifications of complex issues or Catch-22 criticisms of physicians. For example, he criticizes the approach of the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) to his illness. It is true that HMO's are not designed to handle the most difficult cases efficiently, and he may have a point about the HMO's natural tendency to provide cut-rate care by overloading him with "on-hand" therapy and avoiding expensive outside care. Here Mr. Barnhurst is simply expressing the public's own ambivalent view of medical economics; that is, *your* medical care costs too much, but don't hold back on tests or any medical procedures when *I* get sick. . . .

He says he wants the "ancient gesture of healing" rather than the specialist's procedures. Would he also prefer the ancient results? Furthermore, he argues that "medical practitioners tend to play down or deny the pain they inflict on humans." As a practical matter, of course, many diagnostic procedures are done under some type of sedation or analgesia; greater reduction of discomfort could be effected only at a considerable and unwarranted risk to the patient. . . . But would Mr. Barnhurst have physicians, in some perverse expression of intellectual honesty, emphasize the potential magnitude of discomfort prior to the procedure? Pain may be increased or decreased by suggestion alone.

Mr. Barnhurst's complaints appear to reflect anger and frustration at the medical profession's inability to eradicate disease totally or make its remedies completely palatable. This is hardly new. . . .

Mr. Barnhurst provided a moving account of courage in the face of terrible suffering and uncertainty. In view of such courage, it is disheartening that he needs to vent an unfair and illogical rage against the physicians who, with some clear exceptions, appear to be genuinely trying to help a patient with a rare disease, as well as a profession which, with all of its faults, deserves more than Mr. Barnhurst's unsubstantiated attacks.

RICHARD E. VATZ
Towson State University
Baltimore, Maryland
KENNETH A. VATZ, M.D.
Winnetka, Illinois

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

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

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To the Editor of Commentary:

As a victim of hasty doctors and superficial diagnostic techniques,... I fully agree with Kevin G. Barnhurst that we don't know much more about our bodies than "the terrain of our skins," and even that we don't know too well.

Had Mr. Barnhurst known that systemic lupus erythematosus is a disease that strikes women ten times more frequently than men, he might have sought out a different physician immediately and saved himself a lot of grief.

The best medicine for anyone is a basic knowledge of human physiology—and a healthy dose of skepticism.

Ellen Leitner

New York City

To the Editor of Commentary:

As a physician, I am intrigued by the technical aspects of Kevin G. Barnhurst's illness. What is the diagnostic entity, how did the complication from aspirin arise, why the surprise at receiving oral cortisone therapy when oral cortisone derivatives have been available for years? But the technical matters, while inseparable from the problem as a whole, are overshadowed by Mr. Barnhurst's predicament as a young man who has a chronic, debilitating disease with unusual symptoms and an unpredictable course. Such a disease doesn't kill, it just makes the patient wish he were dead. This is not said to be facetious, but to emphasize that chronic disease, with its debility, pain, and lack of finality, either through definitive therapy or death, poses one of the most difficult problems that afflicted persons and their physicians can encounter. The reactions of Mr. Barnhurst to his illness and to the medical community are all too common, understandable, and not unreasonable. But his analysis breaks down when he implies that current medical technology necessarily separates physicians from their humane role.

It is argued that as medical technology has increased, there is less humanity and concern for the whole patient among physicians. Yet there is nothing humane about a charlatan or an incompetent physician who misses a diagnosis . . . or botches a procedure. The point of all the technological advances in medicine has been to promote better patient care and health. Conjointly, . . . entire new fields of medicine have evolved over the last twenty years. A certain amount of specialization among physicians is required so that expertise and quality of care are not compromised. The physician must keep abreast of new technology (drugs, procedures, etc.), but also meet the diagnostic demands of an ever increasing array of disease entities and clinical problems. . . .

However, the limits of scientific medicine need to be recognized. Obviously, there are many diseases for which no therapy exists. But in addition . . . the success of any established therapy canot be guaranteed. The appropriate antibiotic for an otherwise fatal infectious disease does not always prevent mortality. Finally, many people have symptoms which, simply, cannot be explained. Most often, these symptoms do not portend a serious illness.

But again, there is no guarantee. So a humane physician must be technically competent, recognize his limits, and, to complete the definition, he must care about his patients. Such a physician will accept the responsibility for the medical care of his patients whether delivered personally or by consultants. He will treat his patients with respect, address their fears, and educate them in the setting of scientific medicine. Are such physicians rare? I do not think so, but there is nothing newsworthy about them. Their patients rarely complain.

That such a physician was not found at a Health Maintenance Organization or at the Veterans' Administration does not surprise me. Medical positions in these organizations tend to be filled by people who are attracted by a forty-hour work week, a fixed salary, and no interruptions during their off-hours. In this setting, the usual doctor-patient relationship has gone awry. The patient has little or no choice of physician and the reputation, stature, and income of the physicians in these organizations are not determined by patient preferences. So I am not surprised, but I am dismayed, that pain induced by procedures was minimized and reported symptoms were denigrated. I am also curious about the age of Mr. Barnhurst's physicians. Apparently, the archaic, authoritarian mode of medical practice is not extinct.

What could a competent and caring physician do for Mr. Barnhurst? Unfortunately, nothing definitive. But he could help alleviate the pain.

Martin Caplan, M.D.

Richmond, Virginia

Kevin G. Barnhurst writes:

Notable in the letters from Stephen M. Baron and Richard and Kenneth Vatz are two points: first, with considerable venom, both letters accuse me of venting frustration, anger, and rage against the medical profession—Mr. Baron calls it "inexcusable," the Vatzes call it "unfair and illogical"—and, second, both letters suggest that I am angry because I, in the Vatzes' phrase, "expect smooth diagnosis, therapy, and prognosis" (Mr. Baron asks whether I "would have been more satisfied if they had said, 'We're sorry, but we don't know what you have' ").

Because my essay was personal, rather than scientific or scholarly, I suppose I should have expected my critics to take a personal tack. And my response must be personal as well: I do not now feel, nor have I ever felt, anything approaching rage toward the medical profession. When I first became sick I was saddened and frightened, not angry. Since then I have become skeptical, the approach Ellen Leitner rightly proposes.

If there is anger in my essay, it is aimed at a society that blindly refuses to accept its limitations. If I had not been taught to expect health or prompt healing from doctors, I would not have "wanted, nay demanded, that they do something, almost anything," as Mr. Baron suggests. My essay recounts how I learned what Mr. Baron says I "should have realized": that medical science has its limits, that doctors have their limits, and that my life has its limits. The title, "Living without Health," was meant to suggest that conclusion, not to introduce do-it-yourself hints.

To the charge that I have missed "the distinctive character" of my experience—that I "could as easily have opted not to pursue marriage, family, education, and a professional career"—I can say only that I have lived the one life I *could*, being myself and not Stephen Baron. My point was not that my experience was unique. I believe it is common, and I do not subscribe to the notion that the truth of our physical decline and mortality should be hidden behind the pretense of good health, as do Mr. Baron and the fictional De Guest.

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In response to the other points made by the Vatzes, I offer the following. First, their inference from La Rochefoucauld that one must first suffer to appreciate suffering strikes me as silly, like saying one must first die to appreciate dying. Second, my point was not that physicians have humor but that their humor is demeaning. Third, I criticized the HMO because it pretended to do more than what it could reasonably do, not because I wanted my case to be above the sensible economic limitations of medicine. Fourth, my argument is that I was *mistaken* to expect the ancient gesture of healing—that we would all be better off to give up our mistaken expectations of physicians.

On this last point, Martin Caplan's letter offers a much more subtle and reasonable analysis. Still I must disagree. His definition of the humane physician and his mention of "the usual doctor-patient relationship" are both references to the collection of beliefs I call the health ethic. Like the rest of society, physicians today may have been inculcated with this mistaken ethic, but the processes by which they are selected for and trained into the profession have almost no relation to humane values.

As Dr. Caplan argues, the "explosion of knowledge" has made specialization imperative. The advance of technology has also weakened the claim of a special humane role for medicine. If doctors are humane, it is because they are humans, not because they are doctors.

My experience is that, except in the debased meaning of the term, patients and doctors do not have a relationship. Madison Avenue and popular psychology may want me to have "a relationship" with my attorney, my broker, and my insurance agent, but although I depend on doctors constantly, the only one with whom I have a relationship happens to be a member of my family.

Christianity and the Holocaust, Cont.

To the Editor of Commentary:

In Hyam Maccoby's response to my offering in the spirited exchange [Letters from Readers, March] precipitated by his December 1982 article, "Theologian of the Holocaust," he accuses me of giving an "idealized account" of the Second Vatican Council's declaration, *Nostra Aetate*. For the record, I believe it should be made clear that *Nostra Aetate* neither offered "forgiveness of the Jews" nor, as Mr. Maccoby states, "required" them "to dissociate themselves" from any generation of Jews, much less that of Jesus.

The Conciliar declaration stated that "what happened in his [Jesus'] Passion cannot be blamed upon all the Jews then living, without distinction, nor upon the Jews of today." This is a deceptively simple statement, almost naively obvious from one point of view. What it accomplished, however, was the logical destruction of the entire edifice of the ancient "teaching of contempt" (to use Jules Isaac's apt terminology), by pulling out its foundation stone—the canard of collective guilt. If "the Jews" cannot be blamed, then there can be no question of "decide," or of divine wrath, or of "wandering Jews," etc.

As the 1975 statement of the American bishops precisely noted: "The Council's rejection of the collective-guilt charge against Jews has been interpreted by some commentators as an 'exoneration' of the Jewish people. Such a view of the matter still persists. The truth is that the Council acknowledged that the Jewish people never were, nor are they now, guilty of the death of Christ" (NCCB, November 20, 1975).

Lost in the wrangling over what the Council did *not* say, I fear, has been an appreciation of what it said regarding a positive Christian understanding of the religious relationship between the Church and the Jewish people. Briefly, this amounted to an acknowledgment of the permanent validity (*pace* Mordecai Kaplan) of God's covenant with the Jewish people. It is in this development, increasingly specified by official Church teaching since the Council, that I would find the deepest resources for the renewal of Jewish-Christian dialogue today.

The evils of the past must, as Mr. Maccoby rightly insists, be honestly faced, for they define the present. But a 1982 survey of some 400 leading Catholic educators commissioned by the National Association of Diocesan Ecumenical Officers hints at future possibilities. The educators were asked to respond to two statements: (1) "Judaism still plays a unique role of its own in God's plan of salvation" and (2) "The Jewish covenant with God has never been revoked by God; the Jews remain 'people of God.' "

Before the Council, the responses would most likely have been largely negative. The 1982 survey reported, however, an overwhelming 92 percent agreement on the first question (7 percent uncertain, 1 percent disagreement), and 85 percent agreement on the second (9 percent uncertain, 6 percent disagreement). This is not sufficient reason to become sanguine, but it does offer hope.

Eugene J. Fisher
Executive Secretary
Secretariat for Catholic-Jewish Relations
National Conference of Catholic Bishops
Washington, D.C.

To the Editor of Commentary:

Hyam Maccoby is clearly right to distinguish between what the Church or churches say officially or dogmatically and what is generally felt among uninstructed Christians. But on the most popular and unthinking level, the sense that the Jews were not like us, not our people, and hence at best not our business to protect was probably, in Germany, more "racial" and cultural than religious. There was even a good deal of class feeling.... Christian anti-Semitism was probably much stronger in Poland—a more religious country, where the Church had fostered a rural cooperative movement designed to drive Jewish shopkeepers out of business—than it was in Germany. One can also find Christian anti-Semitism in high intellectual circles in the 20's and 30's—T. S. Eliot is a salient example. Of course, the Holocaust stopped that in the West, but it is unreasonable to think that things like Eliot's "Bleistein" had nothing to do with the Western failure to save more Jews.

I assume that Mr. Maccoby has read Guenter Lewy's *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany*, an absolutely fair book written by a man with no personal stake in exculpating the Church. Lewy demonstrates in careful detail that the German hierarchy spoke out very strongly against the Nazis before they came to power. When they did come to power, the Church attempted to accommodate them, and did not label Hitler's war unjust, but it also furnished a respectable number of martyrs to the camps. The failure of the Church seems to

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

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have been not in making intellectual concessions to the Nazis or in sympathizing with them in their attack on the Jews, but in mere fear and political calculation—fear of another *Kulturkampf*, calculation that nothing the Church could do would deter Hitler where the Jews were concerned. The Church was also worried about what would happen when Stalin took over Central Europe; its leaders knew what Western intellectuals sometimes still avoid recognizing—that when Hitler attacked Stalin the Soviet government had already murdered hundreds of times as many innocent people as the Nazis had. . . . The Church does not, on the whole, have a bad record, in human terms, where the Holocaust is concerned, but neither does it have a particularly good one. . . .

Now that most people with a Christian heritage are not really Christian and a great number of Jews do not practice Judaism, the Jewish people are still susceptible to hatred and massacre. This is because of the totalitarian potential in modern civilization. It is not necessary, after Hannah Arendt, to explain the relationship between totalitarianism and anti-Semitism. Nobody who witnessed the mindless uniformity of (formally irreligious) groups of American students in the 60's and 70's can believe that an American totalitarianism is impossible. If we have such a thing, it will not go after Jews as Jews, at least not for a while, but it will have to destroy Jewish life in one way or another. And it will be anti-Christian as well.

ROSS DABNEY
Sweet Briar College
Sweet Briar, Virginia

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . Hyam Maccoby . . . must be highly commended for hitting so many nails squarely on the head, particularly those that clearly and unsparingly expose the guilt of Christianity in the development of anti-Semitism and its culmination in the Holocaust. But there are some things he . . . fails either to perceive or to come to grips with. . . . These are: that the Christian drama is not a myth (see Michael Fixler on Northrop Frye in the August 1982 COMMENTARY), nor is it ever devoid of or entirely separable from theology; that Pauline doctrine is not a *mis-* but a *re-*interpretation of the Fall, which is neither as dualistic nor as pessimistic as Mr. Maccoby claims (from Ecclesiastes and Job to Dante and C.S. Lewis, radical evil can be seen to exist without resorting to dualism or succumbing to a world-denying pessimism); that the crucifixion is not "an urgent *technique* of redemption," though there have been and continue to be many so-called Christians who prove this claim of Mr. Maccoby's.

Obviously Mr. Maccoby believes, with George Steiner, that "we sense today to what subterranean but cumulative extent the Christian teaching and vision of everlasting, sterile incarceration and punishment in Hell prefigured, perhaps made potentially real, the method of the concentration camps." Not only does this thinking exhibit a sudden ignorance of history (whether of human torture as it existed under the Inquisition or under Roman emperors like Nero and Caligula, of human sacrifice in Gehenna, or of human slavery in Egypt under the Pharaohs), but an almost blissful ignorance as well of the theology of free will and the God, rather than a human poet or philosopher, Who "creates" Hell, Sheol, Hades.

Finally, the whole problem of the Holocaust cannot be solved—"analyzed and corrected"—on the merely historical level, for, as Emil Fackenheim seems to understand better than Hyam Maccoby, history without metaphysics or revelation isn't even history. The inner reality of the Holocaust for both Jews and Christians is diminished by relativizing it as the product of "a cultural pattern." Historical complexity itself is dismissed—and a cultural pattern perpetuated—by attributing the Holocaust, as Mr. Maccoby does, to "a false turn taken by one sector of humanity."

Otherwise, Mr. Maccoby's is the kind of generally hard thinking and tough speaking I have come to expect and appreciate in COMMENTARY.

PAUL EDWARD GUAY
Allston, Massachusetts

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Although I was pleased to find my response to Hyam Maccoby's essay printed in COMMENTARY, I think my concluding remarks on his interpretation of the Talmud were unclear. What I meant to suggest, although perhaps I did so too elliptically, was that Mr. Maccoby incorrectly interpreted the Talmud as a body of humanistically based precepts intended for entirely rational beings. The Talmud addresses itself to what the rabbis believed was a radically flawed humanity subject to the entrenched powers of the *yetzer hara* [evil urge]. Halakhah and midrash both attempt to guard men from their sensual appetites, which are repeatedly identified with sin.

As William Davies has shown (in *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*), the view of human nature as sinful and fallen which pervades Pauline theology can find demonstrable support in rabbinic opinion and midrashim. Davies's contention seems defensible even if we accept Samuel Sandmel's qualified distinction between a Hellenistic Judaism that anticipates aspects of Pauline Christianity and a rabbinic Judaism more remote, but not entirely removed, from a Christian theological framework. Despite differences . . . Hellenistic (Platonized) Judaism, the Talmud, and Pauline Christianity overlap in their understanding of man's sinful appetitive nature. One would have to cite the Talmud very selectively to reconcile it with rationalism, humanism, or any other modernist dogma.

PAUL GOTTFRIED
Rockford College
Rockford, Illinois

HYAM MACCOBY writes:

Eugene J. Fisher rightly points out that *Nostra Aetate* stimulated new thinking on the part of Christians, and thus led to further advances which are still continuing. In itself, however, *Nostra Aetate* was only a small step forward. As Father Edward Flannery has said, the declaration's "main defect was a failure to refer contritely to the role the Church played in the development of anti-Semitism throughout Christian history." The whole tone of the declaration was one of gracious condescension, hardly the right tone for people with a long history of persecuting to adopt toward their victims. The declaration was a reassertion of the standpoint that despite everything, and in view of all the excuses that can be offered for the Jews by forgiving natures, and in view of the debt owed to the Judaism of the pre-Christian era, Christians should refrain from persecutory behavior toward Jews and put up patiently with the Jews' rejection of Jesus' divinity. Tribute was paid to Old Testament Judaism, but not to

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talmudic Judaism. On the contrary, the Tannaim, the founders of talmudic Judaism, were once more stigmatized as those who "pressed for the death of Christ" and as a "wicked generation" (this latter phrase occurs in the "Explanations" accompanying the final draft). To call a generation of leaders "wicked" is to call upon all moral beings to dissociate themselves from it; but we Jews cannot dissociate ourselves from the Jewish religious authorities of the time of Jesus, who included such revered figures as Gamaliel and Johanan ben Zakkai. I do not believe that these religious leaders had anything to do with the death of Jesus, though the High Priest, who had no religious authority (being a mere ceremonial official and a Roman appointee and Quisling) may well have handed Jesus over to Pilate on political, not religious, grounds. But here we touch on criticism of the Gospels, which the Vatican Council did not even consider; this shows how remote it was from the honesty of a Catholic theologian like Rosemary Ruether. The omission of the word "deicide" from the final draft was a great disappointment. This deletion was largely the result of protests by the Arab bishops, who argued that if the Jews were cleared of deicide, the punishment of exile would be lifted and the Jews would be justified in claiming a state in Palestine. The "Explanations," moreover, reasserted the traditional idea that the destruction of the Temple and Jerusalem was a punishment for the death of Jesus.

Ross Dabney argues that factors other than religion—class, culture, etc.—also played a part in the indifference to the sufferings of the Jews. The German Jews, however, were most thoroughly assimilated. If they were still felt to be "different," this was not for objective reasons. Church opposition to Hitler (e.g., by Pastor Niemoeller) was not on the grounds of opposition to the persecution of the Jews. The chief superiority of the Catholics over the Protestants was that the Catholics did something to protect Christians of Jewish origin, while the Protestants did not even do this. This is not to ignore the heroism of a few Christian individuals who tried to support the Jews.

I am grateful to Paul Edward Guay for his praise for my "hard thinking and tough speaking" and for "hitting so many nails squarely on the head," but am somewhat bemused by his reservations, which are so numerous that I wonder which nails I am supposed to have hit. If I may pluck out two points from his rapid fire: (1) the picture of Hell differs fundamentally from routine tyrannical torture, from "human sacrifice in Gehenna," "human slavery in Egypt," and also from Hades and Sheol. Hell is a vividly imagined topography of organized mass torture of eternal duration; none of the others comes remotely near this; (2) the "merely historical level" is not so "mere" when it takes into account the influence for evil of a profoundly moving myth. Mr. Guay's objection to "relativizing" the Holocaust seems to me a plea to regard the Holocaust as an ineffable mystery instead of as a loathsome and bloody fact.

Paul Gottfried explains that when he referred to my "strange view of the insignificance of humanism in talmudic Judaism," he meant my strange view of the significance of humanism in talmudic Judaism. I am grateful for the explanation, but think that my misunderstanding was forgivable. I certainly do think that "humanism" is an accurate description of the temper of the Talmud. This does not mean that the Talmud thinks that human nature is wholly rational and sinless, but that it is possible to attain rationality and responsibility with much effort (and with the aid of divine teaching), since evil is a psychological, not a cosmic, force. Here talmudic Judaism differs from Pauline Christianity, which regards such effort as a waste of time, since humanity is hopelessly in the grip of unreason and sin, so that its only hope is through a human-divine savior. (The Torah was given, says Paul, just to demonstrate the impossibility of moral effort.) This difference between talmudic Judaism and Pauline Christianity is fundamental.

Journey's End?

To the Editor of Commentary:

Ruth R. Wisse's . . . critical review of Paul Cowan's *An Orphan in History* [Books in Review, February] contrasts sharply with the rapturous reception the book received in the periodicals of national Jewish organizations. . . . On the clerical front, my rabbi told me that Paul Cowan was the only person in his memory accorded a standing ovation by the Rabbinical Assembly. . . .

Why, then, when the American Jewish family hails the return of the prodigal son, does a skeptical Ruth Wisse . . . dissent? . . . Perhaps there is the awareness that Paul Cowan is not the first Jew to have proclaimed his return to the fold and his rediscovered Jewishness in a book and in public appearances, to have received accolades from Jewish organizations, to have achieved a position in public consciousness where his pronouncements *as a Jew* carry uncommon weight. Perhaps I am being grossly unfair to Mr. Cowan, but recent experience should have taught us to examine newly-minted credentials very carefully.

As Paul Cowan tells it, the realization that "I was getting ready to resume my spiritual journey" set his feet on the road to Judaism. The final pages of his book leave wide open the question of whether he is indeed at journey's end. Mrs. Wisse's interest in the author's "next autobiography" is thus not idle curiosity. As one of our most perceptive observers of the current Jewish scene, she is warning us that the resumption of his journey might provide some unhappy surprises for many members of a Jewish community which has so ardently clasped Paul Cowan to its bosom....

Robert A. Riesman
Providence, Rhode Island

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The Acoustic Detection

Scientists have studied microstructural discontinuities in high-carbon steel since the early 1920s. By monitoring acoustic emissions, a materials research engineer at the General Motors Research Laboratories has arrived at a more detailed understanding of how one type of discontinuity occurs.



Figure 1: Cumulative acoustic emission counts for Fe-1.3%C steel, and control specimens of SAE 4140 and 304 stainless steel.

Figure 2: Artist's rendering of two proposed sources of microcracking: (A) impingement of the plates during the formation of martensite and (B) carbon atom rearrangement during the aging of martensite.



MARTENSITE is a hard microconstituent of steel which forms when austenite, iron containing carbon in solid solution, is quenched from a high temperature. The martensitic transformation produces steel that is hard and strong, but non-ductile. Through heat treatment, the steel can be tailored to applications requiring different degrees of ductility. High-carbon martensite—a highly stressed microstructure with a plate-like morphology—contains microscopic ruptures or separations 10 to 20 microns in length. These structural discontinuities, termed "microcracks," influence the mechanical properties of steel.

Although aspects of the microcracking phenomenon have been understood by metallurgists for more than fifty years, there is still no definitive explanation for when or how it occurs. An engineer at the General Motors Research Laboratories has devised an experiment that detects the microcracks as they occur.

The elastic energy released when microcracks form should produce a stress wave and associated high-frequency acoustic emission (AE). Using a piezoelectric transducer as the monitoring device, Dr. Michael Shea set out to determine what could be learned about the microcracking process by measuring AE.

The more widely accepted of two current hypotheses—the "impingement model"—asserts that microcracking is transformation-induced, taking place due to the collision of martensite plates during the quench. The other model maintains that microcracking occurs during the aging of martensite after the plates have already formed. The "aging model" suggests that thermal activation enables carbon atoms to rearrange themselves, producing localized stresses high enough to cause microcracking. Dr. Shea's ongoing research into high-carbon martensite led him to believe that the aging hypothesis was important. He proceeded to determine if AE is produced during aging.

For his study, Dr. Shea chose Fe-1.3%C steel, which undergoes martensitic transformation during quenching and is known to form

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microcracks. To provide baseline data, control specimens of 304 stainless steel and SAE 4140 steel were put through the same procedures as the test composition. When quenched, 304 stainless steel produces no martensite, and SAE 4140 forms a low-carbon martensite which has a lath-type morphology, and generally does not microcrack.

SPECIMENS of the three compositions were quenched to -196°C and then slowly heated to room temperature. Acoustic measurements were made beginning at 0°C, at which point carbon atom mobility is sufficient to allow rearrangement processes to take place, and continued for 45 minutes after the specimens had reached room temperature. No AE was recorded for 304 stainless steel, and only a slight amount for SAE 4140. Significant emission, however, was measured for the Fe-1.3%C steel specimen during the entire testing period (see Figure 1). Since martensite had already formed during the quench, these results support the hypothesis that microcracking is produced during aging of the freshly-formed plates. Dr. Shea ruled out both slip and twinning as sources of AE since the literature indicates that neither factor is significant during aging of martensite below 40°C. The possibility that the AE resulted from isothermal transformation of austenite to martensite could also be excluded because this process does not take place in the composition studied.

"These results demonstrate conclusively," says Dr. Shea, "that microcracking occurs during the aging of high-carbon martensite, thereby providing support for the less accepted of the two models.

"The next challenge," he continues, "will be to quantify the relative contributions of both models—impingement and aging—in an effort to determine which, in fact, is the more important mechanism, thus furthering our understanding of microcrack formation. Then, perhaps, we can more systematically explore ways to minimize microcracking."

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

Dr. Michael Shea is a Staff Research Engineer in the Metallurgy Department at the General Motors Research Laboratories.

Dr. Shea received his undergraduate and graduate degrees in metallurgical engineering from Michigan Technological University, and his Ph.D. in materials engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. His thesis concerned deformation and fracture of cesium chloride type superlattices. He joined General Motors in 1971.

The areas of metallurgical research pursued by Dr. Shea at General Motors include the mechanical properties of high-carbon steels, mechanically-induced transformation of austenite, and structure/property relationships in nodular cast iron. His exploration of the microcracking phenomenon in martensite was conducted with the help of instrumentation developed by GM colleague Dr. Douglas Harvey.

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

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Bishops, Statesmen, and Other Strategists On the Bombing of Innocents

Albert Wohlstetter

MUST the West threaten to bomb innocent bystanders in order to deter nuclear war? Does the West itself need to be threatened with annihilation of its civil society in order to be deterred? President Reagan's speech of March 23 proposing a decades-long research program to protect civilians against ballistic-missile attack revived these questions. The instant hoots of ridicule and references to *Star Wars* from many Senators and Congressmen suggest that holding out the nightmare vision of last things, the apocalypse, is now part of the nature of things; that the need to threaten the end of the earth must dominate earthly policy.

In fact, the West has for years used apocalyptic threats as a substitute for improving our capacity for discriminate response and in particular for a conventional reply to conventional attack. (The media hardly noticed the more immediate technical effort urged in the President's speech—to improve conventional technology.) Reckless nuclear threats and the intimidating growth of both Soviet conventional and nuclear strength have had much to do with the rise of the anti-nuclear movement here and in Protestant Northern Europe. By revising many times in public their pastoral letter on war and peace, American Catholic bishops have dramatized the moral issues which statesmen, using empty threats to end the world, neglect or evade. For the bishops stand in a long moral tradition which condemns the threat to destroy innocents as well as their actual destruction. They try but do not escape reliance on threatening bystanders. Ironically, the view dominating all their revisions reflects an evasive secular extreme which, instead of speeding improvements in the ability to avoid bystanders, has tried to halt or curb them. But because the bishops must take threats seriously, they make more visible the essential evasions of Western statesmen. That, however, is a kind of virtue. The letter offers a unique opportunity to examine the moral, political, and military issues together, and to show that, as the President suggests, threatening to bomb innocents is not part of the nature of things. Nor has it been, as is now widely claimed, an essential of deterrence from the beginning. Nor is it the inevitable result of "modern technology." It may be that our Senators and even some of our younger Congressmen haven't watched *Star Wars* closely enough.

The bishops have been sending a message to strategists in Western foreign-policy establishments —and to strategists in Western anti-nuclear counter-establishments. It seems unequivocal: "Under no circumstances may nuclear weapons or other instruments of mass slaughter be used for the purpose of destroying population centers or other predominantly civilian targets." Though that only restates an exemplary part of Vatican II two decades earlier, it is far from commonplace. Nonetheless it should be obvious to Catholics and non-Catholics alike. Informed realists in foreign-policy establishments as well as pacifists should oppose aiming to kill bystanders with nuclear or conventional weapons: indiscriminate Western threats paralyze the West, not the East. We have urgent political and military as well as moral grounds for improving our ability to answer an attack on Western military forces with less unintended killing, not to mention deliberate mass slaughter.

The bishops *seem* to be countering the perverse dogma which, after the Cuban missile crisis, came increasingly to be used by Western statesmen eager to spend less on defense: that the West should rely for deterring the Soviets on the ability to answer a nuclear military attack by assuring the deliberate destruction of tens or even hundreds of millions of Soviet civilians; and that the United States should also, for the supposed sake of "stability," give up any defense of its own civilians and any attack on military targets in order to assure the Soviets that they could, in response, destroy a comparable number of American civilians. The long humanist as well as the religious tradition on "just war" stresses especially the need to avoid attacks on "open," that is undefended, cities. The new doctrine exactly reversed this; it called both for leaving cities undefended and threatening to annihilate them. John Newhouse succinctly stated this dogma, to which he was sympathetic, in the "frosty

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apothegm": "Offense is defense, defense is offense. Killing people is good, killing weapons is bad." The late Donald Brennan, a long-term advocate of arms control to defend people and restrain offense from killing innocents, was not sympathetic. He noted that the acronym for Mutual Assured Destruction—MAD—described that Orwellian dogma.

Having observed long ago that not even Genghis Khan avoided combatants in order to focus solely on destroying noncombatants, I was grateful, on a first look at this issue in the evolving pastoral letter, to find the bishops on the side of the angels. Unfortunately, a closer reading suggested that they were also on the other side. For, while they sometimes say that we should not threaten to destroy civilians, they say too that we may continue to maintain nuclear weapons—and so implicitly threaten their use as a deterrent—while moving toward permanent verifiable nuclear and general disarmament; *yet we may not meanwhile plan to be able to fight a nuclear war even in response to a nuclear attack.*

Before that distant millennial day when all the world disarms totally, verifiably, and irrevocably—at least in nuclear weapons—if we should not intend to attack noncombatants, as the letter says, what alternative is there to deter nuclear attack or coercion? Plainly only to be able to aim at the combatants attacking us, or at their equipment, facilities, or direct sources of combat supply. That, however, is what is meant by planning to be able to fight a nuclear war—which the letter rejects.

Perhaps the bishops can work this out in later statements. But a close reading of their changing text, their congressional testimony, and the writings of their associates suggests that this is unlikely. For their struggle with conscience has led them to make only more explicit the widespread confusions and evasions of many secular strategists—including many statesmen, scientists, Senators, editors, and business leaders. Take John Cardinal Krol and Father Brian Hehir, who was staff adviser to the ad-hoc committee drafting the pastoral letter. Cardinal Krol repeated in a sermon at the White House in 1979 what he and his associates had been saying in recent years: in brief, "possession, yes, for deterrence . . . but use, never." It is all right for the United States implicitly to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, but "at the point of such decisions, . . . political and military authorities are responsible to a higher set of values" and so "must reject the actual use of such weapons, whatever the consequences." Any consequence "whatever" includes giving up military resistance. But "the history of certain countries under Communist rule today shows that not only are human means of resistance available and effective but also that human life does not lose all meaning with replacement of one political system by another."

Father Hehir elaborates this view: (A) We should not get or keep an ability to attack combatants. (B) We may maintain an ability to attack noncombatants while waiting for nuclear disarmament, and (C) We may use that ability implicitly (though not explicitly) to threaten retaliation against noncombatants. (D) Indeed, to deter nuclear attack, we must *convince* other nations that our "determination to use nuclear weapons is beyond question." (E) We should never intend to use nuclear weapons. (F) Nor (to make the deception harder) *declare* an intent to use them even in reply to a nuclear attack. (G) We should never actually use them; that is to say, we shouldn't retaliate at all.

Precisely how this volubly revealed deception is to fool allies and adversaries "beyond question" has not itself been revealed. (Future sermons at the White House might have to be classified.) If the bishops could transmit that revelation, it would fortify a good many strategists in our foreign-affairs establishment who want fervently to believe that we can safely deter an adversary solely by threatening the nuclear extermination of his cities while making clear to the entire world that we would never use nuclear weapons at all; and who also want firmly to believe we needn't spend much money on a less reckless defense. In sending that message to Western elites the letter only relays, amplifies, and broadcasts signals our elites have themselves been sending for years. The troubling obscurity of the letter reflects that establishment ambivalence and incoherence. On many matters of technical military and political fact the bishops derive their views not from sacred authority but from a more doubtful range of secular strategists than they realize. Much of the letter, for example, stems from the strategists who hold that defense is offense and that killing people is good and killing weapons bad—the very strategists who would rely exclusively on threatening to destroy cities.

In invoking divine authority to sustain such lay strategies, the bishops' power seems dangerous to many Catholics who disagree. But their moral prestige alone gives weight to the bishops' strategic views with non-Catholics and Catholics. They reinforce the impassioned pacifist and neutralist movements that have been growing in Europe and in the United States, as well as the establishment strategies which helped to generate these protest movements.

For the bishops pass lightly over or further confound many already muddled and controversial questions of fact and policy. In a world where so many intense, deep, and sometimes mutually reinforcing antagonisms divide regional as well as superpowers, are there serious early prospects for negotiating the complete, verifiable, and permanent elimination of nuclear or conventional arms? If antagonists don't agree,

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should we disarm unilaterally? If we keep nuclear arms, how should we use them to deter their use against us or an ally? Might an adversary in some plausible circumstance make a nuclear attack on an element (perhaps a key non-nuclear element) of our military power or that of an ally to whom we have issued a nuclear guarantee? Might such an enemy nuclear attack (for example, one generated in the course of allied conventional resistance to a conventional invasion of NATO's center or of a critical country on NATO's northern or southern flank) have decisive military effects yet restrict side effects enough to leave us, and possibly our ally, a very large stake in avoiding "mutual mass slaughter"? Could some selective but militarily useful Western response to such a restricted nuclear attack destroy substantially fewer innocent bystanders than a direct attack on population centers? Would any discriminate Western response to a restricted nuclear attack—even one in an isolated area on a flank—inevitably (or more likely than not, or just possibly, or with some intermediate probability) lead to the destruction of humanity, or "something little better"? Or at least to an unprecedented catastrophe? Would it be less or more likely than an attack on population to lead to unrestricted attacks on populations? Can we deter a restricted nuclear attack better by threatening an "unlimited," frankly suicidal, and therefore improbable attack on the aggressor's cities, or by a limited but much more probable response suited to the circumstance?

The bishops' authorities slip by or confuse almost all these questions. The bishops sometimes seem only to be saying that the extent of direct collateral harm done by a particular restricted attack is uncertain, quite apart from the possibilities of "escalation." At other times they are certain that restricted attacks will lead to an entirely unrestricted war. And they then suggest that the chance is "so infinitesimal" that any Western nuclear response to a restricted attack would end short of ending humanity itself, that we might better threaten directly to bring on the apocalypse. The bishops cite experts as authority for their judgment that any use whatever of nuclear weapons would with an overwhelming probability lead to unlimited destruction. And some of their experts do seem to say just that. But some they cite appear only to say that we cannot be quite sure (that is, the probability is not equal to one) that any use of nuclear weapons would stay limited. If any response other than our surrender is to be believed, it makes a difference whether we talk of a probability that is not quite zero or a probability that is not quite equal to one that any nuclear response would bring on a suicidally total disaster. Yet two successive paragraphs in the 1982 *Foreign Affairs* article by McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith proposing "no first use" of nuclear weapons, which the bishops cite, assert each of a wide range of such differing possibilities without distinction. Most authorities relied on by the bishops are themselves not very discriminating about which point they are trying to make.

Some important components of conventional military power vulnerable to nuclear attack are close to population centers. Others, however, may be very far from them—for example, naval forces at sea; or satellites in orbit hundreds or even a hundred thousand miles above the earth, that may be expected to perform the essential tasks during a conventional war of reconnaissance, surveillance, navigation, guidance, and communications. These are more vulnerable to nuclear than conventional attack. If we have no way of discouraging a limited nuclear attack except by extracting a promise from an adversary that he will not attack, or by threatening that we will respond to such isolated attacks with a suicidal retaliation on his cities, an adversary might, in the course of a conventional war, chance a small but effective nuclear attack against such isolated military targets. Such an attack would do incomparably less damage to civilians in the West than any of the "limited" attacks discussed by the bishops' authorities. Is it really so evident that a similarly restricted Western nuclear response to such a nuclear attack would be nearly certain to escalate to the end of humanity? Wouldn't a restricted response doing minimal damage to civilians on either side be much less likely to escalate than an attack on cities? And wouldn't the ability to respond in a proportionate way be a better deterrent to an adversary's crossing the gap between nuclear and conventional weapons? The bishops' lay experts tend to see the Soviets as mirror images of themselves, but sometimes diabolize them. They argue as if the Soviets would not continue during a war to have the strongest possible incentives to keep escalation within bounds; and as if the Soviets would love every killing of a Western bystander exactly as much as the West values his survival; as if the Soviet interest were in annihilating rather than dominating Western society.

IN FACT, calculations cited by the bishops' authorities hardly probe the issue as to whether an adversary might use nuclear weapons that would destroy key components of a military force discriminately, leaving us a very large stake in making either a discriminate response or no response at all. The calculations published in 1979 by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), in answer to an inquiry by supporters of MAD on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, deal with hypothetical "small" and supposedly "limited" attacks. However, OTA's "limitations" were not seriously designed to test the feasibility, now or in the future, of destroying military targets and *not* population. One of their "limited" cases involves direct attacks on the populations of Detroit and Leningrad. And OTA's

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most "limited" Soviet attack directed 100 one-megaton nuclear warheads at oil refineries, including some inside Philadelphia and Los Angeles, in order "to inflict as much economic damage as possible" and "without any effort to maximize or *minimize* human casualties" (emphasis added). No one should be surprised that such a "limited" attack might kill about 5 million bystanders; or that a similar attack on Soviet oil refineries might kill 840,000—a result which the influential English military historian, Michael Howard, describes as "little better" than "a genocidal pact" killing up to 160 million in each country and leaving the rest "to envy the dead."

The bishops rely heavily on a three-and-a-half page study embodying the views of fourteen scientists who seem mainly to be specialists in public health. The Papal Academy of Sciences convened this group from several countries, including the Soviet Union, "to examine the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons on the survival and the health of humanity." Like the Physicians for Social Responsibility in this country, the group considers (except for one paragraph) only the effects of intentionally bombing cities. It says that the consequences of such an attack on the survival and health of humanity "appear obvious." Indeed they have always been. That is the principal reason to reject MAD and avoid threatening cities.

The papal study devotes one paragraph to "a nuclear attack directed only at military facilities." Like the pastoral letter, that paragraph assumes that any nuclear attack by an aggressor anywhere or any response by his victim would be directed at *all* the adversary's military facilities, however minor or irrelevant to the immediate outcome of the conflict that generated the use of nuclear weapons. It also assumes there would be no attempt to explode the weapons at altitudes that avoided fallout and no attempt in any other way to confine destruction to targets critical to the conflict's outcome.

But such analyses dodge all the serious issues as to whether an adversary might, in the course of a conventional war, use some nuclear weapons with substantial military effect and yet deliberately leave us and our allies with very strong incentives to avoid mutual mass slaughter; and as to whether we should have no response to such an attack except bringing on the mass slaughter or surrendering; and no better way of deterring it than promising one or the other or even, like the bishops' strategists, *both* of these two incompatible bad alternatives.

Yet the problem of deterring nuclear coercion or attack on an ally will persist. Despite lip-service at Geneva and the United Nations, hardly anyone seriously expects that each and every one of the six or seven or eight nations that have made nuclear explosives will destroy all their nuclear arms irretrievably and verifiably in a future near enough to govern our present actions. (The uncertainty as to the number of *present* nuclear powers suggests some of the difficulty we would have in getting actionable evidence that all of the existing nuclear powers had destroyed all of their weapons.) Nor are all prospective nuclear powers likely or even able to surrender the possibility of making the bomb. Moreover, the harm that these weapons can do is so great that merely reducing them to the numbers talked of by "minimum deterrers," who would use the remainder to threaten the mass slaughter of populations, would not remove and might increase the probability of an enormous catastrophe. And it would not prevent the potent use of threats of mass slaughter for coercing those who have disarmed. Pope John Paul II has observed that "a totally and permanently peaceful human society is unfortunately a utopia"; and that "pacifist declarations" frequently cloak plans for "aggression, domination, and manipulation of others" and could "lead straight to the false peace of totalitarian regimes." (The Pope has known that false peace personally.)

IT HAS been obvious since the 1950's that the West needs to: rely less on threats of nuclear destruction and much more on improving conventional defenses; discourage the spread of nuclear weapons; and continue making nuclear weapons less vulnerable to attack, safer from "accidental" detonation, and more secure against seizure and unauthorized or mistaken use. The Soviet Union has its own reasons, as have we, for undertaking such measures unilaterally, with or without formal agreements or even "understandings." Formal agreements on these matters, in fact, have frequently defeated their overt purpose. Agreements, for example, that were supposed to encourage exclusively peaceful uses and research on nuclear energy have spread plutonium usable in explosives. The bishops call for "strengthening command and control over nuclear weapons" to make them more secure against unauthorized or inadvertent use, but call more strongly for agreement on a freeze—which would halt all current programs to replace aging nuclear weapons with ones that are not only more secure against seizure but safer against accidents, more discriminate, and less susceptible to attack.

What is more, the West has many excellent reasons for reducing the numbers and destructiveness of its nuclear weapons quite apart from any agreement. The indiscriminate destructiveness of the American stockpile (as measured in numbers of megatons) was four times higher in 1960 than in 1980. The number of weapons was one-third higher in 1967. The persistent failure of the bishops and other strategists who make a fetish of bilateral agreements to observe the unilateral decline in destructiveness and numbers in American nuclear stockpiles shows, at the very least, a certain

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lack of seriousness. In any case, if a freeze doesn't stop it from doing so, the U.S. can reduce further and drastically the numbers and destructiveness of its nuclear stockpile by exploiting the improved accuracies possible today. Improved accuracies make feasible greater discrimination as well as effectiveness in the use of nuclear weapons, and they also make possible more extensive replacement of nuclear with conventional weapons.

My own research and that of others has for many years pointed to the need for a much higher priority on improving our ability to hit what we aim at and only what we aim at. That would mean, in particular, that effective conventional weapons could drastically reduce the West's reliance on nuclear force. Moreover, for years now, the thrust of technology, as in the electronics revolution, has been to improve the possibilities of discrimination and control. It can increasingly provide us with just such intelligent choices between using conventional or nuclear weapons, and between killing innocent bystanders with nuclear weapons or attacking means of aggression and domination.

The danger of Soviet aggression is more likely to be lessened by a Western ability to threaten the military means of domination than by a Western ability to threaten bystanders. First, the Soviets value their military power, on the evidence, more than the lives of bystanders. Second, Western non-suicidal threats against legitimate military targets are more credible than threats to bring about the destruction of civil society on both sides. The latter have a negligible likelihood of being carried out by Western leaders, and therefore cannot be relied on to dissuade Soviet intimidation or aggression. Finally, it is even more absurd and dangerous to suppose that the only way to dissuade the U.S. from unleashing aggression is to help the Soviets threaten our civilians by leaving them defenseless and by leaving us no choices other than capitulation or an uncontrollably destructive offense against Soviet cities that would invite the reciprocal destruction of our own civil society.

Only some widely prevalent but shallow evasions and self-befuddlements, and not any deep moral dilemma or basic paradox, force us to threaten the annihilation of civilians in order to prevent nuclear or conventional war. The bishops are clear about rejecting the actual use of nuclear weapons to kill innocents. About *threats* to kill innocents, they are much less clear. Their obscurity mirrors an uneasy area of darkness at the core of establishment views.

II

PRECISELY because the bishops' views do not come from on high but are shared by many in the establishment, and also in the anti-nuclear and pacifist movements that shake the establishment, it is worth looking at their arguments on the morality of nuclear deterrence in the context of changing defense policies. Anti-nuclear arguments proceed from premises about the inevitable dependence of deterrence on threats deliberately or uncontrollably to kill innocents. To some degree, bluffs about bringing on the nuclear apocalypse helped generate the rise of the unilateral nuclear disarmers; and continuing reliance on such bluffs helps to disarm the establishment from answering the unilateral disarmers. The arguments of both undermine deterrence.

Many recent accounts of defense policy in the nuclear age rewrite history to lend an aura of inevitability to the extreme view that we can reliably deter a nuclear attack in any plausible circumstance solely by threats to kill innocents on both sides, threats which we plainly should never and would never carry out. Advocates of that dangerous self-paralyzing bluff claim that this extreme has been the essential base of Western defense policy since Hiroshima. It wasn't at the beginning. Nor was it the meaning of the second-strike theory of deterrence that originated near the start of the 1950's. The second-strike theory did not hold that we had to choose between deterring and being ready and willing to fight if deterrence failed. Americans who oppose unilateral disarmament have never split into a "party of deterrence" as distinct from a "war party" that prefers fighting to deterring a nuclear war. Advocates of MAD suggest as much. But MAD was not declaratory policy before the mid-1960's. And it has never been operational policy. Yet many liberal and conservative critics of the bishops, like the bishops themselves, are under the impression that it always has been. Many believe that MAD has kept the nuclear peace and is therefore necessary, at least as myth. But the evolution of doctrines and policies of deterrence needs to be seen in relation to the changing technologies of discriminateness and control as well as the technologies of nuclear brute force.

Mass Destruction and Initial Doubts about Stability

MANHATTAN PROJECT scientists assumed immediately that the least destructive fission (or atomic) bomb would affect so large an area and the number of such bombs would always be so scarce that they were suited only to attacks on large population centers rather than military forces or war plants directly supporting them. Hence the standard description—weapons of "mass destruction" or "mass slaughter." Worse yet, the atomic scientists thought atomic deterrence extremely unstable. (Leo Szilard, for example, thought in 1945 that the odds for nuclear war in ten years were 9 in 10.) In short, the imminence of total destruction was so probable that nothing less than world government soon and total disarmament would permit survival. It was—in a

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slogan common in 1945 to which Jonathan Schell might now subscribe—"One World or None."

By the time it had become clear that we were not about to get one world, and that atomic weapons could be used effectively and in adequate numbers against military targets, the atomic scientists' movement had come to the view that they should be used *only* against military targets. By then, fusion weapons were in prospect and many of the same scientists assumed, as they had at first about the A-bomb, that the new H-bomb was suited only to destroy population centers and, at that, offered a net advantage over A-bombs only against a few of the largest population centers. Therefore, they opposed the H-bomb and advocated a vast expansion of the A-bomb stockpile to be used in fighting a ground war in Europe, in anti-submarine warfare, in continental defense, and against enemy bomber bases.

In 1952, thoughtful analysts of the implications of thermonuclear weapons like the economist Charles Hitch found that—contrary to many claims—H-bombs were indeed much more effective than A-bombs against military targets and war-supporting industry; but, like the atomic scientists, he was concerned that they raised the gravest problems of *unintended* collateral damage to noncombatants. To reduce civilian casualties one should give priority to targets outside cities and warn urban populations to evacuate. Like the physicists, Hitch considered mainly very large (25-megaton) H-bombs delivered with great inaccuracy, that is, with half the bombs missing by a radius of at least a half-mile and generally by well over a mile. Other writers on the H-bomb at the time, like Bernard Brodie, an international-relations theorist who had once thought A-bombs were suited only to attack whole cities, sometimes agreed with Hitch that H-bombs made restraint essential and that war objectives had to be limited as well; at other times he talked of them as "city busters"; at still other times, he talked about their tactical advantage for use in Europe where they could destroy so large an area as to frustrate dispersion and concealment of ground forces.

Yet, whether one considered H-bombs or A-bombs, the trend in NATO policy—if only to keep defense budgets within domestic political bounds—was to rely increasingly on nuclear weapons in large numbers and to neglect the unintended harm they would do. Churchill, who justified British nuclear weapons in part because they would be able to destroy military targets of special interest to Britain, was so impressed by the destructive side effects of the H-bomb soon to be acquired by both Britain and the U.S., that he talked vividly and hopefully of safety becoming the sturdy child of "terror." The Republicans, coming to power at the end of an unpopular and costly conventional war in Korea, talked of nuclear weapons as simply "modern weapons" which furnished a "bigger bang for a buck." They talked of massive retaliation against lessser threats; and the NATO Military Committee in 1957 formally adopted a strategy of threatening a "full" nuclear response even to a local persisting incursion into NATO territory.

Inevitably, uneasiness about the sturdiness as well as the morality of a balance based on threats of such massive destruction, however unintentional, led many sober critics to propose more limited applications of nuclear force, and especially the use of small nuclear weapons on the battlefield. But it soon became clear that nuclear weapons used on the battlefield in the center of Europe also had drawbacks as a replacement for adequate conventional force. The Carte Blanche exercise in 1955 indicated that the side effects of their early introduction might kill nearly 2 million West Germans and wound many others. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer therefore resisted an increased reliance on nuclear weapons and changed his mind only at the end of 1956, when he saw that a conventional build-up in West Germany would be drastically constrained by domestic political problems in getting eighteen-month terms for army conscripts. After that, the Germans and other West Europeans came more than any American President since 1961 to favor relying on nuclear weapons as a cheap substitute for conventional force.

Operational plans, however, have always differed from the rhetoric of indiscriminate threats. Certainly NATO has never planned to avoid military targets in order deliberately to kill innocents at long or short range. NATO plans have always included various restraints on the size of weapons used against military targets in Eastern as well as Western Europe. Nonetheless the problem of unintended harm to noncombatants on both sides remained and always cast some doubt about the sturdiness of deterrence and especially about the Western will to respond to limited or isolated nuclear attacks against the military forces of an ally. (Where that ally is a country on the northern or southern flanks of Europe, the doubt is most obvious; yet these "flank countries" are at present more endangered and more critical for the Alliance than ever. Doubts have increased, especially about the effectiveness of massive nuclear threats as a substitute for conventional force.)

The Second-Strike Theory

ANOTHER line of research that was pursued intensively in classified form, beginning in 1951, disclosed a different but even more urgent range of problems about the sturdiness of nuclear deterrence. This research, which generated the second-strike theory of deterrence, looked at the vulnerabilities of all the essential elements of strategic nuclear forces under nuclear attack, and the problems these entailed for maintaining a convincing deterrent. These problems

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had been badly neglected in part because the original belief after World War II that nuclear weapons could be used effectively only against cities predisposed political and military leaders, as well as scientists, to overlook the possibility that our own nuclear force might come under attack; also because bombing doctrines during and before World War II had stressed that the chief aim of strategic forces was to destroy the centers of war-supporting industry and not the military forces themselves.

As a result, the force we had planned for the mid- and late-1950's, before the introduction of ballistic missiles, was much more vulnerable than is generally realized even today. That was dangerous in particular because NATO had always counted on the help of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to deter or oppose an invasion of Western Europe and to reduce the intimidating political shadow cast by the possibility that an invasion might grow out of some future crisis. A strategic force, however powerful when left undisturbed to do its work, cannot deter an attack which it is unable itself to survive; and the studies showed that we needed to protect not only the vehicles but all the complex elements of an effective response, including in particular a politically responsible command-and-control. Moreover, preserving control required operating in peacetime in ways that avoid a large risk of lethal "accidents" or even more lethal mistakes in response to false alarms. It excludes, for example, "launching under attack," a euphemism for launching ICBM's on ambiguous electromagnetic signals.

Popularizations of the second-strike theory and some recent academic accounts distort history to make it seem essential deliberately to threaten innocents rather than military forces in order to deter. They frequently identify a second strike with attacks on civilians. In its origins the second-strike theory assumed no such identity. The study that generated the distinction and first specified requirements for a second strike, the Rand Base Study, in which I was engaged between 1951 and 1953 with Fred Hoffman, Harry Rowen, and Robert Lutz, made explicit that it would not deal with how to choose targets, but rather how to choose a protected mode of basing and operating a strategic force that would be best for any of several target systems. It looked at several target sets typical of the time: a quite limited number of key war plants supporting combat; military targets whose destruction might retard the advance of ground forces in Europe; and those that might blunt a continuing enemy strategic attack. It did so in order to show in all cases how best to reduce the vulnerability of our own strategic forces. That was the more important result, but the study also saved 9 billion 1953 dollars, showing that one does not have to aim to destroy cities only, or to destroy cities at all, to avoid "exponential" increases in defense spending, as one implausible rationalization for bombing innocents has it.

The authors' next long study, started at the end of 1953, was about defending a strategic force in the coming ballistic-missile era of reduced warning—then seven years or so off. It paid particular attention to "fail-safe methods" of avoiding war through mistaken responses to ambiguous signals and with the difficult issues of protecting political command-and-control. However, like the Base Study, it dealt only with the urgent problem of choosing responsible ways to protect SAC, not with choice among SAC's targets. Separating targets for SAC never looked harder than in the mid-1950's, since our bombs were then at their most destructive and expected inaccuracies near their anguishing worst. However, in successive later studies of strategic aims, the authors became increasingly clear that to have only the alternative of indiscriminate attack would seriously compromise the credibility that there would be any response at all. The two lines of research, one on targeting and reducing collateral damage and the other on protecting the strategic force, converged. It had become apparent that to have a persuasive deterrent, we had not only to be able to protect command-and-control, but also to have some alternatives which a responsible political leader would be willing to command.

Imprecision and Unintended Harm

THE recognition at the end of 1953 that fusion warheads might be made small enough to be carried in ballistic missiles by the 1960's might have seemed to hold out the prospect for reducing collateral damage somewhat. For these first ballistic-missile warheads were expected to be substantially smaller than the gravity bombs carried in aircraft. (Later Navy SLBM warheads were about the same size as some early A-bombs, 40 kilotons. Even the first SLBM and ICBM warheads were about a half-megaton, much smaller than the H-bombs contemplated in the initial debate.) In fact, however, the prospect of the ballistic missile worsened expectations about collateral damage because the first generation of missiles was expected to be much more inaccurate than aircraft. The median miss distance then expected for the first ballistic missiles was anywhere from two to five miles. A five-mile median radius of inaccuracy meant that half the bombs would strike outside of an 80-square-mile area!

But inaccuracy determines the unintended harm done in destroying a small target more basically than does the explosive yield of individual bombs. It is the lack of technology smart enough, rather than the availability of large brute-force single weapons, that lies at the root of the problem of collateral damage. One makes up for incompetence in aiming by filling an enormous area of uncertainty either with a few large-yield nuclear

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weapons or, as the British did in World War II, with many thousands of small conventional bombs. When the British discovered in June 1941 that only a third of the bomber crews who thought they had bombed the target were within 80 square miles of it, they resorted to huge raids involving thousands of bombers with results that became visible in Hamburg and in Dresden. David Irving's estimate of the dead in Dresden came to 135,000—much more than the official estimates of the Hiroshima dead. A single American conventional raid on Tokyo in March 1945 destroyed an area over three times that destroyed by the Hiroshima bomb (15.8 compared to 4.7 square miles) and nearly nine times that destroyed by the Nagasaki bomb (1.8 square miles). The average area destroyed in 93 conventional attacks against Japanese cities amounted to the same as that in Nagasaki.

During the postwar period the prospects for reducing collateral damage seemed at their worst in the late 1950's when the average explosive yield of a bomb was *ten* times the present level and when anticipated missile inaccuracies were also at their maximum. Some of the most familiar and perverse current views on nuclear deterrence, including those that have shaped the pastoral letter, were formed at that time. Since then, the prospects of hitting only what one is aiming at have changed by several orders of magnitude. That implies improvements in effectiveness against small, hard fixed targets that are in some ways more revolutionary than the transition from conventional to fission explosives or even fusion weapons. The fission and fusion revolutions blasted themselves, so to speak, into public awareness. Revolutionary improvements in our ability to focus destruction on targets alone have proceeded quietly and attracted less public notice and understanding.

The fact is, however, that a tenfold improvement in accuracy is roughly equal in effectiveness to a thousandfold increase in the explosive energy released by a weapon. Improving accuracy by a factor of 100 improves blast effectiveness against a small, hard military target about as much as multiplying the energy released a million times. The fission bomb at Hiroshima released about a thousand times more energy, and a 10-megaton fusion bomb can release a million times more energy, than a 10-ton conventional "block buster." A one-hundredfold improvement in accuracy roughly equals in effectiveness a millionfold increase in the release of destructive energy to enable the blast destruction of a small fixed target.

The Revolution in Precision

But while the improvement in effectiveness may be the same, these two technologies achieve it in essentially different ways. When one improves effectiveness by releasing more destructive energy, there is a corresponding increase in collateral damage. When one improves the ability to destroy a target by increasing one's accuracy, there is a corresponding decrease in collateral damage.

Improvements in guidance using midcourse adjustments have already reduced cruise-missile inaccuracies to 200 feet from the 12,000-30,000-feet average misses expected for ballistic missiles in the late 1950's. That improvement by a factor of 60 to 150 makes feasible radical reductions in collateral damage. Even more important, terminal guidance systems in development now that can be deployed in the late 1980's could further reduce inaccuracies at extended ranges by another order of magnitude. That would permit a conventional weapon to replace nuclear bombs in a wide variety of missions with an essentially equal probability of destroying a fixed military target. It would drastically raise the threshold beyond which one would have to resort to nuclear weapons in order to be effective. It would mean a much smaller likelihood of "escalation" and incomparably smaller side effects.

Destroying ground targets that might decide a conventional conflict could have much more troubling side effects even in relatively isolated areas than the destruction of equally decisive naval forces at sea or key satellites deep in space. Yet the situation has altered greatly here too. Most such land targets are less blast-resistant than ICBM silos. Yet attacking them effectively with the huge inaccuracies expected in the late 1950's would have meant filling an enormous area of uncertainty with destruction. That might typically have subjected an area of 1000 square miles or so to unintended lethal effects. By contrast, a current cruise missile, with midcourse guidance and a small nuclear warhead, could be equally effective against a military target while confining lethal damage to less than one square mile. Most important, improved terminal guidance in the next few years could enable a cruise missile with a suitable *non*-nuclear warhead to destroy a military target and reduce the area of fatal collateral damage to about one-thousandth of a square mile —an enormous contrast with World War II.

Some conservative critics counter the bishops' strictures against a nuclear response to conventional attack by suggesting that any "conventional war in Western Europe would almost certainly mean terror and destruction far in excess of World War II"—with perhaps 100 million dead; that, in short, any conventional conflict in Europe would bring on horrors hardly less terrible than nuclear war. Such expectations lead many Europeans to feel that even a conventional war would destroy Europe and end Western civilization. For the bishops, a policy of No-First-Use follows from the broader nuclear policy of "Use, Never." And both are only part of Cardinal Krol's injunction in his White House sermon against all war. ("No

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more war, war never again.") Through all the political compromises in various drafts, the bishops support conventional alternatives only grudgingly. But estimates of conventional damage by the bishops' critics have even less basis in evidence than those the bishops cite to show that nuclear damage would be unlimited. It is plain that the increasing advances in precision and control can be most fully exploited by suitably designed conventional weapons.

It is essential to emphasize that advances in our ability to reduce collateral damage and increase the effectiveness of conventional weapons do not blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional force. On the contrary, that remains vital. But these revolutionary changes make it much more feasible to avoid crossing the divide between nuclear and conventional weapons. They give us choices.

Discussions of the morality of bombing and deterrence today often proceed as if "the technical realities" foreclose choice (as one eminent physicist, Wolfgang Panofsky, suggests), as if "the mutual hostage relation" were not at all a "consequence of policy and therefore . . . subject to change," but a matter of physics—permanently determined by the technology for releasing nuclear energy. Yet the evolution since the 1950's of technologies other than the release of nuclear energy has altered the possibilities of discrimination and will not excuse us from the responsibility for preparing to keep violence from mounting without bounds.

III

With few exceptions, even the most thoughtful considerations of the morality of nuclear threats have been frozen in the technology of the late 1950's and specifically that of nuclear brute force. This can be shown by referring to the evolution of NATO policy, to the development of technologies of destruction and of discrimination and control, and to a sequence of substantial analyses of the morality and prudence of threats to bomb innocents between the end of the 1950's and the present.

Terror and Technology at the End of the 1950's

Robert W. Tucker's book, *The Just War* (1960), observed that the policy of nuclear deterrence in the 1950's had demonstrated "at least a striking verbal insensitivity" to the consequences of the defensive use of nuclear force. Indeed, "the more extreme versions" were "obsessed" with the idea that the deterrent threat would never have to be carried out and therefore regarded "the effectiveness of deterrence as directly proportionate" to its horrors. If one accepted this extreme, then one had to acknowledge that "in the nuclear age . . . virtually no substantive restraints . . . need to be observed by those waging a defensive war." But Tucker himself leaned toward the extreme, since he thought no restraints would be effective. He was writing when the average destructiveness of our weapons and the expected inaccuracies, and hence the probable unintended harm, were all near their peak.

Indiscriminateness, he suggested, is a " 'necessity' that is inherent in technology." He rejected the position taken by the World Council of Churches in 1958, against "all-out" use of nuclear weapons. As Paul Ramsey observed, Tucker agreed with the pacifists that statecraft in the nuclear age entails using evil means—threats whose execution would inevitably exterminate civilians. He parted company with the pacifists because the pacifists would abandon statecraft. Tucker would rather abandon morality. His concluding paragraph argued: "There is something patently absurd in the complaint that a threat of extermination, even when restricted to preventing one's own annihilation, signifies a moral decline for which there is no explanation other than that men have deliberately chosen to abandon any sense of restraint. If men presently show less restraint in threatening their adversaries, it is largely because they are less secure than in an earlier age." But during the 1950's, doubts grew about the credibility and the political and military implications of threats of extermination and about whether there were no better choices.

The McNamara Doctrine of the First Two Years

The view dominant among the Kennedy administration and its advisers during its first two years embodied the two converging lines of research on the protection of the strategic force and its targeting. It put into effect many of the criticisms of massive retaliation that had accumulated during the 1950's. It stressed the importance of a second-strike capability, including a responsible command-and-control system with its vulnerabilities reduced, for example, by the use of airborne command posts. But it also called for a conventional build-up to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and contemplated the use of nuclear force itself only with discrimination and restraint in the service of political ends. Both conventional and nuclear force, neither of which could substitute for the other, would have to be used in limited ways, if we were to deter aggression, or frustrate it should it occur.

Alain Enthoven defended the continuing relevance of the traditional Christian doctrine of "just war" in the context of the initial Kennedy policy. He explicitly rejected the "realist" and pacifist views of deterrence, both of which assume the incompatibility of morality and statecraft in the nuclear age. We do not, he said, have to choose

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one or the other. The realists would eliminate moral restraints because they believe them impossible or suicidal. The pacifists think that the impossibility of restraint in nuclear war proves what they had believed all along, that the only moral course is to disarm totally, even if unilaterally, and that this would bring universal peace.

Enthoven distinguished his view also from the obsessive extreme which Tucker had in mind—the position known sometimes by the euphemisms "Minimum Deterrence" or "Deterrence Only." Enthoven noted that this view, which had begun to take hold among academics after Sputnik (1957), resembled that of the pacifists in its belief that a lasting peace was feasible in the short term. But Deterrence Only would base stability on threats to respond to an attack on our strategic force by *deliberately* bombing enemy civilians, by avoiding enemy military targets, and by exposing our own civilians to attack. The core of this newer view, as he might have noted, was therefore an antithesis both of pacifist nonviolence and of the Christian and other ethical traditions of humane warfare.

It also differed drastically from preceding U.S. policy. In one sense the new dogma seemed to return to the immediate postwar understanding of nuclear weapons. But the typical view after Hiroshima held that the number of either side's nuclear weapons would be intrinsically so small and the individual bombs so destructive that they could be effective only against large population centers. An aggressor *could* effectively attack only cities. His victims *could* effectively retaliate only against the aggressor's cities. Deterrence Only, on the other hand, accepted the fact that strategic forces *could* bomb military forces, but held that we *should* threaten to respond to a nuclear attack only by bombing cities, and that we *should* leave our own cities undefended. It was remarkable not only for its extreme departure from humane ethics, but also because it represented a 180-degree turn by many of its main proponents, who, for nearly a decade before they adopted this dogma, had proposed using nuclear weapons only against military targets—in continental defense against invading bombers, against ground forces in Europe, and against combat ships at sea—and who had recommended immense deep-shelter programs for civil defense. Deterrence Only was an extreme minority view at the time of Enthoven's writing. After the Cuban missile crisis, it became an established ideology.

It was in a speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan in June 1962 that Robert McNamara made public that, in a nuclear war growing out of a major attack on NATO, our main goal would be to destroy enemy military forces, not civilians. He added that we could reserve enough power to destroy the enemy's society, "if driven to it," and that threat would give him "the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities." (This last resort, which some moralists questioned at the time, I believe was unnecessary: the Soviets have the strongest incentives to preserve their military power.) The part of McNamara's speech about restricting, so far as feasible, the use of strategic forces to military rather than civilian targets, was embedded in statements stressing that American military force was designed only to discourage aggression, not to change the status quo and never to initiate a war; and that the United States was reducing reliance on nuclear weapons in general and wanted to discourage their spread.

Despite these cautions, his speech produced a strikingly negative response from conservatives as well as liberals both here and abroad, and from keepers of the traditional morality of "just war." McNamara's harsh didactic style can hardly explain it. Rather, a certain ambivalence about, if not affection for, nuclear terror had become nearly universal. Franz Josef Strauss, then West German Defense Minister, made clear that he continued to believe that deterrence depended on threatening the immediate use of tactical nuclear weapons at the battle line, to be followed quickly by massive strategic retaliation. Senator Richard Russell and Senator Margaret Chase Smith, Democratic and Republican stalwarts respectively on the Senate Armed Services Committee, denounced McNamara's statement. Some scientists and engineers, who had only recently, in the aftermath of Sputnik, turned to relying on threats to bomb cities and away from advocating the use of nuclear weapons against military forces and from massive continental defense and deep-shelter programs, now pronounced any ability to attack military forces or to defend cities to be "destabilizing." With a rancor suggesting a bad conscience, they said that the very modest Kennedy fallout-shelter program, and the new official focus on military targets rather than massive retaliation, might influence American leaders to initiate preventive nuclear war. This, though members of the administration had abundantly stated the very opposite and had explicitly recognized that any nuclear war would be an "unprecedented catastrophe."

IT WAS plainly silly to suppose that American political leaders would be eager to unleash such an unprecedented catastrophe simply because it might not be total. The reaction was all the more striking since neither these critics nor anyone else had ever suggested that the much more costly and supposedly more effective programs the critics had been backing a few years earlier (for nearly leakproof air defenses, a thick ballistic-missile defense of population as well as of strategic forces, extensive deep shelters for civilians, and the limitation of nuclear weapons to legitimate military targets) would induce American leaders to undertake preventive war. All in

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all, the venomous response, including that of the media, was shallow, partisan, and, not infrequently, in bad faith. Such venom unfortunately continues to poison current debate as to whether there is an alternative to suicide or surrender. It takes great civic courage to sustain that burden and, in the détente that started after the missile crisis, the administration did not show such courage. Nonetheless, every one of the last six Secretaries of Defense has found it essential both to rely less on nuclear weapons and to return to the subject of the limited use of long- as well as short-range nuclear forces against military targets. Much of Paul Ramsey's work on "just war" (brought together in *The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility,* 1968) is related to such a policy.

Ramsey's answer to Tucker states that the conduct of a nuclear war need not—and, if it is to be moral, must not—"violate the moral immunity of noncombatants from direct attack." Any harm to noncombatants should at least be unintended. He implies, moreover, that the conduct of nuclear war should involve a serious effort to minimize such unintended damage. If he had been more aware of the possibilities implicit in the electronic revolution, he might have added that research and development need to aim at improving the ability to discriminate. He insists that attacks should not only attempt to discriminate but that the unintended damage should be proportionate to any good that would come out of the war.

In a chapter on "The Limits of Nuclear War," Ramsey considers what actions in a nuclear war are "undo-able" even if they are "thinkable." He notes that McNamara's announcement at Ann Arbor that our main aim in responding to an attack on the Alliance should be to destroy the enemy's forces, not his civilian population, had occasioned hardly a single amen on either side of the Atlantic. The only responses were stereotyped objections from defense establishments here and abroad, and the same from publications like the *Christian Century,* normally regarded as keepers of such a civilized rule. Ramsey proceeds with a brilliant support of such limitation and with a sympathetic but penetrating critique of Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn, who favored limiting nuclear war, but included under those limits attacks on cities, and who held that it might be rational to threaten such attacks even though it would be irrational to execute them. Limited attacks on military installations and forces are both thinkable and do-able, according to Ramsey; but a direct attack on innocent civilians to achieve some other goal, even a good goal, is wrong. Like art, a political action has consequences beyond itself, but, as Aristotle pointed out, an action is also right or wrong in itself. Attacking innocent civilians is wrong even to accomplish something else. Ramsey rejected the use of threats of even limited city attacks.

Enthoven criticized such threats on the grounds also that they would not be believed; that policies based on "the rationality of irrationality" (on which Father Hehir and the bishops also rely) are not viable in the long run for a democracy, especially one with allies: "Rather, the most credible kind of threat is the threat that we will do what in the event will be most in our interest to do."

According to Michael Walzer, in *Just and Unjust War,* Ramsey relies on unintended "collateral civilian damage from counterforce warfare in its maximum form to deter potential aggressors." Walzer himself believes that to deter one must intentionally or unintentionally threaten to kill innocents. But Ramsey was not referring in that context to deterrence of the initial outbreak of an aggression. He was talking of the possibility that, *during a war waged against military targets on both sides,* both sides might avoid attacking cities and also avoid a maximum counterforce attack—in order to prevent the collateral damage that would ensue from attacking even military targets that are closely co-located with population centers. That is very different from saying that to deter an initial attack one must threaten civilians —even unintentionally. Nor does selectivity in attacks on military targets *during* a war mean threatening civilians, but rather the opposite. Ramsey did sometimes falter by recommending a "studied ambiguity" about our intentions to retaliate in kind to an attack on cities. Michael Novak's answer to the bishops also finds "the best of the ambiguous but morally good options . . . in a combination of counterforce and countervalue deterrence." Yet even he is affected by the insidious semantics of MAD: "countervalue" suggests the Soviets value only bystanders, not military force. But to deter we need rely neither on unintended harm nor on ambiguous intentions.

IV

McNamara, MAD, and MADCAP

One difficulty in getting the evolution straight of both official doctrines and operational policies on nuclear weapons is that the two have often diverged, and the statements of doctrine have often been designed for political combat within domestic bureaucracies rather than potential combat with the Soviets. McNamara in his first two years as Secretary of Defense sought options between suicide and surrender, according to Stewart Alsop, "as Parsifal sought the Grail." Out of office, he has ended ironically by foreclosing all such options. With an intensity that dims his memory as well as his understanding, he doubts that any nuclear response to nuclear attack can limit destruction.

After the missile crisis, McNamara often talked of Assured Destruction—and later Mutual Assured Destruction—as if they were serious operational policies. Neither was. While Secretary, he never abandoned the goal of using strategic forces

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against Soviet military forces or the goal of limiting harm to American civilians. Even as declaratory doctrine he never stated MAD in the unqualified and brutal Orwellian form of the aphorism "killing weapons is bad, killing people is good." When he talked about a capability for assured destruction of 20-25 percent of the Soviet population, he was thinking of deterring the Joint Chiefs of Staff from asking for higher budgets rather than the Soviets from attacking the U.S. It was his way, if not the best way, of winning a budget battle and putting a lower ceiling on the size of our strategic forces. He stressed that we would have the capability for destroying the Soviet population—and he expected that capacity to deter the Soviets; but if deterrence failed, we would use our strategic forces to destroy Soviet forces attacking the United States. Later, when he drifted toward regarding it as desirable for the Soviets to deter us, he was still talking about capabilities.

In short, the form of MAD doctrine he introduced can best be described by the acronym MADCAP rather than MAD. McNamara said we would use a MAD *capability* for deterrence without seriously intending to assure the destruction of enemy noncombatants. Nor was he entirely serious about attacks on combatants. MADCAP did not lead to any persistent thought about how to improve the force to make it increasingly discriminating, and it discouraged thinking about the selection of various theater and other military targets suited to proportionate responses. It led to slowing or stopping various programs that would have increased our ability to discriminate between military and civilian targets. It made us less serious about the problems of nuclear targeting of combatants *or* noncombatants: it avoided some of the obloquy of *seriously* threatening to do the cheap and easy job of killing large "soft" concentrations of civilians without forcing thought about the harder job of carefully selecting and, if necessary, destroying military targets without killing bystanders; or about the hard but feasible and necessary job of keeping violence under control.

The bishops, their defenders, and the strategists on whom they rely all talk of the uncontrollability of nuclear weapons as a deplorable but unavoidable fact of life. However, they make a virtue of this supposed necessity. John Garvey, columnist for the Catholic *Commonweal*, knows that one may not threaten what one does not intend to do, and grants that "if your enemy knows that you will absolutely refuse to use a weapon, what you have is no longer a weapon and is therefore useless"; but he claims that "it would be naive to think that we are so fully in control of ourselves that in the event of an attack we would not say, 'What the hell,' and hit them with everything we've got." Which apparently would give the threat, however immoral, some use as a deterrent.

However, it would be naive or worse to suppose that we cannot impose controls over both initial and subsequent uses of nuclear weapons. "Permissive action links," which we place on all our weapons overseas and which microchips and other electronic advances are constantly improving, can make it essentially infeasible for military commanders to use nuclear weapons without release by a remote political authority. Moreover, if we really thought political authority were reckless, we could make this release mechanism as elaborate as we liked and even divide the releasing codes so that they would require the agreement of many parties. But the processes of consultation in the Alliance are now complex, and would affect not only the initial, but also subsequent releases. It is most unlikely that we would simply say "Whee!" and let everything go. In Europe the problem is quite the opposite. We should not and do not rely on the threat of losing control to deter either nuclear or conventional attack. But MAD and the fictions of uncontrollability it has propagated encourage us to rely on the threat of losing control as a substitute for dealing with the dangers of conventional conflicts. In short, they have led us to be less serious about conventional war as well.

The bishops' strategists, who believe that one can deter even if one is plainly committed never to use nuclear weapons, first, second, or ever, would maintain a capability but never use nuclear weapons at all. McNamara, when he changed from the doctrine of his first two years to talk of capabilities for mutual assured destruction, said he would maintain the capability to kill Russian civilians but would actually use nuclear weapons against certain military targets. That's rather different. Nonetheless it was a long step on the way to the present absurdities and evasions of the moral and prudential problems of discouraging a nuclear attack on the U.S. or one of its allies. Or a conventional attack.

Soviet Values and MAD Nuclear Threats to Deter Conventional Attack

MICHAEL WALZER writes perceptively about the use of terror by guerrillas to provoke counterterror against innocents. But when it comes to nuclear weapons, he accepts the MAD stereotype about the use of threats of terror against innocents to deter attack. He doesn't question the technical determinism of the nuclear technologists that limiting harm to civilians on either side is impossible. He advances comfortably the familiar paradox about "the monstrous immorality that our policy contemplates" but thinks it inevitable. "The unavoidable truth is that all of these policies rest ultimately on immoral threats." Like Tucker, Walzer is unwilling to give up immoral threats because he thinks they are necessary for deterrence. Here he rests on the baseless judgment that the *only*

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thing that will deter Soviet aggression is the prospect that Russian bystanders will be killed.

To reject that view one need not assume that Soviet values are the same as our own; nor that the Soviets are simply monsters who don't care or even like to see civilians killed. We need only observe that the Soviets value military power and the means of domination at least as much and possibly more than the lives of Russian civilians. This is surely evidenced by a long history documented by careful scholars like Adam Ulam, Robert Conquest, Nikolai Tolstoy, and many others, in which the Soviets have sacrificed civilian lives for the sake of Soviet power. Their collectivization program in the 1920's gained control over the peasants at the expense of slaughtering some 12-15 million of them. (Stalin told Churchill that the great bulk of 10 million kulaks had to be wiped out or transferred to Siberia.) The Soviet government sharply increased grain exports during the famine year of 1933, when 5 million Ukrainian peasants were dying. If Robert Conquest is right, the Great Purge of the late 1930's killed several million more Soviet citizens. If Nikolai Tolstoy is right, Stalin and the NKVD were responsible for more than half of the 20-30 million deaths suffered by the Soviets during World War II. Soviet refusal to abide by the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War doomed many additional Soviet as well as German prisoners.

Whatever else one may say of these actions, they do not suggest that Soviet leaders value the life of Russian citizens above political and military power. If the West responded to Soviet military attack by destroying military targets, it would affect something on which Soviet leaders continue to lavish a huge part of their painfully scarce resources and which they appear to cherish quite as much as they do Russian citizens; and the prospects of such a Western response would be the best deterrent to their initiating war. Moreover, continued attacks during a war on elements of their military power and means of domination would appear to be the best way to bring the war to a rapid close. Prudence does not force us to rely for deterrence on even *unintended* damage done to civilians. Discrimination remains an important goal during the war—and an important capability to achieve in advance of the war. It helps deter the war or bring it to an end.

But Walzer believes that "counterpopulation deterrence" is basic. He also believes it is perfectly effective. It "rules out" (i.e., makes so unlikely as to be negligible) any nuclear war between the great powers; even though the Soviets know we believe that nuclear attacks on populations would be suicidal, our threat would be sure to deter them. And, typical of his time, he is also quite comfortable about the effectiveness of counterpopulation deterrence for forestalling a conventional invasion. His complacency here parallels that expressed in various British and American magisterial writings of the late 1960's and 1970's. He quotes with approval a passage from Bernard Brodie: "The spectacle of a large Soviet field army crashing across the line into Western Europe in the hope and expectation that nuclear weapons would not be used against it—thereby putting itself and the USSR totally at risk while leaving the choice of weapons to us—would seem to be hardly worth a second thought. . . ." One may surmise that if Brodie were alive he would be having second thoughts. Many who wrote that way in the late 1960's and 1970's are less comfortable today, in particular about threatening mutual annihilation as a way of deterring a conventional attack on Western Europe.

McGeorge Bundy illustrates the change in the American establishment. He had chided Henry Kissinger for expressing public doubts on the credibility of American strategy for the protection of West Europe at Brussels in 1979. "American strategy for the protection of West Europe," he was satisfied, was "a classic case of doctrinal confusion and pragmatic success." (He inserted the two words "so far," suggesting he was not completely satisfied.) I cautioned at the time that it would be a great mistake to attribute the pragmatic success to the doctrinal confusion; and Bundy did not disagree. The protest movements in Europe were already visible, for one thing; for another, there were the Soviets, and they might not be confused just because we were. We cannot count on a Mutual Assured Confusion. In any case, Bundy, less confident now about MAD threats to deter conventional invasion, has joined Robert McNamara, George Kennan, and Gerard Smith in proposing that we exchange pledges with the Soviets that neither would be the first to use nuclear weapons. The four stress the No-First-Use pledge much more than any serious and extensive program to improve the size or quality of NATO conventional forces, so that NATO could depend less on nuclear threats to overcome Soviet advantages in the use of conventional force. These advantages have to do not only with the massive and increasing size and quality of the Soviet force, but with the Soviets' geographical position and their relatively improving access to air space and bases near critical areas. Japan and Korea as well as all our European allies are within immediate range of Soviet, but far from the center of American, conventional power. So is Persian Gulf oil on which they all have come to depend.

Indeed, it seems that Bundy and his three coauthors have not really abandoned an implicit threat of the first use of nuclear weapons to make up for our conventional disadvantage. For while the four may *mean* the Western pledge, they rely on the Soviets not trusting us to live up to our pledge and so continuing to keep their ground forces dispersed and less effective for conventional attack and defense. In short, the policy they ad-

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vocate resembles the pastoral letter in *explicitly* abandoning a nuclear threat, while implicitly continuing to rely on it. In their case, the threat is implicit in NATO's continued capability to use nuclear weapons first. If their policy led each side to believe the *other's* pledge, the Soviet Union would be more likely to concentrate its conventional force effectively—and safely since, on their recommendation, we would keep our pledge. On the other hand, if we trusted the Soviet pledge, we might concentrate our defenses at the likely points of attack. That would *not* be safe since NATO has no way of enforcing such a Soviet pledge. It seems that the four want neither side to believe the other's pledge. In sum, recommendations for exchanging unenforceable pledges about the first use of nuclear weapons in Europe do not reduce the doctrinal confusion that has been troubling NATO even on the subject of nuclear deterrence of conventional attack. They only alarm West European leaders who continue to rely excessively on nuclear weapons.

Many have observed that the four are rather perfunctory about a program to improve NATO conventional forces—in size, quality, method of deployment, or strategy—which would make it less necessary for European leaders to rely on nuclear weapons by making it more likely we could defeat by conventional means any of several plausible Soviet conventional attacks. They do talk of "maintaining and improving the specifically American conventional forces in Europe" but claim, in the face of much evidence of an unanticipated worsening in our ability to defend Europe's interests in more than one critical area near the Soviet periphery, that we tend to exaggerate Soviet relative conventional strength. And they say we underestimate "Soviet awareness of the enormous costs and risks of any form of aggression against NATO"—which is to rely covertly on the threat of first use of nuclear weapons that they overtly abjure.

RECENTLY Bundy and McNamara have joined Cyrus Vance and Elmo Zumwalt in a letter to the Congressional Budget Committees calling for large cuts in the administration's FY '84–FY '89 defense budget—with two-thirds of the dollars cut coming out of conventional programs. Like some drafts of the pastoral letter warning that an "upward spiral even in conventional arms may lead to war," and saying that "We do not in any way want to . . . [make] 'the world safe for conventional war,' which introduces its own horrors," their budget letter warns of the dangers of "spurring the arms race." What is more, the conventional arms cuts it recommends are squarely incompatible with reduced reliance on the early first use of nuclear weapons or indeed with any coherent view of potential critical conventional conflicts. It plans for only a short conventional war, cutting in half the program for increasing the number of days of stocks of "modern conventional munitions" in Europe. But it would cancel the C-5B program for rapid airlift and depend much more on the comparatively slow sealift that would be important in a long conventional war. It would focus the Navy largely on the defense of the sealines of communication in the North Atlantic, yet drastically cut Navy programs important for defending these sealines, such as those permitting long-range precise conventional attacks on the Soviet naval air bases from which Backfire bombers could menace both the sealines and ships defending them.

I do not doubt the earnestness of the authors' desire for a more than nominal decrease in NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. I can testify that Robert McNamara's interest goes back at least twenty-two years. I was his representative on the Acheson Committee which drafted the National Security Council decision formally to end the U.S. policy of massive retaliation in the spring of 1961. That decision called for raising the nuclear threshold by preparing a capability to defeat at its own level all but a very massive conventional attack; and the use of nuclear weapons only if our increased conventional force did not suffice. But as the stormy reaction to the McNamara doctrine of his first two years indicated, NATO's threats of first use showed its reluctance to spend the resources needed for an adequate conventional defense rather than any convincing willingness actually to use nuclear weapons quickly or at all. Moreover, though McNamara doubted the utility of battlefield nuclear weapons, to quiet the political storm he did not resist sending several thousand more tactical nuclear weapons to Europe, making a stockpile there of 7,000. And contrary to his recent memory, he increased our total stock of nuclear weapons until it reached its peak in his last year as Secretary. When six years after the Acheson Report the Europeans did agree to "flexible response," it was a grudging compromise—agreeing on the need for improved conventional forces but insisting that the main defense would be nuclear. That tended to undercut the seriousness with which they or we attended to the problem of improving NATO's conventional ability to defend itself against conventional attack.

Carl Kaysen, McGeorge Bundy's former deputy as National Security Adviser, in his influential contribution to the 1968 Brookings study, *Agenda for the Nation*, contemplated a No-First-Use pledge, but also called for large cuts in defense including the halving of U.S. ground forces in Germany. Senator Mark Hatfield and Senator William Proxmire, eager to freeze nuclear weapons then as now, led the battle to cut conventional arms. All that may seem bizarre, but it is not. The wave of "study groups" that deplored "exaggerations" of the Soviet build-up and the supposed spiraling of U.S. strategic budgets that forced the Soviets unwillingly to follow our lead,

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continued to set national priorities toward more social spending. But not much social spending could be got out of strategic budgets. They had been spiraling not up but down at 8 percent a year. By the early 1970's, they were less than 1 percent of GNP, and by FY '76, less than one-half of 1 percent. The Soviet deployment of ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy and medium bombers averaged twice as great as the "greater-than-expected" threat predicted by Defense Secretaries for ten years starting with Secretary McNamara. Now, once more with program cuts in mind, the Bundy *et al.* budget letter talks of "greater-than-expected" threats and, like the bishops, resurrects the old apparition of our spurring an arms race by doing too much.

From the beginning of the 1960's to the late 1970's, the U.S. and all its major allies, while prattling about a U.S.-driven arms race, halved defense budgets in percent of GNP, while the Soviets steadily spent more in real terms for conventional as well as nuclear forces. As a result, NATO found itself continuing to rely on the early and first use of nuclear weapons, while the "correlation of forces" was changing so as to make that less convincing than ever before.

If the anti-nuclear movement in West Europe has served any useful function at all, it has done so by making responsible West Europeans more aware of the recklessness of depending on apocalyptic nuclear threats to meet conventional attacks. And given Europe's economic problems, key Western leaders are forced to think not merely of multiplying brute numbers but also of exploiting the new intelligent technologies to increase the effectiveness of the resources used. Such an effort has been hampered up to now by a kind of Luddite and moralistic resistance to qualitative improvement and by a particular antipathy to technologies that improve the possibility of discrimination and choice.

Moralists who have chosen to emphasize the shallow paradoxes associated with deterrence by immoral threats against population have been at their worst when they have opposed any attempts to improve the capability to attack targets precisely and discriminately. While they have thought of themselves as aiming their opposition at the dangers of bringing on nuclear mass destruction, they have often stopped research and engineering on ways to destroy military targets without mass destruction; and they have done collateral damage to the development of precise, long-range conventional weapons. (Junior Congressmen like Thomas Downey and Edward Markey, who had their fun with talk of *Star Wars* in March, might have benefited from observing that Luke Skywalker used one accurately placed weapon to destroy the indiscriminately destructive Death Star. And with advanced terminal guidance we need not rely on "The Force.") They have tried to stop, and have slowed, the development of technologies which can free us from the loose and wishful paradoxes involved in efforts to save the peace with unstable threats to terrorize our own as well as adversary civilians.

The events leading to the destruction of German and Japanese cities in World War II offer parallels. British scientists, when the menace of Hitler overcame their natural distaste for arms research, formed a Committee for the Scientific Study of Air Defense which backed Watson Watts's development of radar for the defense of Britain. Their distaste was not overcome enough for them to support as energetically the Committee for the Scientific Study of Air Offense, whose work was quite desultory. The lag in developing radar for navigation and bombing, however, did not prevent the bombing of German targets. It only assured that the raids would destroy more German civilians. Some blame lies with the Royal Air Force's failure to improve accuracy in the period between the wars. Marshall Trenchard, relying on the special experience of strategic bombing in clear weather against undefended targets in Iraq, thought British accuracy in general excellent. In 1928 he argued, "What is illegitimate, as being contrary to the dictates of humanity, is the indiscriminate bombing of a city for the sole purpose of terrorizing the civilian population." Citing the draft code of rules for air war drawn up at the Hague in 1922-23, he held that air attacks were legitimate—"provided all reasonable care is taken to confine the scope of the bombing to the military objective. . . ." But he hardly took reasonable care to improve discriminateness *before* the war. (A minor fault, compared to that of religious strategists who testified to Congress *against* "targeting systems that minimize collateral damage to civilian life" and against any defense of U.S. civilians.) Trenchard's opposite numbers in the British Army and Navy had doubted that the state of accuracy in 1928 would permit either the effectiveness or the discrimination that Trenchard claimed. During World War II, when he found how poor its aim was, Trenchard advised that if Bomber Command missed its intended targets it would still kill Germans and so do good work.

Declaratory doctrine for the American defense of Europe started in the 1950's with the belief that strategic and tactical nuclear weapons could replace the conventional firepower which our NATO allies hesitated to supply against conventional invasion. It went through a phase in which many of the present advocates of MAD entertained exaggerated hopes for limiting the harm done by the large-scale use of tactical nuclear weapons on European battlefields; and for using massive active and civil defense, limiting to quite small amounts the damage done by a large raid on U.S. cities. When their hopes began to seem excessive, they switched to the view that the *threat* of unlimited mutual destruction was actually good,

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since it was nearly sure to deter even a conventional invasion. The last year or two have seen signs of a renewed serious interest in improving NATO's ability to meet a conventional invasion in Europe on its own terms. Manfred Woerner, the current Minister of Defense in the German Federal Republic, has set forth a program which is designed not only to discourage a Soviet conventional invasion, but to do it responsibly in a way that will also put to rest the growing West German anti-nuclear movement. He would exploit the advanced technologies that are coming to be available for that purpose.

Woerner's view stands in contrast to that of his predecessor, who held that even a conventional war in Europe would be "the end of Europe," and that it was essential that tactical nuclear weapons be used quickly but only as a link to the "intercontinental exchange"—which would be "the end of the world." But anyone who relies on such threats to deter a conventional attack is likely to threaten up to the last minute and then, when it would have become clear that the Soviets did not believe that NATO leaders would consciously bring on the end of Europe and then the end of the world, rush to reassure the Soviets that they did not really mean to execute the "threat." Such a policy, Herman Kahn accurately labeled "preemptive surrender." It differs from the policy advocated by West Germany's party of the Greens in the anti-nuclear movement who would make their accommodation with the Soviets now, in time of peace, safely in advance of a threatened Soviet attack. Pierre Hassner has characterized the difference between the leaders of the anti-nuclear movement and some leading figures in the West European establishment who rely on suicidal threats: it is the difference between "preventive surrender" and "preemptive surrender."

V

Deterring Nuclear Attack on an Ally

BUNDY, McNamara, Kennan, and Smith have lost their faith in suicidal threats as a way of deterring a conventional invasion. They believe in the necessity and adequacy of such threats to deter nuclear attacks. However, a hope that an adversary can be safely deterred by our threat to blow him up along with ourselves, is unfounded not only for a conventional attack but also for a *nuclear* attack on the ally.

Consider a strategically placed ally like Norway with an American nuclear guarantee and no nuclear weapons of its own. How would a capability to destroy Soviet civilians, along with American civilians and possibly the civilization of Europe itself, discourage Soviet use of nuclear weapons against military targets in the course of an attack aimed at seizing the sparsely populated but strategic northernmost counties of Norway? No one —no Norwegian, no American leader, and no Soviet leader—would seriously expect us to respond to such an attack by consciously initiating the killing of 100 million or so innocent Soviet civilians and a corresponding number of Americans and/or West Europeans. That is one reason why some believers in MAD are explicitly *for* threats and *against* their execution. But a capability which plainly will never be used to initiate a chain of events we believe would lead to the end of civilization will terrify an adversary no more than a capability that would destroy half, or a tenth, or a millionth the number of civilians, or no civilians at all. The only way weapons can inspire concern is by the likelihood that they will be used. The residual fear that the West might deliberately blow up the world tends to terrify some in our own elites much more than the Soviets who chatter less on this subject.

The Incoherence of "Deterrence Only" Even for Deterring Nuclear Attack on Oneself

DOGMAS of "Minimum Deterrence" and "Deterrence Only" had their origins in the late 1950's in the writings of General Pierre Gallois. Gallois believed that nuclear weapons spelled the end of alliance: no nuclear guarantee to a non-nuclear ally was credible since no nation would commit suicide for another. His version of Minimum Deterrence formed the center of his justification for the spread of nuclear weapons to any nation, even very small ones that wanted protection against nuclear attack or coercion. Initial American variants of the Minimum-Deterrence doctrine in 1958 cited some of Gallois's principal arguments and the calculations he had designed in order to prove the necessity for targeting cities rather than opposing military forces; and some 1958 American writings on Minimum Deterrence recommended distributing Polaris submarines to NATO allies to replace the American guarantee. However, the incoherence of the Deterrence Only view is thorough and applies to deterring an attack on oneself. If it is true that a nation will not commit suicide for another, neither can it commit suicide to assure its own survival. Suicidal threats are *in general* not a reliable means of dissuasion.

Yet the total separation of threat from any possibility of execution has been common in establishments abroad as well as here, even among those who would maintain the Alliance. A former associate director of that pillar of the European establishment, the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), talked in much the way Father Hehir does. Father Hehir holds that nuclear weapons exist "to be not used; their purpose is to threaten, not to strike." Ian Smart then of IISS has said that "nuclear weapons are exclusively destined to deter" and suggested that only certain misguided American hawks view them "as reasonable and

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effective" for fighting. An instrument that destiny or purpose plainly made unreasonable and ineffective for actual use, and thus sure to remain unused, could hardly deter. It would make war more likely, not less.

William O'Brien's 1981 book, *The Conduct of Just and Limited War*, while a painstakingly honest and informed inquiry into the circumstances in which war is justified and into its discriminate and proportionate conduct in a wide range of historical conflicts, is less incisive on MAD. He gives a little credence to the possibility that at least a one-sided abandonment of the threat against innocents might be destabilizing, and, though he is aware of the possibilities, he appears to underestimate the actual progress in technologies that gives us a choice between destroying military targets and destroying innocents. However, he is right on the mark in his more recent writings answering the Deterrence Only version of the pastoral letter proposed by Father Hehir and the Jesuit Father Francis Winters.

O'Brien is blunt about the insanity of deception labeling itself deception, as does the doctrine of Deterrence Only. Father Winters has an enthusiastic explication of the pastoral letter as opting "with notable casuistic ingenuity for possession of the strategic arsenal along with renunciation of the intention to employ it." O'Brien responds that, "given the centrality of credibility to deterrence . . . this proposition is insane. What is needed is not casuistic ingenuity, but a serious commitment to face the dilemmas of nuclear deterrence without recourse to escapist diversions."

As for Father Hehir, he is aware of but troubled by the fact that some nuclear weapons are less destructive than some conventional ones. He has argued on the basis of "psychological criteria" that we may continue to threaten to use nuclear weapons but should ban their actual use because he wants to solidify in our minds the dangers of crossing the gap between conventional and nuclear weapons. He wants to set up a psychological barrier against *our* ever using them. Unfortunately, like the lay strategists who are his model, he is less concerned to set up a psychological barrier against the use of nuclear weapons by our *adversaries*. Assuring them that we would never use nuclear weapons, even in response to a nuclear attack, cancels the deterrent and, for them, opens up a psychological expressway.

One can see why "casuistry," which once meant dealing with cases of conscience and the resolution of questions of right or wrong in conduct, acquired a bad name and came to refer to the trivial and false application of moral principles to make things seem like their opposite. The upholders of the bishops' doctrine of "Use, Never" (i.e., No Use—First-Second-Or Ever) seem unaware that an adversary might be concerned not only about the magnitude of the harm we threaten but about the likelihood that we will inflict it.

However, it is a familiar fact of everyday life that we consider implicitly in our behavior not only the size of the assorted catastrophes we might conceivably face when we get up each morning but also their likelihood. Blizzards in August might find us peculiarly unequipped to survive them. So also sunstroke in December. Neither bothers us much, nor leads us to wear furs in summer and carry parasols in winter. Even when we face adversaries and not merely environmental dangers, we have a way of arraying threats according to the probability that they will be carried out and not only in terms of the damage they would do if they were. When a threatener can execute a terrible threat to us with little harm to himself, we worry more than when he would suffer at least as much as we would. Moreover, when a threatener, who expects to destroy himself and his allies along with the aggressor, says that he has no intention whatsoever and, in fact, would regard it as immoral to execute his threat, this can only be reassuring to a potential aggressor. It is an invitation rather than a deterrent. Somehow it does not occur to those who hope to deter by a suicidal threat (which they loudly proclaim they will never execute) that they may be doing the opposite of deterring. Their policy is—to use that dread catchword—"destabilizing."

Soviet leaders who were not deterred by a threat they knew would never be executed would not, as Cardinal Krol suggests, have to be insane. It seems more nearly insane, as O'Brien says, to hold that in all circumstances, even during a stalled conventional invasion when all alternatives looked risky to them, the Soviets would be deterred "beyond question" from using nuclear weapons by our self-confessed suicidal bluff. Nonetheless, the doctrine of "Use, Never" advanced by the bishops merely makes more explicit the operational meaning of secular strategies of Deterrence Only. The Stanford physicist, Sidney Drell, recently has repeated the standard jumble about deterrence and fighting: instead of observing that our *threat* to fight back will dissuade an opponent only if he thinks we are able and if necesary willing to fight back, Drell says deterring and fighting are incompatible goals.

Deterrence Only focuses on deterring Western responses rather than Soviet attacks. It assumes that it is really the West, and especially the United States, in its misunderstanding of the Soviets, that menaces the nuclear peace and not the Soviets. This is an assumption widely held, even by those who oppose the disarmers. Michael Howard of Oxford tells us that the Soviets are entirely satisfied with the present division of Europe and that only Western extremists are not. He grants that the Soviets would revise the rest of the world, but doesn't notice that in that process they might effectively alter the division of power within West Europe too. It would be hard for the

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Soviet Union to avoid altering the division of power in Europe, even if unintentionally, if it seized some future opportunity to satisfy its long expressed interest in expanding toward the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean. (England is said to have acquired its empire in a fit of absentmindedness.) Moreover, from the Soviet point of view, the destruction of the Western alliance that would result would surely be a bonus in defense of Soviet Western borders. George Kennan draws rather more satisfaction than is warranted from Soviet paranoid defensiveness. Paranoids can be dangerous.

But Michael Howard isn't terribly worried about the Soviets beginning a war. He worries about Americans. Though he has been subject to attack by E.P. Thompson and the nuclear disarmers, he sometimes sounds a little like them. He says: "Whether I could encounter the same phenomenon in the Soviet Union, I do not know. But wars begin in the minds of men, and in many American minds the flames of war seem already to have taken a very firm hold." And: "When I hear some of my American friends speak of that country [the Soviet Union], when I note how their eyes glaze over, their voices drop an octave, and they grind out the words *'the Soviets'* in tones of gravelly hatred, I become really frightened; far more frightened than I am by the nuclear arsenals themselves or the various proposals for their use." I know some of Howard's American friends (indeed have counted myself as one), but none resembling that description. If such glazed-eyed monsters controlled the U.S. arsenal, instead of planning proportionate Western responses that might credibly discourage Soviet attack, the West might focus its attention entirely on stopping us and let the credibility of U.S. guarantees erode.

Unfortunately, the reactions to the President's speech of March 23 on protecting civilians showed that the view of some Americans, indeed of some former Cabinet officers firmly attached to MAD doctrine, resembles that of Michael Howard. These Americans, like their British counterparts, may deplore the "oversimple" view of Soviet leaders which they attribute to American "hawks." But when seized by MAD dogmas their view of U.S. leaders is more outrageously simple. They suppose American leaders to be so wantonly unconcerned about the unprecedented catastrophe of nuclear war that they are very likely to start one in any grave crisis. Anyone professing to believe that finds it even easier to believe that an American President would casually unleash nuclear war if he thought that American civil society had some substantial protection. But it is absurd to think that American *or Soviet* leaders are straining at the nuclear leash.

FORMER Defense Secretary Harold Brown answered the President with a variant of the fantasy that American hawks are likely to unleash nuclear war if they think the U.S. has a fair chance of coming out gravely but not totally ruined. The bishops cite him in support of their view that there is "an overwhelming probability that a nuclear exchange would have no limits." While in office, Brown was torn between, on the one hand, the view forced upon him by evidence that Soviet arms had been going up while ours went down and, on the other hand, the view that *both* superpowers are engaged in a spiraling buildup incapable of yielding either side the ability to fight, to coerce, or even to gain some political advantage. Thus "the Soviets have as great an interest and should have as great an interest in strategic arms limitations as we do." And he oscillated between the MAD dogma that all either side needs is to be able to destroy the other as a "functioning modern society"—an implicit pact for mutual suicide—and the recognition embodied in Presidential Directive 59 that the Soviets have made no such pact and shown no desire to make any possible Soviet attack an act of suicide. Like Hamlet (and McNamara) he is "but MAD north-northwest; when the wind is southerly, he knows a hawk from a handsaw." But now the political winds blow more from the north and Brown's American leaders are amazingly susceptible to clever briefers:

> Deterrence must leave no doubt that an all-out nuclear war would destroy the nation—and the leadership—that launched it. Realistically we must contemplate deployments by both superpowers, investing huge amounts in such defensive systems. If a clever military briefer, in a time of grave crisis, with such systems in place, can persuade the political decision-makers that the defensive systems, operating together with other strategic forces, had a reasonable chance to function well enough to result in even a severely damaged "victor," the scene will have been set for the ultimate disaster.

One might suppose that leaders on either side might be given pause if they thought that *they* would be completely destroyed even if the nation were not. But evidently the American leaders Brown contemplates wouldn't mind that and would be easily swayed by a military briefer who told them that the nation would have a reasonable chance of coming out only "severely damaged."

The United States could have launched a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union during any of several crises that came up while we had nuclear weapons and they did not. For example, we had 50 nuclear weapons and they had none in 1948 at the time of the Berlin crisis. It would not have taken a very clever military briefer to convince our leadership that the United States would not be destroyed by a nuclear attack in 1948. Yet since McNamara introduced the notion that it was very important for the U.S. that the Soviets be able to threaten the U.S. with annihilation of

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its cities, the absurdities implicit in MAD have become gospel even with intelligent men like Harold Brown.

The United States never seriously considered an attack on the Soviets when it had a nuclear monopoly; nor for many years after, while Soviet nuclear forces were extremely vulnerable. The idea that it would launch nuclear aggression now is a fantasy worthy only of the conspiracy theorists in the disarmament movement. Nor should we take seriously the idea that the Soviets tremble in fear that the United States might launch a nuclear attack simply because it had deployed some defense of innocent bystanders.

Many analyses in the 1960's related the use of our strategic forces to the objective of limiting harm done to ourselves and our allies in case deterrence should fail; and they related deterring an adversary to the ability to harm him *if* we responded. McNamara's Annual Posture Statements after the missile crisis, for example, tended to treat these two aims as independent. However, the separation misconstrues the problem of deterring. In a war, when all alternatives may be extremely risky to an adversary, we may not convince him that the alternative of nuclear attack is riskier than the others if we have persuaded him also that it can be done safely because we won't retaliate for fear of the unlimited harm we would bring on ourselves. We only complete the absurdity and undermining of deterrence when we *say* that we have no intention to fight, that is, to use nuclear weapons if deterrence fails. Unfortunately, the principle of deterrence and the principle of "Use, Never" mutually annihilate each other.

VI

Declaring—or telling oneself—that one does not really mean to use nuclear weapons if deterrence fails is one way of stilling uneasiness about threatening to kill innocents in order to deter. Another standard way of softening guilt is to say that the West should continue to raise such a threat even implicitly only if it is making serious progress toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons. That, however, does not lie solely within the West's power. It depends on others who have or may acquire nuclear weapons, and in particular it depends on the disposition of the deeply suspicious, hostile leadership of the Soviet Union.

For a brief time in the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima, some Western leaders talked fervently about world government and the need to sacrifice national sovereignties to assure world peace. British Prime Minister Clement Attlee invoked "an act of faith" by the United States, the United Kingdom, and other nations, and "a new valuation of what are called national interests." Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson "spoke continuously about a way to use nuclear energy for other things 'than killing people' " and of "the changed relation of man to his universe." It is easy to understand and sympathize with their initial emotional reaction to the enormous destruction released at Hiroshima and to feel their disappointment as Soviet behavior made evident that such hopes were utopian. But thirty-eight years later, the utopian hopes expressed by Jonathan Schell and others are more obviously groundless. Since then, Soviet behavior has made clear many times that Soviet versions of utopia differ from our own. The Soviets see the lasting independence of Western democracies side by side with their own system as a permanent danger to its maintenance, not to say its expansion toward an international utopia. Meanwhile, there is little evidence that some plausible arrangement would lead them to surrender so powerful an instrument of coercion or defense. That, after all, was indicated in their rejection of the Baruch-Acheson-Lilienthal plan for international control of atomic energy. Stalin exhibited none of the anguish sincerely felt by Western leaders and none of their momentary hopes for a world authority governing Communist and non-Communist nations side by side. The contrast of his private view with that of Western leadership is illustrated by the accounts of such privileged and reliable witnesses as Milovan Djilas: "He spoke of the A-bomb, 'That is a powerful thing, pow-er-ful!' His expression was full of admiration. . . ."

Nor have Soviet leaders since Stalin shown any lesser awareness of the value of nuclear weapons as an implicit or explicit means of intimidation in a hostile world they do not dominate. Their value is only enhanced by the contrasting Western scruples on the same subject. If Western political as well as religious leaders take Western possession of nuclear weapons as justified only if there is progress toward agreement with the Russians to eliminate them altogether, they place in Soviet hands the decision as to whether the West will continue to maintain a nuclear deterrent.

Not all differences are negotiable. Pretending that they are suggests a willingness to disarm unilaterally—either because the Soviets prevent agreement or because they agree only to a disarmament which would be purely nominal for them but real for the West. The Greens in West Germany look forward to the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their immediate withdrawal from Eastern and Western Europe. They are not noted for their realism. However, they reject Reagan's zero option for intermediate nuclear forces in Europe as "unrealistic," even though it would seem to be a substantial step on the way to their own goal. Petra Kelly and Manon Maren-Griesbach, two of their principal leaders, explain that the zero option is "unrealistic" because the Russians would never agree to it. It is therefore "not even an honest step toward arms reduction." But the inconsistency of the Greens and their willingness to

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see the West accommodate to an unwavering Soviet aim to increase Soviet advantage does not differ substantially from many in the West who complain that the American government has not been able to convince the *Soviets* that we are sincere.

Paul Ramsey has understood very well what was involved in Western tendencies to take agreement with adversaries as an absolute essential. He questions the "omnicompetence of negotiation" and observes about some statements in *Pacem in Terris* that there can be hope in negotiations only if these proceed "from inner conviction" that, if such statements mean that "the way to conduct negotiations is not to permit them to fail," then for any single nation to adopt that way of negotiating would mean "its premature surrender. . . . It takes two to negotiate in any such fashion."

THE view of the present administration on this subject is, at best, mixed and sometimes lacks conviction. The President has said "it takes two to tango." But when the New York *Times* editorialist, who apparently thinks the impulse for social dancing is universal, said "So Tango!," and when the American Catholic bishops proposed negotiating rather than responding to the Soviet build-up, the administration tended mainly to justify its programs as the best way to get agreements. Implicitly, the administration, then, seems to see no escape from the holocaust except by agreeing with the Soviets. But this particular apocalyptic view also has no basis in fact.

We should recognize that utopian hopes for total nuclear disarmament cannot excuse a Western failure to defend its independence soberly without using reckless threats. Unfortunately, our elites now link the phrase "arms control" not only to millennial dreams of early complete nuclear disarmament, but to the strategy of using threats to annihilate cities as a way of deterring attack; and to a perverse myth of the "arms race" that suggests that nuclear war is imminent because our nuclear arms have been spiraling exponentially and will continue to do so unless we limit our objectives to the destruction of a fixed small number of vulnerable population centers. (No one has ever suggested that the only way to avoid an exponential race in conventional arms is to train our fire on villages rather than enemy tanks. But when it comes to nuclear arms our elites will believe almost anything.) That is not the "arms control" Donald Brennan had in mind. "Arms control," as he and the Princeton physicist, Freeman Dyson, have understood it, should aim at the more traditional and more sensible goal of restraining the bombardment of civilians. But the phrase is now loaded with wishful and mistaken prejudices. It suggests that without arms agreements our spending on defense inevitably will rise exponentially and uncontrollably; and that with arms agreements Soviet arms efforts will diminish. Experience for nearly two decades after the Cuban missile crisis illustrates the opposite.

A serious effort to negotiate agreements with the Soviets might enable us to achieve our objectives at lower levels of armaments than might otherwise be possible. (Improved active defenses, as J. Robert Oppenheimer observed, could facilitate such bilateral agreements since they would make us safer from cheating or assaults by third countries.) Being serious about arms agreements, however, is not the same as being desperate. Even without agreements the West is quite able to deter war and defend its independence against a formidable and persistently hostile adversary committed, as the Soviet Union has been, to changing the "correlation of forces" in its favor. The contrary view is deeply pessimistic and ultimately irresponsible, leading easily to treaties and "understandings" which only worsen the situation of the West.

For a serious and indeed sincere pursuit of arms negotiation by the West calls for a sober assessment of how any arrangements contemplated in an agreement are likely to affect the West's long-term objectives of security and independence, and its intermediate objective of redressing the balance which worsened during the period of détente. These are not merely technical matters. The actual results of arms negotiations have, in the past, contrasted sharply with our expectations and desires. The negotiations of the last two decades started with Western expectations that the agreements achieved would reduce arms spending on both sides without any change in the balance. We assumed that the Soviets, like ourselves, had, as a principal objective, the desire to reduce the percentage of their resources devoted to arms spending and that they would choose "arms control" rather than arms competition. The record plainly shows that Western assumptions were wishful. The Soviets pursued arms agreements as a method of limiting Western spending—which did decline as a proportion of GNP by nearly half in the period after the missile crisis—while they themselves steadily increased their spending and did succeed in changing the balance. Now the West has the problem of catching up and that is especially hard to negotiate.

SERIOUS negotiations today must recognize the limits to what they can accomplish. We and the Soviets share an interest in avoiding mutual suicide, an interest which each of us will pursue whether or not we reach genuine agreement in various understandings and formal treaties. But the Soviets also have interests in expanding their influence and control and, in the process, destabilizing the West, if necessary by the use of external force rather than simply by manipulating internal dissension. Arms agreements might

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temper, but are unlikely to eliminate, this reality. In particular, there seems scant basis to hope for major economies in our security effort through negotiated limits or reductions.

Experience suggests that when the Soviets agree to close off one path of effort, they redirect their resources to other projects posing differing but no lesser dangers. On the other hand, many of the ostensible goals of arms agreements are best achieved through measures which we can and should implement on our own. Our current efforts—which a freeze would stop—to design and deploy nuclear weapons which are more accident-proof and more secure against theft or unauthorized use, are a good example. Measures to improve the safety, security, and invulnerability of nuclear weapons can be implemented by both sides individually because they make sense for each side independently of formal treaties or elaborate verification measures. These need not mean a net increase in the numbers or destructiveness of nuclear weapons in our stockpile. The United States has already greatly reduced both the megatonnage and the numbers of its nuclear weapons. It recently removed 1,000 weapons from Europe and has said that if, in accordance with NATO's decision in 1979, it installs 572 intermediate-range nuclear missiles, it will withdraw an equal number of warheads. If we increase precision further, we can drastically further reduce the number and destructiveness of our nuclear weapons. Increased precision can also improve the effectiveness of conventional weapons so that they may increasingly replace nuclear brute force. And it would improve our ability to avoid the unintended bombing of innocents with nuclear or conventional warheads. It would enlarge rather than foreclose our freedom to choose.

But many strategists in our foreign-policy establishment prefer to foreclose choice. The orthodox view, expressed by editors of our magazines dealing with foreign affairs, liberal Senators, scientists, and many former officials, holds that any use of nuclear weapons by us will almost surely end in a disaster leaving almost everybody dead or worse than dead; yet that we should have no alternative other than to threaten the bombing of cities; and that we should therefore make clear to our adversaries and allies that we will never fight a nuclear war. Anyone who holds that as the true faith will want to believe that he has no other choice. If he cannot say, like Flip Wilson, "The Devil made me do it," he can introduce the *deus ex machina* of technology: Nuclear Technology makes me do it. He is likely to be outraged by any heretic who dares suggest we might have choices.

The grand inquisitors on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had Kenneth Adelman on the rack recently during the hearings on his appointment as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. They probed to find some trace of a doubt in him on the question as to whether we should try to be able to limit nuclear destruction. Dostoevsky would have been fascinated. His Grand Inquisitor, a venerable Jesuit who had had Christ seized on the streets of Seville, argued with the savior that his mistake was not to recognize that men cannot bear the burden of free choice. That's a point on which many in our establishment have impaled themselves.

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Indicting American Jews

Lucy S. Dawidowicz

THE rabbis of the Talmud blamed the Roman destruction of the Temple in 70 C.E. on "groundless hatred" among the Jews. The enigmatic phrase presumably refers to political and religious differences that split the Jewish community at that time and set one faction against another. In the nearly two thousand years since then, the penchant for self-castigation has remained as constant among Jews as the divisions the rabbis alluded to.

Among American Jews, the latest example of groundless hatred born of divisiveness has been the exploitation of the Holocaust by some with old political scores to settle within the Jewish community. Charging that American Jews could have rescued the European Jews during the Holocaust, these accusers have created a new staple of propaganda which has already been seized upon by enemies of the Jews, especially on the Left. The present agitation has been sparked mainly by the so-called American Jewish Commission on the Holocaust, whose birth, death, and resurrection have been chronicled on the front pages of the New York *Times*. It has been sustained by the release of a self-styled documentary film, *Who Shall Live and Who Shall Die?*, which deals with the role of American Jews during World War II. Both the commission and the film have much in common besides subject matter.

The public life of the American Jewish Commission on the Holocaust began in August 1981, when Arthur J. Goldberg, former Justice of the Supreme Court and former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, wrote to several dozen persons, including me, inviting them to join this body of which he had accepted the chairmanship. He did not say from whom he had received his appointment.

The commission, wrote Goldberg, was to consist of "outstanding American Jews"; once again he did not say by whom they were chosen, or by what criteria. The commission's task was to "embark on a searching inquiry into the actions and attitudes of American Jews and others in our country during the Holocaust." The purpose of the inquiry was "to learn and publicize the lessons to be learned from what occurred," with the hope that the commission's findings would "perhaps" help to insure that "such a Holocaust" would never happen again.

Goldberg advised the prospective members that the working papers for the commission would be prepared by a research team at the Jack P. Eisner Institute for Holocaust Studies at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York (CUNY). The research team was to be headed by Professor S.M. Finger, who had been in the U.S. foreign service and had also once been Goldberg's deputy at the UN. Finger, a political scientist, directs CUNY's Ralph Bunche Institute; he has no connection with CUNY's Institute for Holocaust Studies, or any record of research into any aspect of the Holocaust.

Goldberg's letter arrived just as I was going abroad and I had no time to respond. Had I done so, I would have focused on the list of ten questions included with the invitation, concerning the "actions and attitudes of American Jews" to which the commission inquiry would address itself. Question No. 4 read: "Why were so many American Jews passive or relatively unconcerned about the plight of European Jews?" In other words, even though the commission was not yet constituted, it had already found American Jews guilty. By what authority, I would have asked, had Goldberg and Finger undertaken to sit in judgment on American Jews, and what competence did they or CUNY's Graduate Center have to conduct such a pseudo-judicial proceeding?

Commonly a government creates a commission, authorizing it to inquire into a specific event or situation, with a view to some remedial action, usually in the form of legislation, or, in an investigation of wrongdoing, to determine responsibility for that wrongdoing. For example, in 1980 the United States Congress established the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians to review the facts about how American government agencies, civilian and military, handled Japanese Americans during World War II and to recommend appropriate remedies. It consisted of nine members (Goldberg was one), a Special Counsel, and thirty-three staff members.

Another example is the Commission of Inquiry

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into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut 1983, which the government of Israel established on September 28, 1983, to inquire into "the atrocity carried out by a unit of the Lebanese forces against the civilian population in the Shatilla and Sabra camps." The three-man commission—the president of Israel's Supreme Court, a justice of that court, and a major-general—had the full authority of the government behind it to gather information and conduct hearings.*

In terms of empowerment, authority, purpose, and personnel, these commissions contrast sharply with the American Jewish Commission on the Holocaust, which, despite its grandiose title, had no mandate from any responsible institution.

UPON my return home two months later, I found that even though I had not replied to the invitation I was listed as a commission member and was getting its mail. I wrote a note to Finger asking that my name be removed from his list. But the commission materials in my mail absorbed my attention like a sore, and the sore was aggravated by a memorandum prepared for the first meeting, September 23, 1981, stating to the members that "much of the background research has already been done, notably by scholars at the Jack P. Eisner Institute for Holocaust Studies and at other institutes in the U.S. and Israel." This was surely a record for speedy research unsurpassed in the annals of historical scholarship. Then, four days after the meeting itself, a front-page story about the commission appeared in the New York *Times* (September 27, 1981), in which the reporter faithfully transmitted hints and innuendos about "potentially embarrassing" findings and referred darkly to "neglected opportunities" which American Jews had failed to seize, thereby dooming their European brothers.

On November 2, however, Finger sent out another communication, which indicated that something had gone wrong, though he did not say what. He did say that, at the suggestion of some commission members, an academic-review committee would be set up "to screen the work of the research staff." What had happened?

Here we must revert to the prehistory of the commission, which I have had (without other corroboration) from Finger himself. The idea had originated with Jack Eisner, a Holocaust survivor who has prospered in the United States and who largely funds the institute at CUNY that bears his name. Eisner had proposed to underwrite an inquiry into the role of American Jews during the years of the Holocaust, and the president of CUNY's Graduate Center asked Finger to develop this proposal. Finger turned the task over to an old friend, not associated with CUNY; in due course the friend's proposal was presented to Eisner, who endorsed it enthusiastically and agreed to fund it. That is how the American Jewish Commission on the Holocaust came into existence.

Finger's friend, who prepared the proposal and who was subsequently entrusted with the commission's central and most sensitive task—the preparation of its report—was Samuel Merlin, himself a key actor in events on the American Jewish scene in the 1940's. In those days Merlin was an ardent member of the militant Irgun (about which more below). Although he no longer has the same politics he did then, having apparently moved leftward on questions concerning Israel and the Arabs, he still retains undiminished a forty-year-old hostility to the mainstream Zionist movement and to American Jewish communal institutions.

That Merlin accepted the commission's assignment was extraordinary. Usually a person who has been personally or institutionally involved in events under investigation is expected to disqualify himself as a judge. Yet here Merlin was not only judge, but had become the chief architect of the commission's inquiry. Small wonder, then, that from the day the commission first met until its dissolution in August 1982, a year later, the attention of the members was occupied by the Merlin question.

II

BORN in Kishenev in 1910, Samuel Merlin lived there until 1931, when he moved to Paris. There he studied modern history at the Sorbonne, though without receiving a degree. He joined the militant Revisionist wing of the Zionist movement led by Zev Jabotinsky and moved up fast, becoming secretary of the Revisionist World Executive in 1934. In 1935 he and the Executive moved to Warsaw.

In those years differences over goals, tactics, and strategies created ugly strife between the Revisionists and mainstream Zionists in Palestine and in Jewish communities abroad. A major issue of conflict centered on the military posture of the Palestinian Jewish settlement. The Haganah, an arm of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, whose objective was to protect Jews from Arab assault, was committed to a mainly defensive policy. A group within the Haganah advocating a more aggressive posture, including the use of terror in response to Arab terror, broke away and formed the Irgun Zevai Leumi (National Military Organization). Thenceforth, until Israel was established, the Haganah and the Irgun were bitter antagonists (though also sometimes joining under unified commands).

In mid-1938 Merlin became an Irgunist and an editor of the Irgun's Yiddish newspaper. He managed to leave Warsaw just before the German

* The official findings are available in English translation, with an introduction by Abba Eban and supplementary materials, in *The Beirut Massacre: The Complete Kahan Commission Report* (Karz-Cohl, 136 pp., $14.95).

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invasion of Poland and early in 1940 arrived in New York, where he stayed through the war years. There, together with other comrades whom the war had stranded in New York, Merlin began anew to work for the Irgun cause.

Since the Irgun was a military organization, the group's leadership fell to whoever held the highest military rank. In New York that was Hillel Kook, who operated under the assumed name of Peter Bergson so as to spare his family in Palestine (which in the previous generation had included the chief rabbi, Abraham Isaac Kook) embarrassment over his political activities. A few years younger than Merlin, he had migrated with his parents from Lithuania to Palestine. In 1930 he joined the Haganah and then left it for the Irgun. By 1937 he was a member of the Irgun's high command.

A handful of young men, these Irgunists in New York were without a constituency, and in the conduct of their operations free of institutional constraint. (Jabotinsky, the charismatic Revisionist leader, had died in August 1940.) Their charm and the aura of glamor and mystery attached to their undertakings won them access to circles on Park Avenue and in the entertainment world.

In their first incarnation, 1941-42, the Irgunists emerged as the Committee for a Jewish Army (also known as the Committee for an Army of Stateless and Palestinian Jews), which so dissembled its connections that to most people it appeared indistinguishable from the general Zionist campaign for a Palestinian Jewish brigade to fight in the war. In their next incarnation, which lasted only from late 1942 until early 1944, they changed their letterhead to the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, but kept the names of the celebrated supporters they had attracted to their first cause. Now they collided with the larger Zionist movement and also with all the American Jewish organizations, into whose work the Irgunists abruptly jumped—without, for the most part, identifying themselves for what they were. In their final incarnation in 1944, the Irgunists represented themselves as the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation. The Jewish Agency for Palestine branded this committee "an unscrupulous piece of political charlatanism."

After the war, the Irgun cohort in New York continued to compete with the Haganah in efforts to raise funds for the defense of the Palestinian Jewish settlement. Finally, when the new state of Israel was proclaimed, the Irgun agreed to halt its independent arms purchases and to integrate its members into the army of the new state. But in June 1948, during a short cease-fire in the War of Independence, the *Altalena*, an Irgun ship in whose outfitting Bergson and Merlin had played a major role, arrived on Israel's shores carrying immigrants, machine guns, rifles, and ammunition. (Merlin was said to have been on the ship.) In the battle that ensued the ship was sunk by government artillery. It was an ugly incident, but it established the authority of the state and the national army.

IN 1948 Merlin and Bergson were among the founders of the Herut party, which (under the leadership of the Irgun's commander Menachem Begin) merged the military organization of the Irgun and the political organization of the Revisionists. They were both elected to Israel's first Knesset, but within a very few years, each broke with Begin. Bergson returned to New York in 1951, became a commodity broker and then an investment banker. He retired from business in 1968. As for Merlin, he returned to New York in 1956 and the following year established the Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, which he describes as an independent educational institution (and which, when I visited it last year, consisted of two rooms with a kitchen in a rundown Manhattan tenement). Merlin has been its executive director and Peter Bergson a trustee, vice-chairman of the board, and presumed underwriter. S.M. Finger has been its president since 1971. In its quarter-century existence, Merlin's institute has had a meager record of accomplishment: a short-lived journal; one small book on the Palestine refugee problem (1958), another on Cyprus (1967), and two colloquia on the Middle East (1967 and 1973), the proceedings of the latter edited by Finger.

It was this institute which was being used as a research arm for the American Jewish Commission on the Holocaust. To compound the indiscretion of assigning Merlin to write the report, the commission had also hired as its principal researcher a young Israeli then studying for his doctorate at CUNY's Graduate Center. He happened to be a disciple of Merlin. Like his mentor, the young man had already found American Jews guilty of failure to rescue the European Jews, and had even published a few articles to that effect. As for CUNY's Institute for Holocaust Studies, at no point did it prepare any research for the commission.

When it became clear to the commission members that Merlin could not or would not produce a balanced report, the academic-review committee mentioned above was formed to screen the document Merlin was to prepare. The review committee consisted of some four or five professors, nearly all of whom had written on one or another aspect of the Holocaust, though only one—a non-Jew—had ever dealt with the role of American Jews. (I was invited to join the academic review committee, but declined.)

The review committee studied Merlin's first draft and at a meeting in March 1982, with Merlin present, picked it apart. Some changes were consequently made. On May 17, 1982, the edited version, a 76-page typescript entitled "Introduction and (Preliminary) Overview," was sent out to the commission members. The report's preface declared that the draft had been prepared by a

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"Research Group," not further identified but consisting presumably of Finger, Merlin, and the Israeli graduate student (who in the meantime had withdrawn from CUNY's doctoral program and whose contract with the commission had been terminated).

Despite the editing, the report was in essence a reiteration of the old Irgun attacks on the mainstream Zionist movement and American Jewish organizations, and an effort to insure the Irgun's place in history as the sole defender of the Jewish people in its darkest hour. The thesis, in brief, was that the European Jews could have been saved, had not the "Jewish establishment" interfered with the efforts of the Irgunists to do so. Thus on page 25, to take one illustration, the report stated that "the leadership of major Jewish organizations . . . knew enough to act or rather counteract, had there been enough compassion and a will." (By "counteract" Merlin perhaps meant that Jewish organizations could have outfitted ships, as he and Bergson did in 1948, and sent them out against the armed forces of the Third Reich.) The report contained no new documents, no new data, no analyses, no historical evaluation of evidence.

On June 2, 1982, the commission met to consider Merlin's typescript. It was reportedly a stormy meeting, with members vehemently protesting the undocumented charges against the Jewish community. In the wake of the uproar, during which he complained he was insulted, Merlin resigned.

As a consequence, Eisner (who, it turned out, was a strong Merlin partisan) stopped the flow of money. On August 19, 1982, using the letterhead of CUNY's Ralph Bunche Institute, Goldberg informed the commission members that since the necessary funds had not been remitted, he had no alternative but to terminate the commission's work.

There seemed to have been few mourners after the commission's demise. But Merlin was not yet done. Months later, he leaked the story of the commission's dissolution to a New York *Times* reporter, and it was his version of the events in question that appeared in yet another front-page story in the *Times* (January 4, 1983), complete with spicy accusations against the American Jewish leadership taken from Merlin's original text.

Eisner, for his part, denied that his failure to provide the funds was what brought on the commission's dissolution. He charged that "the vestiges of the old establishment were fighting to protect its name" and that Goldberg had given in to the "pressure" of "old-timers of established groups," who "were determined to hold back the truth." With the help of the *Times*, Eisner and Merlin thus managed to salvage something from the wreckage of the commission. If they could not convict the Jewish organizations by commission, at least they had succeeded in broadcasting their accusations to a large audience.

Goldberg rose to the challenge. To demonstrate his independence, he announced that he would resuscitate the commission and personally provide or raise the funds necessary for its operations. Finger was quoted as saying that Goldberg resented "any implication that he gave way to anybody's pressure." On January 20, 1983, the *Times* accorded the same front-page treatment which it had lavished upon Merlin's account of the commission's demise to the story of its resurrection.

Only two voices, neither of them reported in the *Times*, spoke to the real issue. One was that of Martin Peretz, editor-in-chief of the *New Republic* and a member of the commission, who said that the selection of Merlin to write the report was "appalling," and that Merlin, as someone with "a lifelong grudge against the Zionist leadership," was using the commission "to wreak vengeance on the established Jewish leadership." The other voice was that of Gerhart Riegner of the World Jewish Congress in Switzerland. Riegner was the man who, in August 1942, had provided the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State with the information that Hitler planned the total destruction of European Jews, and who was a central mover in the efforts of the American and world Jewish organizations to succor the European Jews. He branded Merlin's charges "absurd." In an interview in the Washington *Post* (February 5, 1983), Riegner asserted that the commission was "ideologically fueled by people determined to rewrite history."

On February 1, again on the letterhead of CUNY's Ralph Bunche Institute, Finger sent the commission members a lengthy recapitulation of events since the previous June. He also informed them that, with his assistance, Goldberg had prepared a draft report to be considered at a meeting on February 9. Yet on that very morning commission members, some of whom had not yet received their copies of this draft, were astonished to read in the New York *Times* a story about the report and extensive citations from it. Merlin, though he too had not seen the document, volunteered an opinion: he "knew," he told the *Times* reporter, that its purpose was to "whitewash the responsibility and guilt of the Jewish leadership of that time."

Finger's report was, in fact, little more than a sanitized version of Merlin's draft. Most of the accusations against American Jews had been excised, but the tendentiousness remained. Some material was added, consisting mostly of photocopied pages from books published long before. The rush for publicity was never explained.

The CUNY Graduate Center has now severed its tenuous connection with the commission. Finger was informed that his own association with it thenceforth was to be only in a personal capacity. As for the commission itself, now that it has been

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cut off from its original source, it is like the debris of a misguided missile, adrift in space, its mission aborted, beyond recall.

III

THOUGH Merlin lost the battle with the commission, he and Peter Bergson are the stars of the ninety-minute "documentary" film entitled *Who Shall Live and Who Shall Die?*, produced and directed by Laurence Jarvik, a former graduate student in philosophy at Berkeley, now in his mid-twenties. Purporting to be "the story of what happened in the United States during the extermination of the Jews in Europe," the film is a pastiche of news clips and interviews. Interviewed are thirteen persons who participated in events of that time and an unidentified group of Jewish survivors now living in the United States. The subject matter of the film is divided into three main parts: a critique of America's restrictive immigration policy before the outbreak of the war; an indictment of the Roosevelt administration, the Zionist movement, and the American Jewish organizations for their alleged indifference to the fate of the European Jews and their reluctance to rescue them; and an account of the origin and activities of the War Refugee Board.

Bergson and Merlin are identified in the film with the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, but the viewer is never told exactly what that committee was. Nor is there a clue that Bergson and Merlin have been adversaries of the organized Jewish community for forty years.

As spokesmen for the "Jewish establishment," Jarvik presents Nahum Goldmann and Gerhart Riegner. They are not given nearly as much time as is allotted to Bergson and Merlin, and it is curious, to say the least, that "the story of what happened in the United States" with regard to the Jewish organizations should be told by non-Americans. Goldmann and Riegner, both with the World Jewish Congress, were refugees from Germany who in the 1930's moved to Switzerland. Goldmann came to the United States shortly after the outbreak of the war to establish an office of the Jewish Agency for Palestine in Washington. Riegner was never in the United States in those days.

There is no one at all in the film who speaks out of his own direct experience about the work of the American Jewish organizations during the war. Failing that, there is no one even to read the heartrending letters that Rabbi Stephen Wise, the president of both the American and the World Jewish Congress, wrote to Roosevelt, Frankfurter, and other people in high places. To be sure, Jarvik presents former Congressman Emanuel Celler, who in his day vigorously fought for a more liberal immigation policy and for programs to rescue European Jews. Celler could have said a great deal about the persistent efforts which the American Jewish organizations made all through the 1930's to get Congress to enact special or emergency legislation to admit Jewish refugees, so as to bypass the restrictions of the quota system. But nothing of this sort appears in the film.

JARVIK claims to have spent three years in research and in interviewing. Yet not only did he fail to come up with any authentic participant-witness to speak for American Jews, he failed utterly to offer a trustworthy account of the subject he undertook to document. There is nothing in this film of the public activities in which the American Jewish organizations engaged during the war years—nothing of the mass meetings (with one distorted exception), nothing of the demonstrations, fast days, radio programs, nothing of the formal appeals to the United States government, to other governments, to international organizations, to the Red Cross. There is nothing of the masses of information about the fate of the European Jews with which Jewish organizations deluged America's newspapers and news agencies, its periodicals and radio stations, and which was distributed to private agencies across the country. Nothing of the work done among Catholic and Protestant church leaders, in the labor movement, and among America's ethnic and racial groups to rally public opinion against the Third Reich and its treatment of the Jews long before America's entry into the war. Nothing of the efforts to cultivate allies in educational institutions and civic agencies to come to the aid of the Jews.

Nor does Jarvik even give his viewers any hint of the private, off-the-record activities of American Jewish organizations and their leaders. His narrative tells nothing of the countless intercessions with dozens and dozens of government officials in the White House entourage, in the State Department, in Treasury, in Commerce. Nothing of the meetings with Congressmen and Senators. Nothing of the money and supplies sent via direct and indirect channels to the beleaguered Jews of Europe. Nothing of the endless stream of letters, memoranda, documents which American Jewish organizations produced. Nothing of the meetings at which Jewish leaders sat day and night.

Jarvik has accused the Jewish organizations of refusing to give him access to their files. But at the American Jewish Congress, a staff member spent several days briefing him. The library of the American Jewish Committee, which keeps records of its visitors and requests for information, has none to indicate that he ever wrote, called, or came. Nor did he visit the National Archives in Washington or the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, both indispensable sources for documenting the activities of the Jewish organizations.

When one sees the film, one understands why: Jarvik had the answers before he even knew what questions to ask. In the film's leading roles, Berg-

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son and Merlin expatiate on the perfidy of their fellow Jews, while puffing themselves. Thus the one reference in the film to a mass meeting—which took place at Madison Square Garden in March 1943 under the sponsorship of all the Jewish organizations—is alleged by Merlin to have come about only under pressure from the Irgun. There is no one in the film to challenge this falsehood.

Two undertakings indisputably organized by the Irgun are, however, shown in the film. One is the Ben Hecht pageant, *We Will Never Die*, put on in 1943; the other is the "pilgrimage" of 500 Orthodox rabbis to Washington later in the same year. The rabbis' march was an impressively stage-managed event. These venerable gentlemen were to present President Roosevelt with a petition containing a seven-point plan to rescue the European Jews. The plan had originated at a rally of the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe in July; it was an Irgunist counterpart of an earlier and more substantial rescue program which the American Jewish organizations in concert had worked out early in 1943 and which they had submitted to top American and British officials in advance of the Bermuda Conference on refugees in April 1943. (Not the slightest inkling of that feverish activity appears in the film.) But the rabbis had no appointment with Roosevelt, because the White House staff had learned that the group behind the petition was "not representative of the most thoughtful elements in Jewry." And in truth, this was not an ungenerous way of describing them.

IN ONE of the film's sequences, Peter Bergson tells how he first learned about the mass murder of the Jews. "It changed my life," he says. The story goes like this: in November 1942, Bergson read in the Washington *Post* of Hitler's plan to murder all the European Jews (this was the Riegner report, whose release the State Department had finally permitted). In shock and sorrow, Bergson canceled his appointments and went to the State Department to see if the news were really true. When it was confirmed, he understood that the only thing to do was to start a rescue operation. That is when he decided to revamp the Committee for a Jewish Army into an Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe.

Bergson told me the same story two years ago when I interviewed him in connection with an article I was preparing on American Jews and the Holocaust. I believed then, and I still believe, that he and Merlin both cared about the Jews and were motivated to act by the terrible plight of their people, even if they could not, and still do not, believe that Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion cared at least as much as they did. Yet a big question remains.

After June 1942, when the first reports gave a figure of 700,000 European Jews murdered, the estimates of the mass Nazi killings kept skyrocketing. In July, the American Jewish organizations called a mass meeting in New York's Madison Square Garden. President Roosevelt sent a message declaring that the American people would "hold the perpetrators of these crimes to strict accountability in a day of reckoning which will surely come." Across the country—more meetings, memorial services, fast days. One might speak of a frenzy of activity despite the shock of the news.

Every Anglo-Jewish journal and Yiddish newspaper—there were three Yiddish dailies then—carried columns of news about the murder of the European Jews. Even the New York *Times*, which did not publish much on this subject, carried reports. Other New York papers were better. How is it that Bergson did not realize the extent of the Jewish catastrophe until November 1942, or had not heard the clamor raised by the Jewish organizations? Where was he?

What the Irgunists were doing in those six months between June and November 1942 I do not know. But I think it is possible that they had decided to abort the Committee for a Jewish Army, whose public-relations work since Pearl Harbor, when the United States entered the war, must have collapsed anyway. Even if the committee had been just a front for gun-running across continents and oceans, the war would have brought that activity to a standstill as well. To fill the vacuum left by the Committee for a Jewish Army, then, they may have decided to launch an operation to rescue the European Jews from the Third Reich.

On screen, Bergson indulges himself in a tirade against American Jews and their leaders. If they had been less cowardly and self-centered, he thunders, it would not have been difficult in those early days for them to convince the American government to make the rescue of the European Jews a primary goal of the war. This absurd claim, delivered histrionically, almost drowns out the more sober assessment of John Pehle, an official in the Treasury Department under Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and later head of the War Refugee Board, who further on in the film tries to explain that winning the war and defeating the Axis were Roosevelt's topmost priority.

Let us recall just a few facts about the progress of the war in November 1942, at the time Peter Bergson had his great revelation. About six million American men and women were then in the U.S. Army, nearly four million in the Navy, and over a half-million in the Marines. At home, defense plants were working three shifts to produce the weaponry which the Americans, the British, the Russians, and the Chinese desperately needed. Everywhere the war was going badly. In the Pacific the United States had just launched its offensive against the Japanese, and had finally succeeded in retaking the Solomon Islands, the westernmost

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outpost of the Japanese advance. (Earlier that year, after the Japanese had scored a series of striking victories in the Pacific, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had persuaded Roosevelt to sign the executive order which removed Japanese Americans to the notorious relocation centers.) On the European front, the situation was touch-and-go. The Americans had just landed in North Africa to join the British against Rommel's army. The Germans had meanwhile seized Vichy France, to protect their southern flank against a possible Allied invasion. In the East, Leningrad was still under siege. At Stalingrad the slaughter was estimated in the hundreds of thousands.

Against this background of a desperate global war, Bergson fatuously insists that if American Jews had only had the will, they could have convinced the American public and Roosevelt to make this into what would no doubt have been called a "Jewish war."

"It's garbage," Bergson shouts, "to say that Jews couldn't do anything because of anti-Semitism." As it happens, anti-Semitism did not intimidate the Jewish organizations into silence; they did speak out. But when historians cite the pervasive presence of anti-Semitism during the war, they mean to underscore the relative powerlessness of American Jews, only 3 percent of the American people. Anti-Semites may believe that the Jews rule the world, but the fact is that American Jews were in no position to change national priorities in the war even if they had wanted to. And as a group, Jews had the greatest stake in winning the war as fast as possible. For that was the surest way to save the European Jews.

THE War Refugee Board occupies a substantial segment in Jarvik's film, and here too we get more propaganda than truth. In addition to John Pehle, we see Josiah DuBois, Jr., who had also worked under Morgenthau in Treasury and who later became the board's general counsel; Ross McClelland, who represented the board in Switzerland; and Ira Hirschmann, who carried out special tasks for it. DuBois summons up old passions as he tells how the State Department suppressed the information that it received from its legation in Switzerland about the murder of the European Jews, and how it sabotaged the efforts by Treasury—which was responding to the pressure of the Jewish organizations—to send funds abroad to aid the suffering Jews. This is a story that has been told before. In the article I published last year on American Jews and the Holocaust (New York *Times Magazine*, April 18, 1982), I was able to add some details not previously known.

When Treasury officials finally obtained incontrovertible evidence of State's obstructionism, they presented Morgenthau with an eighteen-page memorandum entitled "Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of This Government in the Murder of the Jews" (January 13, 1944). Morgenthau himself had been profoundly affected by the news of the murder of the European Jews and had persistently prodded the State Department to act more expeditiously. He had even directly accused State's chief obstructionist, Breckinridge Long, of anti-Semitism. Now Morgenthau condensed his staff's report, cooled down its language, retitled it "Personal Report to the President," and took it to Roosevelt on January 16. Morgenthau also had with him a draft for a presidential executive order providing for the creation of a War Refugee Board. Roosevelt did not read the report, but listened while Morgenthau and his staff summarized it. He looked at the executive order, suggested one change, and told Morgenthau to go ahead with it. On January 22, 1944, the White House announced that the War Refugee Board had been established.

Two months earlier, the Irgunists had used their contacts in Congress to introduce a resolution urging the President to create a "commission of diplomatic, economic, and military experts to formulate and effectuate a plan of immediate action designed to save the surviving Jewish people of Europe." Exploiting the coincidence in timing, the Irgunists now falsely claimed credit for the creation of the War Refugee Board. Jarvik in the film follows suit, by splicing his interviews to create the impression that the Irgunists deserve the credit.

I recently raised this issue with DuBois. He believes (as I do) that the Irgunists succeeded in raising the level of public awareness about the terrible fate of the European Jews. But DuBois was nevertheless quick to say that the sequence of events within Treasury that led to the War Refugee Board was unrelated to the Irgun's public-relations activities. The pressure of conscience within Treasury and the need to respond to the desperate entreaties of the American Jewish organizations were what led to the creation of the War Refugee Board.

Near the film's end, Pehle says that the accomplishments of the board, however important, were late and little. No one will dispute that. Surely more Jews might have been rescued—though none who were in Hitler's vise. Without doubt, the restrictive immigration policies of the United States doomed tens of thousands of Jews who might have found sanctuary in this country before the outbreak of the war. The mean-spiritedness of American consular officials in carrying out their instructions barred other thousands of Jewish refugees stranded in inhospitable places just barely beyond Hitler's reach. Had the American people been more generous, more tolerant, less xenophobic, more Jews could have been saved.

But is the United States to be reviled and repudiated on this account? Better to ponder where American Jews would be today had not America —and Britain too—held back the Nazi tide. Some

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say that the United States fought "only" to preserve Western civilization. Had it not so fought, and won, no Jews at all would have been left in the world, and no civilization either.

As for American Jews, they too could certainly have done more, tried harder, shouted more loudly. But I am not persuaded that in the end they would have accomplished much more than they did. At one point in the film, Bergson rages: "What would have happened if [American Jews] had stormed the White House?" One knows what would have happened. They would have been seized, removed bodily, booked, jailed, and condemned. Any interference with the country's prosecution of the war or with war production—strikes, race riots, as in Detroit in June 1943—brought out the army. When necessary, the army seized plants and restored order in the streets. Imagine how Americans would have reacted to an attempt to "storm" the White House. And for what? To hold the President hostage for the European Jews?

IV

One of the supreme ironies in this whole episode has to do with the identity of those making capital out of the accusations of indifference and betrayal which the Irgunists, the American Jewish Commission on the Holocaust, and Laurence Jarvik have entered against the "Jewish establishment." For when one searches the record of the past for those who were *truly* indifferent to the fate of the European Jews, one discovers in many instances the forebears of those who today find retroactive fault with the wartime Jewish record or are detractors of the contemporary American Jewish community for its "uncritical" support of Israel.

Consider the case of the New York *Times*, which has solicitously recorded the pulse rate of the commission, spotlighted Merlin, and treated the Jarvik film as a major cultural event. The *Times* was not very attentive to the fate of the European Jews during World War II. When, for instance, the Polish government-in-exile and five other governments-in-exile submitted a memorandum on the mass murder of the Jews to the Big Three Allied powers and to the Pope, the *Times* ran the story (July 2, 1942) in a single column on an inside page. The continuing stream of terrible news about the European Jews was similarly treated.

The scanting coverage may be fairly attributed to the policies and politics of Arthur Hays Sulzberger, then the *Times*'s publisher. Sulzberger's major Jewish passion was anti-Zionism. He was an ardent supporter of the American Council for Judaism, a minuscule dissident group which had been formed at the end of 1942 by Jews who felt their status as Americans threatened by the rising demand for a Jewish state in Palestine. The Council's president, Lessing Rosenwald, had been a member of America First, the isolationist organization that harbored anti-Semites like Charles Lindbergh. That was just one measure of the distance that lay between the American Council for Judaism and most American Jews.

Sulzberger was not averse to using six columns of the *Times*, on November 6, 1942, to publish a talk he delivered to a Reform congregation in Baltimore, in which he condemned the "professional agitators" for a Jewish state. In August 1943, when the American Jewish Conference met in New York to consider the problem of Palestine and other questions on the Jewish postwar agenda, the *Times* took the occasion to publish a story about the American Council for Judaism and its anti-Zionist principles. The philosopher Isaiah Berlin, then serving in Washington as an information officer with the British embassy, noted the *Times* attack on the conference in a dispatch of August 28, 1943: "There seems no doubt that Sulzberger, so far as lies in his timorous nature, has generally decided to expose what he regards as a dangerous chauvinist movement."*

But much worse than the *Times*'s deficiencies in those days was the failure of the Left in the United States. Hardly any group or party along the Marxist spectrum—from the Socialists of the Second International to the Stalinists of the Third International and the Trotskyites of the Fourth International to the myriads of sectarian splinters—ever gave a passing thought to the fate of the European Jews. As an explanation for the "tardiness" with which he and other leftists responded to the Holocaust, Irving Howe in his recent memoir *A Margin of Hope* writes that he and his friends "continued to think more or less in Marxist categories." Those categories harbored no rubric for Jews, even as the particular victims of Nazi racism, another concept absent from Marxist thinking.

The Socialists (including their leader, Norman Thomas, who was also a member of America First) and the Trotskyites opposed American entry into the war. In the July-August 1941 issue of *Partisan Review*, which was then loosely connected with Trotskyism, two of the editors argued that "all support of whatever kind must be withheld from Churchill and Roosevelt" on the ground that any such support "clears the road for fascism from within." Then, after *Partisan Review* had changed its position and decided to support the war, no one on its editorial board, not even the Jews, and with one exception no one among its contributors ever mentioned the European Jews, even if only to illustrate the depth of Nazi/Fascist barbarism. George Orwell alone—whom no one

* *Washington Dispatches 1941-1945: Weekly Political Reports from the British Embassy*, edited by H.G. Nicholas (University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 240.

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could ever accuse of philo-Semitism—wrote in a "Letter from London" (July-August 1943):

> People dislike the Jews so much that they do not want to remember their sufferings, and when you mention the horrors that are happening in Germany or Poland, the answer is always "Oh yes, of course that's dreadful, but —" —and out comes the familiar list of grievances. Not all of the intelligentsia are immune from this kind of thing. Here the get-out is usually that the refugees are all "petty bourgeois"; and so the abuse of the Jews can proceed under a respectable disguise.

As for the American Communists, they zigged and zagged in accordance with Soviet foreign policy. During the life of the friendship pact between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia (August 23, 1939-June 22, 1941), American Communists opposed U.S. entry into the war. Their slogan was: "The Yanks Are *Not* Coming." After the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, the line abruptly changed. Nothing must be permitted to impede the prosecution of the war, not even strikes by defense workers for higher wages. A new Communist slogan was adopted to fit the new line: "Open Up the Second Front *Now*." Millions for defense of the Soviet Union, but nothing for rescue of the European Jews.

Today the Left, heartland of anti-Zionism, bays loudly against the "Jewish establishment" for having "betrayed" the European Jews during the Holocaust. It appropriates the cruel and ill-founded charges of collaboration which Hannah Arendt, in *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, leveled against the Jewish leadership in the Nazi-controlled ghettos in Eastern Europe, and applies them to the Jewish leadership of the United States. In so doing it finds itself, in one more instance of the bizarre political cross-breeding we witness nowadays, in a retrospective alliance with the Irgun whose commander was none other than Menachem Begin.

In its day the Irgun stood on the Right in Jewish political life—in Eastern Europe as in Palestine. Like its ideological progenitor, the Revisionist party, it defended bourgeois capitalism and was the declared enemy of the socialists within the Zionist movement. Yet Irgun veterans like Bergson and Merlin, having cut their ties with Begin and the Herut party, are welcomed by the Left which regards Begin as its primal foe.

Lenni Brenner is a good illustration of this hybrid. A self-styled anti-Zionist Jew of the Left, Brenner is the author of *Zionism in the Age of the Dictators*,* a pseudo-scholarly book determined to prove that the UN was right: "zionism [*sic*] is racism." In fact Brenner echoes the Soviet-Arab line about "Zionist collusion with the Fascists and the Nazis." In his preface Brenner asserts that "the Palestinian people are deeply appreciative of the firm support given them by progressive Jews." Among the six he cites are Elmer Berger, longtime executive of the American Council for Judaism, and Felicia Langer, an Israeli Communist lawyer who has represented PLO terrorists. In his text, Brenner has good words for two other Jews —Peter Bergson and Samuel Merlin—and says of them and the Irgun that they "did more than all other Zionists to help the Jews in occupied Europe." (He does not say what it is they did.)

All the characters in this sad and politically grotesque tale were gathered in reunion, as it were, in a column by Alexander Cockburn in the *Village Voice* (March 1, 1983). In that column, Cockburn, who has made a reputation as a particularly virulent opponent of Israel, the Jewish community, and Western values altogether, interviewed Laurence Jarvik, quoted Peter Bergson, reviewed Lenni Brenner's book, and condemned Israel and the American Jewish organizations. Jarvik told Cockburn: "The Holocaust is used to browbeat the Christians and keep them from criticizing anything that Jewish organizations do, or anything that Israel does." Here is a textbook example of projection if ever there was one. For it is Jarvik and his companions on the Left who have turned the Holocaust into a stick with which to beat the Jewish community for its "sin" of supporting Israel.

The murder of the European Jews was the greatest Jewish disaster of our time, perhaps the greatest in all Jewish history. Unlike other disasters that have afflicted the Jews, this one has taken on a particularly ugly afterlife. It is not enough that one-third of the Jewish people were murdered, and that Ashkenazi civilization was destroyed. The Holocaust's bitter history is now being transformed into a vehicle of anti-Semitism. The anti-Semites of the Right, as I have had prior occasion to point out in these pages,† deny that there ever was a Holocaust. The anti-Semites of the Left blame it on the Jews.

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* London: Croom Helm; Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill; $16.95 hardcover, $8.95 paper.

† "Lies About the Holocaust," December 1980.

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The Bulgarian Connection and the Media

Michael Ledeen

THE attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in the spring of 1981 should have produced a frenzy of activity from our leading "investigative reporters." The story had everything: the victim, one of the world's most charismatic and powerful men, situated at a dramatic moment in history at the center of the struggle over the destiny of Poland and perhaps of the entire Soviet empire; a photogenic and exotic assassin with a violent and romantic background, including an escape from a prison in Turkey said to be escape-proof; and strong suspicions that the assassin might not have acted alone. Yet for nearly a year, only one American journalist took the time and effort to dig out the details that pointed an accusing finger at the Kremlin, and that journalist (Claire Sterling) has lived in Italy since the 1940's. Almost all the rest accepted the "cover story" offered by a would-be assassin. As the evidence for a Soviet connection mounted, indeed, most looked the other way.

Within days of the shooting in St. Peter's Square in Rome, a five-man team of New York *Times* correspondents in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States had concluded that Mehmet Ali Agca was associated with a "xenophobic, fanatically nationalistic, neofascist network steeped in violence," namely, the National Action party of Turkey and related right-wing groups. Writing from Turkey, *Times* correspondent Marvine Howe described this "Rightist Web of Intrigue" in some detail, suggesting that the international network might well have provided Agca with the money and assistance necessary for his lengthy travels prior to his arrival in St. Peter's Square on May 11.

This was the pattern for much of the comment on the assassination attempt. Thus, Georgie Anne Geyer of the Universal Press syndicate: "Ali Agca is a cold-eyed fanatic—a Turkish ultranationalist and religious zealot who hates the West and Christianity and sought the most effective way to attack them." Thus, Joseph Kraft of the Washington *Post*: "Ali Agca . . . went after the Pope as a living symbol—indeed, the most prominent example—of the spirit that breaks down the barriers the Islamic fundamentalists seek to rebuild." (Kraft concluded, however, that this sort of fundamentalist revolt "is not an organized terrorist conspiracy that can be stamped out by more police and vigilance.") Thus, Joseph C. Harsch of the *Christian Science Monitor*: "There is every indication that the man who fired at the Pope was a criminal psychopath. If he had accomplices or an organization background it was apparently of a right-wing variety. There is no serious suggestion that the deed was motivated from Moscow or the man trained by Moscow or by its agents."

These pieces, it should be recalled, were written against a precise political background: the recent charges by the then Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, that international terrorism, actively supported by the Soviet Union, was a major issue for the United States, and required strong action by all the countries of the West. Whether implicitly or explicitly, the shooting of the Pope constituted a sort of test case of Haig's claims, and in rushing to conclude that Agca was a right-wing fanatic, American commentators may well have been placing their own response to those claims ahead of the evidence.

Admittedly, information was at first hard to come by, and one can perhaps forgive our journalists for failing to notice the elements in Agca's career that pointed the correct way—above all, the fact that he had spent a considerable amount of time in Bulgaria. But for those who spoke Italian, and who had contacts in Rome, the matter was far from impenetrable. Indeed, one such journalist, George Armstrong, writing in the *Christian Science Monitor* just five days after the shooting, noted that "the hottest theory circulating in Rome today" took as its starting point the fact that "the two Poles the Soviets most fear are Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski and Karol Wojtyla."

David Ottoway of the Washington *Post* also heard whispers about a plot coming from the East, although he did not give them much credence:

> "It could be a Muslim group in opposition to the Catholic Church," remarked a high-ranking Italian official, "or there could be a Polish connection," he added, noting Agca alleged he was in Bulgaria after his escape from a Turkish prison in November 1979.

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The Bulgarians must be upset enough by the alternative to Communism evolving in Poland and the strong backing of the Catholic Church, as well as of the Polish Pope, to the Solidarity independent union movement, to encourage Agca in his endeavor, according to this "hypothesis."

One Western diplomatic source, however, called this theory "off the wall," together with that holding some extremist Muslim group responsible.

Journalists elsewhere were not so eager, however, to overlook the one logical international connection, or to accept the idea that it was "off the wall." On April 8, 1982, Thames Television in England broadcast a program charging, *inter alia*, that the KGB was involved in Agca's efforts. The Thames show was the first to piece together the basic elements that would later appear—with a far greater degree of specificity—in Claire Sterling's writing and in NBC News broadcasts: Agca's involvement with Bulgarian/Turkish arms and drug smugglers; his long sojourn in Bulgaria; his acquisition of considerable quantities of money; the Soviet concern over Poland. Yet there was no follow-up in the American media.

In mid-September, the Rome court that sentenced Agca to life imprisonment published its verdict, and somewhat unexpectedly stated that he had not acted alone. Although no evidence existed as yet to "uncover the identity or the motives of the conspirators," the court nonetheless stated that "Agca suddenly appeared among the crowd to execute, with almost bureaucratic coolness, a task entrusted to him by others in a plot obscured by hatred. . . ." This was carried by ABC television, but was not reported in our major publications, or by the other television networks. So far as they were concerned, the Agca case was closed.

Phase Two

Unlike the "elite" press, the *Reader's Digest* was not inclined to drop the matter, especially since there were several good leads that had not been explored in depth. First was the matter of Agca's stay in Bulgaria. Second was the discovery that Agca had contacts with the likes of Beker Celenk, a shadowy underworld figure who, although Turkish, lived in Bulgaria, whence he trafficked in drugs and arms with the clear connivance of Bulgarian authorities. Third was photographic evidence that Agca had not acted alone in St. Peter's Square: there were many cameras in the piazza that day, and it was possible to identify a Turk standing next to Agca just before the shooting. Upon examination, he turned out to be Omar Ay, whose forged passport had been produced on the same day and in the same place as Agca's. The two files stood side by side, in numerical sequence, in the Interior Ministry in Ankara.

These and other connections were identified and analyzed for the *Reader's Digest* by Claire Sterling and by Paul Henze, a former official of the CIA and former staff member of the National Security Council during the Carter administration who is now at the Rand Corporation. Claire Sterling's article appeared in the September 1982 *Reader's Digest*; she is currently writing a detailed book on the subject. Much of Henze's work was used by Marvin Kalb in an NBC News Special broadcast in the same month, and also by the *Christian Science Monitor*.

It was established by Claire Sterling, Paul Henze, and the NBC "White Paper on the Plot to Kill the Pope" that Agca had been involved in a network of Bulgarian and Turkish officials, smugglers, and Mafia characters; that he had lived in one of the most luxurious hotels in Sofia long enough to remove any reasonable doubt that he was "protected" by the Bulgarians; that he had opened secret bank accounts as early as 1977, and that after his escape from Turkey he spent over $50,000 in one year without ever cashing a check; that Agca's network of Bulgarians and Turks provided him with money, with the gun he fired at the Pope, and with other forms of organizational assistance; and that the network extended to Bulgarians in Rome. Finally—and this was Marvin Kalb's "scoop" for NBC (although at least some American government officials knew it earlier)—the Pope had sent a message to the Kremlin saying that if the Russians invaded Poland, he would stand with his people and take a leading role in the resistance to the Red Army.

Claire Sterling's article attracted a fair amount of popular attention, but did not generate much follow-up from the "elite" press. On August 17, the New York *Times* ran a brief Reuters story about the Sterling article on page 12, and two days later carried the Soviet denial on page 7. There was no special investigation, no follow-up of the *Times*'s earlier five-man research project.

It was somewhat harder to downplay Marvin Kalb's program—Kalb is one of the media stars in Washington—yet many in the Washington press corps remained reluctant to credit his findings. I was working at the State Department when the NBC show was screened, and most of the correspondents I spoke to were hostile to the notion that the KGB might have been involved in the plot. This was not simply a matter of questioning the evidence—the material that Kalb and Claire Sterling had uncovered, while powerful for those willing to follow the logical and circumstantial trail, might not convince an American judge and jury "beyond any reasonable doubt"—but rather took the form of an objection in principle: doubt that "the Russians would do such a thing." When I pointed to the history of political murder in the Soviet Union, and to the political assassinations throughout the world that appear to have been

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Soviet-directed (from Trotsky in Mexico to Bulgarian dissidents in London to the late premier of Afghanistan and the late president of North Yemen), the journalists insisted that the Pope was qualitatively different. Besides, Kalb's program was too "cold war" in its implications.

Phase Three

On November 26, 1982, the New York *Times* announced the arrest of Sergei Ivanov Antonov—a Bulgarian airlines employee in Rome—for complicity in the shooting of the Pope. The next day the *Times* carried an interview with an Italian judge who said the available evidence did not justify a theory of international conspiracy. This established a pattern of sorts, whereby the actions of Italian magistrates were juxtaposed with a goodly amount of opinion from other Italians and (invariably unnamed) Western officials tending to diminish the credibility of the charges against the alleged conspirators.

On December 17, the *Times*'s man in Rome, Henry Kamm, filed a story from Jerusalem claiming that "Israeli and West German intelligence and security sources with a special interest in international terrorism are skeptical of charges of a Bulgarian connection in last year's attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II by a Turk." When I asked Israeli officials if they could confirm Kamm's account of their government's skepticism, they responded by denying that any Israeli intelligence official had made such a statement. Indeed, within a few weeks—on January 2, 1983—a top Israeli military official announced in Tel Aviv that "Israel believed Italian assertions that there had been a Bulgarian connection—and a link to the Soviet Union—in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II." This story, curiously enough, appeared only in the early edition of the *Times*; once again, so far as I know, there was no follow-up.

Whatever the nature of Kamm's source, his treatment of the "Bulgarian connection" was not very aggressive. On December 30, he wrote that the evidence was insufficient to tie the Bulgarian secret police or the KGB to the shooting. And then in January, on a trip to Bulgaria, Kamm gave a remarkable picture of that country:

> In addition to its unusual political stability and absence of dissidence and factionalism, Bulgaria basks in a reputation for economic progress rare in a time of recession and crushing foreign debt in other Communist countries. Its people's standard of living has risen. Food and a broad range of consumer goods are in better supply than they have ever been before, and Sofia today, even at the height of winter, presents a more relaxed and prosperous appearance than it has in this correspondent's 18 years of acquaintance.

How could such a bucolic and progressive country have been involved in an assassination attempt?

For the next several weeks, it seemed as if *Times* reporters could find no one in the Western world who believed that the evidence was convincing. At the State Department, the *Times*'s Bernard Gwertzman got the official line: "United States intelligence officials remain intrigued but unconvinced by allegations in Italy that Bulgaria instigated the attempted assassination. . . ." Gwertzman floated a theory, which came from State Department officials, that the whole thing was simply the reflection of an internal Italian political debate:

> Italian leaders are divided on the case. The Socialist party . . . has accused the Bulgarians, and by implication, the Soviet Union of instigating the plot against the Pope as well as in gunrunning, drug smuggling, and cooperation with Italian Red Brigades terrorists. But the dominant Christian Democrats have been more restrained.

The same point was made by the Washington *Post*'s Rome stringer, Sari Gilbert.

Finally, there was the *Times*'s editorial position, revealed on December 18. First, the strategic point:

> If any nation was implicated, it erred foully and foolishly. Killing a Polish Pope would not have made Poland less rebellious; relying on the silence of a deranged zealot risks devastating exposure. Scruple aside, the command to eliminate a statesman is the last resort of a bankrupt diplomacy.

Second, the moral point:

> When it comes to assassinations of state, Americans have reason to test the evidence soberly and to avoid excessive sanctimony. . . .
>
> . . . when the Congo was in turmoil in 1960, [Eisenhower's] angry words were taken by aides as an order to assassinate President Lumumba. In this and other cases, notably Fidel Castro's, the CIA acted on murky authority that would preserve official "deniability" and came up with harebrained plots that, mercifully, failed. . . .
>
> In a world of murderous bureaucracies, crimes of state are not so much ordered as implied. That Yuri Andropov willed an attack on John Paul II is possible but hardly proven. That his people became mired in a sleazy conspiracy on imagined authority is a likelihood Americans should be the first to understand.

Just about everything was wrong with this editorial. Crimes of state are certainly ordered. In the United States, not only an explicit presidential order but congressional approval is required for any covert action; even in Eisenhower's day an explicit order would have been necessary. (In fact, since there is only the flimsiest evidence on which to hang the claim that the United States wanted, let alone attempted, the assassination of Lumumba, those who make this claim have to resort, as here, to the expedient of suggesting that Eisen-

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hower somehow "implied" his wishes.) Furthermore, the *Times*—along with a surprising number of others—had the wrong culprit; a decision of such magnitude in the Kremlin would have to have been made at the Politburo level, not by the head of the KGB. Thus, it was Brezhnev and company (Andropov included, of course), who would have had to make the decision.

What about the strategic considerations? The Polish crisis threatened the entire Soviet empire (as it still does, albeit not with the same immediacy), and there were three crucial figures in the Solidarity phenomenon: Cardinal Wyszynski, Pope John Paul II, and Lech Walesa. The first was dying in Poland (and had been given six weeks to live as of the time of the Agca operation); both of the others appear to have been targeted by the Russians for assassination. The *Times* might believe that a movement deprived of its leaders remains as threatening as before, but many others would disagree. From the Kremlin's standpoint, a Pope who might go to Poland to lead the resistance was a dangerous man indeed.

More to the point, neither the *Times* editorialists nor its correspondents seemed capable of understanding that the Agca case was only one among many, and that the weight of evidence in the hands of Italian judges was growing almost daily. As Claire Sterling wrote in the *Wall Street Journal* on December 22, the evidence was too great to be summarized in a brief newspaper story (and anyway could hardly be obtained by journalists who arrived late on the scene or who, like Henry Kamm, did not speak Italian and consequently had not established the kind of close relationship that would make information accessible). But the journalists were relying for the most part on the word of American officials, both in Washington and in Rome, and these continued to assert that the evidence was insufficient.

Why? In the first place, American officials were not particularly well informed. The evidence came from Italian judges, and the Italian judiciary is exceedingly independent. Even some officials of the Italian government were not abreast of the case, and had to depend upon the judges for what little they did know.

Then, too, we may assume that Americans in Rome suffered from the same professional jealousy that plagued the Italian secret service in the first few days after the arrest of Antonov, when even the Italians were deprecating the evidence. (They had not developed it themselves, and probably still did not know what it was.) It would have been difficult for an American official to admit to inquiring American journalists that their own government had not conducted an investigation of the plot to kill the Pope, and was moreover not aware of the information in the hands of Italian judges.

Added to this was an instinctive shying away from the politically unattractive notion that the Soviets would try to kill the Pope, together with an equally instinctive reluctance to transmit information damaging to the Soviet Union in the name of the American government. An extreme instance of this was presented by Vice President George Bush, who told a reporter from the *Christian Science Monitor*:

> My view of Andropov is that some people make this KGB thing sound horrendous. Maybe I speak defensively as a former head of the CIA. But leave out the operational side of KGB—the naughty things they allegedly do. . . .

Thus, throughout December, while the Italians issued one charge after another, and the Italian press was filled with information about Bulgarian subversion in Italy, the readers of the New York *Times*, along with those of most leading dailies and weeklies, were unaware of the considerable body of evidence in the hands of Italian judges, did not realize that the Italians had arrested an alleged Bulgarian agent in a high position in a trade union that carried on contacts with Solidarity in Poland, and had not heard that the Bulgarians had been caught deeply involved in an enormous drugs- and arms-smuggling operation in northern Italy. Nor did they realize that the Bulgarian agent in question (Luigi Scricciolo) was providing information that matched what Agca had been saying under interrogation, thus giving the Italians further evidence of the existence of a Soviet-inspired plot to kill the Pope.

Phase Four

DURING the same week that the New York *Times* was urging Americans to refrain from thinking the worst of the Soviet Union, the mood of the "elite" press began to change. Of the three major networks, only CBS systematically ignored the story or gave it short shrift in its evening news broadcast. NBC, however, had been continuing its research, and was giving ample coverage to the arrest of Antonov and other unfolding developments. ABC, whose bureau in Rome had been by far the best in reporting on the Bulgarian connection, similarly covered events well. At the same time, the two weeklies, *Time* and *Newsweek*, visibly began to shift gears. In its last issue of the year (dated December 27), *Time* revealed that the Pope himself believed Agca to be part of a KGB plot, and went on to deal with the growing evidence.*

* In an attempt to "balance" this information, *Time* also quoted Italian Interior Minister Rognoni: "It is a matter of extremely serious facts, [but] only evidence, not proof has emerged." Neither *Time* nor any other American publication ever pointed out that before becoming Interior Minister, Signor Rognoni was the President of the Italy-Palestine Friendship Association, and that he has never been particularly acute on the subject of international terrorism.

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The following week, both *Time* and *Newsweek* devoted considerable space to an investigation of the new information. *Newsweek* moved a giant step toward accepting KGB involvement:

> . . . there is reason to believe that the Bulgarian secret police recruited Agca, through Turkish intermediaries, into the ranks of its hired guns, and that he was armed and supported by the Bulgarians when he shot the Pope.

Time came to much the same conclusion: "The normally cautious Italian politicians exuded confidence that they possessed the evidence to incriminate, at the very least, the Bulgarian secret service."

What had changed the minds of the weeklies? First, there had been the presentations to parliament by Italian ministers, above all Defense Minister Lagorio's strong statement that the shooting of the Pope was "a true act of war in a time of peace." (This did not, however, sway Henry Kamm, who in the New York *Times* of December 21 quoted a government official who said that Lagorio's statements "reflected a desire by the Socialists to exploit the present public concern over Bulgaria for political advantage. . . .") Second, the interlocking evidence was beginning to be appreciated, and the logic of the case was asserting itself. Even some previously skeptical columnists changed their minds: Joseph Kraft, for example, and Georgie Anne Geyer, who now explained that the Pope represented a systematic challenge to the Soviet empire ("a brilliant and sophisticated kind of infiltration—and it terrified and enraged the Soviets, for whom murder has historically been a normal tool of diplomacy").

Furthermore, as *Time* had observed, the "normally cautious" Italians were taking a very hard position on the case, and this required some explanation. Historically, Italy has been quite soft on international terrorists; the normal treatment of Arab terrorists caught *in flagrante* on Italian soil has been to book them on a private flight to Tripoli or, in the old days, to Beirut. All of a sudden, several judges of impeccable reputation were refusing to drop charges and were holding firm in the teeth of some quite violent language coming from Sofia and Moscow. Would they act in this fashion without compelling evidence? Would they jeopardize Italy's national interest (which includes, at a minimum, good commercial relations with the Soviet Union) without something approaching solid proof? And as the columnists thought it over, it seemed that even the official American reluctance to credit the Bulgarian connection represented a sort of confirmation.

As Flora Lewis wrote in the New York *Times*:

> The sinister aura of this spy story too fantastic for fiction is enhanced, not diminished, by the remarkable caution of Western governments. Even President Reagan . . . is ducking the question of possible Kremlin complicity now. That is obviously because it is so dreadful to contemplate the consequences if more damaging facts do emerge. . . .

In saying this, however, Miss Lewis launched a new worry: if the Russians turned out to be guilty, it would be better for us all if we pretended they were not. Recalling that the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria at Sarajevo had been instrumental in kicking off World War I, she warned that we must "prepare against impetuous action and an emotional response that could make St. Peter's Square comparable to Sarajevo."

In the weeks that followed, this theme—which could also be sensed behind the New York *Times* editorial of December 18 urging Americans "to test the evidence soberly"—was reiterated over and over again. Tracing the assassination plot back to the Kremlin, it was said, would endanger world peace, or a possible summit between Reagan and Andropov, or arms-control talks, or "good relations" in general. Indeed, by the end of January, Robert Toth of the Los Angeles *Times* was quoting an American official to the effect that "Reagan could never meet Andropov if it was proved unequivocally that the Bulgarians, and therefore the Soviet KGB, were behind the plot." John Wallach of the Hearst News Service wrote that "some CIA officials have actively discouraged speculation of a Bulgarian or Soviet KGB plot against the Pope because they fear if such a link is firmly established, it could poison relations between the U.S. . . . and Andropov."

The elite press had thus once again fallen victim to a double standard. It is inconceivable that the New York *Times* would urge the Kremlin to downplay evidence of American involvement in clandestine activity, even if no murder were involved. And would an American journalist accept the plea of an intelligence official to keep a story quiet if there were abundant evidence of *American* plotting to murder a foreign leader? In such a case, our journalists would bravely wave the banner of the people's right to know, demand an end to official cover-ups, and insist that the truth must out. No such cry was heard from CBS (in fact, hardly anything about this story was to be heard from CBS), the New York *Times* (which did not repair its own investigative deficiency until late March 1983, when it published a long front-page article by Nicholas Gage detailing the links to Bulgaria), or even those publications like *Time* and *Newsweek* that had come to take the evidence seriously.

JOURNALISTS are not policy-makers. Their job is to give us an accurate picture of events and personalities so that we, citizens and officials alike, can make rational decisions.

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But when it came to the plot to kill the Pope, our journalists were not practicing journalism, they were trying to conduct policy. At first, they made an assessment: it would be irrational for the Russians to do such a thing, therefore they could not have done it. When the evidence became too great to ignore, the journalists shifted gears; yes, it seemed the Soviets were involved, but (since the consequences of this discovery might be dangerous) let us try to "limit the damage"—this was the point of trying to stop the trail at the Bulgarians' door rather than following it to Moscow—or deny its significance altogether. As a last resort, invoke *Realpolitik*: our national interest demands good relations with the Soviet Union, and this must take precedence over revelations of international intrigue.

For years, a debate has been raging over the Soviet connection to international terrorism. After the Pope was shot, many journalists deprecated the idea of a KGB connection because to admit it would give added credibility to Secretary of State Haig's claim that the Russians were behind a good deal of terrorism in the world. But in several articles in the past months, it has been casually revealed that most knowledgeable people in the West were thoroughly convinced of Soviet involvement in terrorism, particularly in Italy. Henry Kamm, after citing his unnamed Israeli source to undermine the theory of a Bulgarian connection, went on to provide considerable evidence of Communist-bloc involvement in international terrorism (even to the point of revealing that three of the most radical PLO leaders were then staying in the same Bulgarian hotel where Agca had lived for 50 days). Sari Gilbert, the Washington *Post*'s correspondent in Rome, revealed on March 20 that the Italians were convinced of a long-standing connection between Eastern Europe (primarily Czechoslovakia) and the Red Brigades, a point also made by *Time* and *Newsweek* in their recent coverage. Thus, those who had been arguing for years that such a connection existed—and for doing so were subjected to scorn from their colleagues in the media—seem to have been vindicated.

BUT to accept the factual accuracy of a view is not the same thing as accepting its political implications. In the case of the Soviet connection to international terrorism, what needs to be explained is why the many leads were ignored for so many years, and why, when the truth was finally admitted, so little was done to search out its consequences. On the biggest story of the decade, an elite press that prides itself on its fearlessness in pursuit of the facts had the necessary facts available to it, yet sedulously declined to print them, or denied their significance, or refused to see their pertinence to an accurate account of global events. Whatever the source of this habit, which operates in many areas besides that of international terrorism, the result is a systematic distortion of reality.

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Israel as a Strategic Asset

Steven L. Spiegel

THE idea that the American commitment to Israel has damaged our interests in the Middle East has surfaced once again as a result of the war in Lebanon and its diplomatic aftermath. This, in spite of the fact that in the Middle East, a region located on the doorstep of the USSR and where resentment of the West is well-ingrained, the supposedly damaged U.S. is today the dominant political power.

An examination of the historical record, moreover, demonstrates that Israel has often served as a silent partner in the American role in the area. At the request of the U.S., for example, Israel mobilized in September 1970 to defend Jordan from Syrian attack, a move which in itself averted the need. We also know that Israeli intelligence has acted to warn several Arab governments close to the U.S. of impending actions against them. In the summer of 1977, the new Begin government provided Anwar Sadat with information about an effort by Libyan-backed conspirators to overthrow him. The Israelis have similarly provided repeated secret warnings of threats to the Saudis. In the recent mini-crisis over a Libyan-inspired threat to the Sudanese government, the intelligence sources which the U.S. relied on to mobilize a counter-offensive were largely Israeli.

In 1982 the Israelis drove two Soviet proxies, the Syrians and the PLO, from Beirut and opened Lebanon to the United States. The war in Lebanon itself represented the culmination of a decade and a half in which Israeli intelligence and military methods were in the vanguard of the campaign to control and destroy the network of international terrorism which has been operating against democratic or pro-Western regimes from Germany to Colombia; Ireland to Thailand; Spain to Turkey. The much-maligned Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor also dealt a blow to future instability and violence.

But even these examples do not do justice to Israeli influence on the political and military balance of the area and the benefits this brings to the United States. Israel today is a significant enough military power to act as a deterrent against Soviet plans for an invasion of the Persian Gulf or for activities in the Mediterranean. For example, if the Soviet air force wishes to entertain operational activities in the vicinity, it must take the Israeli air force into account. So too at sea. Although not noted for naval prowess, Israel has become a major factor in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially since its forces were largely withdrawn from the Gulf of Tiran with the relinquishing of the Sinai. Indeed, in the 200-250 mile area off Israel's shores, no power can easily challenge its naval vessels. (During the recent Sudan crisis, it was this major Israeli presence which permitted units of the Sixth Fleet to leave the coast of Lebanon.) The Soviets must also take this force into account in formulating their own plans and operations.

With the Soviet Union so close at hand by comparison with the U.S., in no other area is there such a high premium on U.S. airlift and sealift capabilities to sustain the credibility of U.S. military strategy. The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) does not have available to it adequate supplies, especially fuel, for use in a crisis—which is sufficient in and of itself to destroy its credibility. Where else but in Israel could such supplies be safely stored? The Israelis also have the facilities and the trained manpower to maintain U.S. equipment at a 20-30 percent higher state of readiness than is currently the case. Their naval facilities could be expanded to permit increased cooperation with U.S. forces in the area, such as the tracking of Soviet forces. Israel's outstanding medical facilities—by far the best in the region—could also be expanded, and at relatively low cost, to provide care for U.S. personnel in an emergency.

DESPITE the compelling logic of Israel's past and present utility to the U.S. and the major benefits to be gained from increasing cooperation in the future, recent administrations have moved in the opposite direction. During the very period when the Israeli presence in the region has been most valuable to the United States, officials have made growing efforts to downplay the importance of the connection with Israel, to end the strategic dialogue, and to place ever-

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wider limits on even secret areas of strategic cooperation.

What explains this perverse behavior? The argument repeated so often that it is now an unquestioned article of faith is that cooperation with the Arab states is essential if U.S. interests in the Middle East are to be preserved. Since the Arab regimes will not accept a close U.S.-Israeli relationship—and certainly not strategic cooperation—the only way to protect U.S. interests in the area is to increase the distance between Washington and Jerusalem.

Now it is quite true that Arab states complain publicly and privately about any kind of cooperation between the U.S. and Israel, or any kind of American assistance to Israel. Yet this has not prevented the United States from emerging as the dominant great power in the area. Indeed, U.S. influence with the Arabs has usually been strongest when the relationship with Israel has been the most solid. Thus Anwar Sadat switched from an alliance with the Soviet Union to the United States precisely because he believed that only the U.S. could persuade Israel to withdraw from the Sinai.

No one should expect Arab leaders to applaud the American-Israeli relationship, and in deference to Arab sensitivities, both Washington and Jerusalem need to be discreet in parading the full scope of their contacts. But as the Jordanian crisis of September 1970 makes clear, no matter how loudly they may protest U.S.-Israeli security cooperation, Arab leaders will not hesitate to benefit from the U.S.-Israeli connection in an emergency; and, as demonstrated by Syria's precipitous withdrawal from Jordan on that occasion, both Arab radicals and their Soviet patrons will be deterred.

The arguments against collaboration with Israel might have greater weight if functioning security cooperation had been established with other states in the region. But despite prodigious and generous efforts with respect to all possible alternatives over the last several years, no serious program has been established and none is likely to be. Great hopes have been expressed for bases and cooperation with Saudi Arabia, but its leaders are so frightened that they will not agree to any kind of American activity which will help to fulfill any U.S. strategic schemes. The Saudis have in fact hampered U.S. attempts to enlarge facilities in the Persian Gulf by placing pressure on the Omanis and the Bahrainis not to expand cooperation and preferably to contract it. American officials are reduced to arguing that increased arms sales to Riyadh will lead to American equipment being available in case of an emergency. This position is based entirely on faith, for there is no concrete evidence or specific agreement available to substantiate the confidence with which it is avowed.

Many commentators have viewed Egypt—with its peace treaty with Israel and its new relationship with the U.S.—as an attractive proxy. Yet even under President Sadat the Egyptians were reluctant to provide the U.S. with permanent bases. Today they are embarrassed to be identified with the U.S. too closely lest their new openings to the rest of the Arab world be impaired. One high-ranking Egyptian official recently told the press: "Cooperation between the United States and Egypt is on a bilateral basis and does not deviate to any regional or strategic scales. We are not a party in a regional bloc set up against anybody." So much for all the talk about the development of an Egyptian intervention capability to project force into nearby areas.

The talk within the Reagan administration of a Jordanian Rapid Deployment Force is no more realistic. Jordan is a small country, too weak to risk serious conflict with any of its neighbors. As King Hussein's behavior has always demonstrated, Jordanian politics is the politics of survival, and this is simply incompatible with the role of a regional proxy.

The only other possible alternative is Iraq. To many officials, that country's conflict with Iran and disillusionment with the USSR present a tempting potential for future cooperation. That this option can have been seriously discussed, however, is testimony to the poverty of the strategic approach currently being followed by the U.S. in the Middle East. Iraq, unstable and unreliable in the best of times, is now badly shaken by its disastrous war wth Iran. In the 1950's the U.S had paramount influence with both Iran and Iraq; given the conflict between the two in the 1980's, a close relationship with both will not be possible, even after the war ends. Despite the tensions in the relationship between Teheran and Washington since the Shah's departure, the U.S. cannot afford to burn its bridges with Iran because that country is more important than Iraq on every index of strategic and geopolitical valuation. When the Ayatollah passes from the scene, the U.S. will have to make an attempt to recoup and to prevent Russian domination. The Kremlin has clearly recognized which country represents the greater prize, and its so far unsuccessful attempt to flirt with Iran is in large measure responsible for its tensions with Iraq. Even if Iraq were prepared to realign, and even if it were worth a new effort for the U.S. to consummate a new relationship, the risk in terms of sacrificing future openings to Iran would negate the option.

A HARD look at the potential allies of the U.S. in the Middle East, then, returns us to Israel as the only country in the region upon whom we can rely. It is no longer a question of whether the U.S. dare take advantage of Israel's offer for increased cooperation. The question is, do we have a choice? Before his mind was cluttered with the politics of Washington bureaucratizing, Ronald Reagan said it well: "The fall of Iran has increased Israel's value as perhaps the

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only remaining strategic asset in the region on which the United States can truly rely."

But in addition to its value as a regional power, Israel's importance to the United States has a global dimension as well. The notion that Israel could convey military lessons to the U.S. is seen as either embarrassing or as ludicrous given the disparity in the two countries' size and global responsibilities. Yet the fact remains that it is Israel which is in essence testing American equipment under combat conditions and against Soviet arms, and it is Israel which is developing the technical innovations and tactics to deal with new challenges posed by the latest Soviet weaponry.

In the past, Israeli experience affected the timing and direction of large sections of U.S. research and development—thereby reducing needless expenditure on faulty systems on the one hand and stimulating necessary programs on the other. Thus the 1967 war, by strengthening the case for a fighter like the F-16, helped in its development.

The 1973 war accented the new significance of electronic warfare—work on such weapons as air-to-ground, anti-ship, and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as countermeasures, needed to be intensified. Both the 1967 and 1973 wars demonstrated the continued importance of tanks, whose utility under present conditions many had questioned, and Israeli combat experience significantly influenced the development of the M-1, the latest American battle tank.

As for the 1982 war in Lebanon, much of inestimable military value to the United States came out of it. For example, the Israelis were able to inspect the remains of several Mig-23's and one Mig-25 which had been shot down, thereby providing the basis for adjusting operational tactics and improving American weaponry to counter equipment of Soviet design. The Israelis also worked out a lower-technology, less expensive method of destroying the T-72—the principal Soviet battle tank.

In this war, too, Israel was the first country in the world to deploy remotely-piloted vehicles (RPV's) successfully. The Israelis thus proved that intelligence could be gathered during battle inexpensively and at low risk to the lives of airmen. Thanks to this demonstration, the Pentagon, which had placed a low priority on its own RPV program (the Aquila), revived it immediately after the Lebanon war.

A particularly dramatic event occurred in 1982 when Israel showed there was a means of breaking the anti-aircraft missile wall the Russians thought they had developed against Western air forces. This accomplishment is bound to cost the Soviets heavily, because they will have to make major adjustments and improvements in their entire air-defense system, changing production lines and developing new equipment. Since this system is similar to the Warsaw Pact air-defense system in Europe, the Israeli achievement affects the conventional balance between the U.S. and USSR as well.

Another contribution by Israel to the U.S. is in the field of intelligence. Despite the continued popularity of spy novels, in the 1980's intelligence gathered by electronic devices rather than human spies has become central. As suggested by Israel's success with pilotless drones, which have already proved a powerful intelligence tool, the Israelis have become important as developers of instruments (where they pay for development costs and the U.S. receives the benefit), as providers of information, and as a critical base from which to gather information. Were it not for the Israeli coverage of this critical region, the U.S. would have to spend more on such instruments as spy satellites.

In addition, the Israelis have helped develop intelligence systems with American corporations like Boeing, Sylvania, RCA, E-Systems, Beechcraft —in each case saving the U.S. millions of dollars. On some systems the Israeli contributions can be small but crucial; they often have implications for other regions. Thus, an intelligence balloon developed by Israel for over $100 million will now be used by the U.S. over Cuba. Indeed, the U.S. intelligence community makes use of 60-70 percent of Israel's high-technology intelligence equipment.

IN KEEPING with the hostility toward Israel which has become so fashionable in recent months, three arguments have been brought forth to deny the importance of the Lebanon war to the military interests of the United States. The first is that the Israeli victories demonstrated only that Israeli pilots are superior to Syrian pilots and tell us nothing about the equipment involved. But the Syrians had been trained by Soviet advisers, and while it would probably have been more difficult for the Israelis against Russians, there is reason to believe that the final results would not have been different in major respects.

A second argument—that the Syrians do not receive first-line Soviet equipment—is misleading. The second- and third-echelon units in the USSR (mainly reserves) are still to a large extent equipped with T-54 and T-55 tanks, as are most East European countries (Poland and Czechoslovakia both produce the T-54 and T-55). But these are not good enough for the Syrians, who rely primarily on the much more advanced T-62 and T-72. Thus the argument that the Syrians suffered from inferior equipment simply is not accurate. In most cases the Israelis faced the same type of Soviet equipment the U.S. would face in a conventional war.

The third and most convincing argument against the military value of the Lebanon war to the U.S. is that the Soviets, having been forewarned, will now be able to adjust for weaknesses they did not previously realize they suffered from. This may be so, but taken to its logical conclusion

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it suggests that it would have been better for the Israelis to lose the war with the Syrians lest some of their latest innovations be compromised. The fact is that if both sides learned valuable lessons in Lebanon, only the Israelis (and the U.S. when the information is shared) know *why* the Soviet equipment was defeated. The Soviets are reduced to adapting and guessing. To the extent that they must renovate their air-defense umbrella instead of expanding into new arenas or improving offensive weapons, the Western position is also strengthened, both because of reduced Soviet offensive readiness and because of reduced Western costs to counter new Soviet offensive equipment.

One CIA estimate suggests that the Soviets regularly spend more on air-defense systems (primarily missiles, guns, and associated radar) than on their strategic forces—about 12 percent of their overall defense budget. If we add the cost of the Mig-21 and Mig-23 interceptors, which are part of the Russian air-defense complex, we reach a total of about 20 percent of their entire defense budget—about the same as their navy. That such a substantial percentage of their defense operations should be compromised must be seen as nothing less than a major blow.

An ironic illustration of the effect of Israel's military reputation can be seen in the arms-sales arena. It is well-known in the U.S. defense field that many countries secretly send representatives to Israel to discuss their weapons purchases. Even from afar, Israel's influence in these matters is great. Thus, the Japanese hesitated for more than a year over whether to purchase the Grumman E2C Hawkeye, the airborne command-and-control system the Israelis used so effectively in the Lebanon war. After Israel decided to buy it, the Japanese made their affirmative decision. Since the war, several countries—especially Singapore—have expressed interest in Hawkeye. In this case Grumman gained at the expense of the British Nimrod. What the Israelis once did for the French Mirage, they now accomplish for American aircraft such as the F-16 at the expense of the Mirage 2000. Once the Israelis purchased the MD-500, an advanced helicopter gunship which they had helped to improve, the Jordanians, South Koreans, and Kenyans moved to purchase it instead of the German-made BO 105 and the French and British Gazelle.

One of the reasons the Israelis do as well as they do in the military sphere is their talent for innovation and their technical expertise. In general, Israeli research-and-development procedures are quicker and cheaper than in the United States—partly because the Israelis, living as they do under the threat of imminent danger, are more flexible, and partly because their small size puts a limit on inhibiting regulations. Improvisation and short-cuts are the Israeli specialty, and they operate on a quick-reaction basis which permits crash programs not possible with the standard peacetime procedures prevailing in the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. armed forces have been able to benefit from Israeli developments whose licenses are later sold to American companies for larger production.

Recent examples include various types of mine- and obstacle-clearing equipment in which Israel is particularly advanced; the American SMAW warhead matched with an Israeli B-300 rocket launcher purchased by the Marines from McDonnell Douglas as an anti-fortification device; and the newly developed air filters for helicopters to keep sand particles out of the engines (an example of the dangers of working without filters is exemplified by the disastrous rescue raid over Iran in April 1980). An Engineering Fighting Vehicle for use by army engineers is also being produced in an unusual joint project.

More important than particular cases, however, is the wider application of Israeli innovations. The Israeli air force today faces a more complex challenge than its American counterpart. When an Israeli fighter plane takes off, it does not know whether it will confront Soviet, European, or American equipment. This complicated threat drives Israeli designers to a constant search for improvements and refinements, and it forces them always to probe the fringes of the latest art, to look forward to the next war rather than backward to the last one. Because of the close integration of Israeli developers with American corporations, the U.S. inevitably benefits.

The process works in the following way: the Israelis receive permission to purchase an American weapon—say, the F-15. In dealing with the company producing the weapon, they request particular features which the Pentagon has rejected, or they are offered features the Defense Department is not interested in developing. The Israelis are informed that if they are prepared to pay for the research-and-development costs, the American company will include it in the models sold to Israel. The Israelis agree, the item is developed, and the Israelis employ it. Once the weapon has been developed and tested, the Pentagon adopts it for American use (with obvious savings to the American taxpayer in comparison to a situation where the U.S. forces would have had to develop and test the item themselves).

A few recent examples of this process include: the conformal fuel tanks on the F-15; leading edge slats for the F-4 Phantom; an external fuel tank for the M-113; modification of the M-109 self-propelled artillery piece; a Head-Up Display and a weapons-delivery system for the A-4; bomb racks for the F-16; certain types of FLIR night-vision equipment; and a digital weapons-delivery system for the F-4.

Similarly, Israeli combat experiences have led to the improvement of American equipment—potentially saving American lives in the process and cer-

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tainly cutting costs. Indeed, just realizing that a piece of equipment has a problem may be more critical than providing a solution.

Item: Israel discovered problems in the fuel pumps of the engine for the F-15 and F-16, and provided American engineers with ideas on how to deal with the difficulties. In all, the Israelis have made 27 substantial recommendations for changes in the F-15.

Item: The Israelis learned from combat use of the M-60 tank before the October 1973 war that its hydraulic fluid was highly flammable, thereby increasing casualties, and this discovery led to the adoption of measures to prevent such casualties in the future. Over the years Israel has made 114 modifications in the M-48 and M-60 tanks, many of which (such as improvements on tank air cleaners and the development of new cupolas for the M-48) have been adopted by the U.S. Army. In addition, the Israelis have been extremely successful in developing dry-clad storage for their tanks so that they can go for years without being checked or repaired and can be used suddenly in a crisis.

Item: Israeli combat experience has led to such changes as the decreased use of searchlights and the increased use of thermal sights for night fighting; the increased use of tanks and armored personnel carriers (APC's) in tandem; improvement in command, control, and communications, facilitating the coordination of air, land, and sea operations down to the unit level; the use of electronic warfare in reconnaissance units and aerial electronic countermeasures.

There is evidence, however, that the U.S. military could benefit to an even greater degree than it already does from Israeli developments. For example, the Israelis recently perfected the land-navigation system (LANS) for tanks, facilitating their accuracy of navigation, and the position-and-azimuth-determining system (PADS) for the artillery corps. In the U.S., where development costs typically exceed Israeli expenses by 30 percent and the lead time is usually longer, neither of these systems has yet been built despite the expenditure of tens of millions of dollars. Similarly, since the Israelis have already deployed and proven the effectiveness of the mini-RPV, it would be more cost-effective to piggy-back on the first-generation Israeli innovation than to spend millions merely to equal the Israeli achievement.

THE facts speak for themselves. Israel is a unique and impressive ally. It influences political developments in its own area, causes the Soviets embarrassment and military difficulties, facilitates the evaluation of American weapons, conveys lessons which can be learned only from combat experience, provides intelligence on the region, and saves U.S. defense costs through innovations and modifications of U.S. weaponry. Despite claims that Israel is a strain on the U.S. treasury, the types of assistance it provides more than compensate for U.S. aid. After all, if Israeli experiences were worth only 2 percent of the annual U.S. defense budget, that would amount to over $4 billion.

Israel's willingness to cooperate and its capacity to innovate suggest that the savings could be even higher if we were prepared to place the relationship with Jerusalem on a more solid footing. Instead, the strategic factors in the American-Israeli relationship are regularly neglected or made subservient to political disputes over such issues as West Bank settlement or withdrawal from Lebanon.

In Shakespeare's *King Lear* the monarch foolishly relinquishes his kingdom to two daughters who flatter him with expansive but false promises of everlasting devotion while he disowns his one faithful daughter, Cordelia, because she will not stoop to pretenses. The analogy with America's current Middle East policy is compelling. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which offer friendship but will not cooperate with U.S. defense or diplomatic efforts, are regarded as crucial allies, whereas Israel—which offers facilities and services—is progressively treated as a pariah, a candidate for economic sanctions and political alienation. King Lear destroyed his life, his family, and his kingdom because he could not judge between friend and foe. The moral for the United States is obvious.

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What Do the Poles Want?

Leopold Tyrmand

> . . . compared to us our Western friends are sheep and adolescents. They prove with their articles that they know what socialism is; we prove it with our ulcers. After reading a few books, they declare it a paradise; after a few more books, they say it is hell. They don't know what it is when they visit party secretaries; even now, when they are interviewing dissidents, they still don't.
>
> —GEORGE KONRÁD, *The Loser*

ONCE it was only rulers, statesmen, or revered champions of science who attended conferences. These days, people of more modest stations in government, social agencies, and the communications industry are entitled to sit around a table, deliver papers, and deliberate the complexity and destiny of politics, aesthetics, law. Their personal or professional caliber does not necessarily guarantee a conference's success, let alone practical results. But the synergistic impact of the thousands and thousands of conferences, meetings, seminars, symposiums, and panels that flourish in the West cannot be underestimated.

Conferences tend to be regarded as decorative, yet they do have a formative influence. In the endless and amorphous process of shaping public opinion—our inept sovereign—they connect higher learning with the mass diffusion of information and opinion, often against the will of the mass media. The dissection of topics which may be of only secondary interest to some may appear inconsequential, but it should not be dismissed lightly: cautious thinkers believe that the idle talk of intellectual chatterboxes actually engenders history.

The First Day

THIS was a roundtable conference. The subject was Poland—a country that has recently contributed more to the conference industry than any other on earth. It was held a mere eighty miles from the Polish border, in West Berlin. While we may assume that the distance was of little significance either actually or symbolically, it meant a lot to me.

From the outset, it occurred to me that I was less interested in what was going to be said here than in my own reactions to it, so that I could participate most profitably by remaining as detached as possible. Such subjectivity is not, of course, *de rigueur* at conferences. The observer at such events is supposed to extract faithfully the gist of all points of view presented, evaluate them fairly, convey some sense of the general atmosphere, and then and only then inject a few reflections of his own. Nothing, however, could have been further from my impulses when I took my place at the table. Even before the first speaker had finished talking, I was already formulating my rejoinders, in a display of presumption which I can only compare to a sudden outbreak of mental illness: a sort of temporary schizophrenia which afflicts the mental state of anyone who has actually lived under a totalitarian regime when faced with a group of people who deal with such regimes professionally—as diplomats, journalists, scholars. Having spent most of my life under Hitler and Stalin, I see Nazism and Communism not as abstractions but as personal enemies. I tend to anthropomorphize them in a way that appears unintelligible to those who have not shared the experience.

Although there is, I agree, a bit of phoniness in the posture of a better-informed victim, I firmly believe that the understanding of a totalitarian reality is inseparable from an organic and empirical relationship with it. My fellow Americans in particular (since I am now one of them) seem uncomprehending when I try to describe my former condition. For them freedom is like breathing, and they no more notice its presence than they notice the presence of oxygen in their air supply. Americans are not the only ones who find it hard to understand the nature of totalitarian reality. Soon after I defected, I talked in Paris to a prominent Polish editor in exile who had spent his life in the West doing battle (and quite successfully) against Communism. Our con-

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versation took place at the time of a state visit to France by a top Polish Communist who had been directly instrumental in my Warsaw miseries and humiliations. "You understand nothing," I told my interlocutor, "you weren't *there*." "Would that guy who's talking in the Elysée Palace with the French President understand you any better?" sneered the editor. "Of course," I said, with no hesitation. "The hunter and his prey are linked by an identical sense of reality; they both know something others don't."

My own meditations aside, the conference itself can only be called a very successful one. Convened by the prestigious Aspen Institute-Berlin, it was presided over by a moderator who combined sartorial excellence with a gift for wit and a sense of order firm enough to bring the most diverse intellections into focus. In attendance were Americans and Germans, Poles and Britons, government officials and press people, all suffused with good will, agreement, and intellectual harmony. So unified were we that a sort of Salvation Army spirit pervaded the exchanges, saturating even opposing views with the gentlest bonhomie. Why then at this veritable banquet of good intentions could I not shake the feeling of irrelevance, and the growing realization that the gap between perception and comprehension was as vast here as it is everywhere else?

The majority of my fellow conferees, even the most insightful among them, used the plural "Poles" when speaking of Polish Communist officialdom, apparently not cognizant of the fact that in Poland, since 1945, the Communists have been considered a category apart from the rest of the nation, a subgroup without clear-cut national definition. They may call themselves Poles, but in those deep layers of collective consciousness where the sense of a commonly accepted propriety resides, a distinction is made between *them* and *us*, and they are referred to almost universally in the third person.

This distinction, sealed into the very fabric of the Polish reality, somehow escapes the recognition of Westerners. Thus, no American is able to comprehend the bitter frustration of a Pole on reading daily headlines like "Poland Takes Action Against Striking Miners." What Poland? Why should those who slaughter miners be designated *Poland* just because they hold brutal sway over the nation's territory and have stolen and falsified Polish national emblems and signs?

Like the citizens of my mutilated former homeland, I still retain a nonpolitical approach to politics. That is why I felt so apart from the other conferees, as they painstakingly scrutinized every detail of the interplay among the Communist party, the Church, and Solidarity, and drew minute distinctions among the various factions and individuals within these bodies. My table partners were perfectly ready to agree that the basic struggle in Poland is between the society as a whole and Communism. They seemed to have understood that the intangibles of personal yearning, suffering, and alienation form the very core of this fight; but somehow the crux of the matter was lost as they noted all the other aspects to be pondered, negotiated, and perhaps even resolved by the combined impact of Western economic help, political maneuvering behind the scenes, and tough but "pragmatic" dialogue with the supreme supervisor in Moscow. "*No*," I constantly wanted to shout, "there is *one* issue only, that of Communist power, whose legitimacy the Poles have refused to accept ever since Yalta, and will never accept. The West must do something about *that* essential factor, and if it doesn't, it's the West that will be the loser."

There was more too that I wanted to add: that the West must honestly and thoroughly reevaluate its notion of Communist power, something it has never really done, and that only then will it finally understand—for the good of the so-called "captive nations" but for its own good as well—that the main principle of Communist strategy is never *really* to negotiate anything with anybody, even while pretending to do so. The Hungarians and the Czechs tried unsuccessfully to tell the world about the fraudulence of Communist negotiations, but only the Poles have succeeded, though only to a limited extent, in making the issue more visible. The Poles have lost the latest round, but they will never stop knocking at the walls of the dungeon, which is, actually, not the Poles' but the West's problem. Yet none of this did I succeed in making clear, since my views were emotional rather than analyses of changing political realities.

Instead, I listened as a West German representative of one of the major parties involved in the formulation of *Ostpolitik* got up and delivered a sensible, kindhearted plea for priority aid to the Poles at any cost and through every possible channel of assistance. Here was a gentleman overwhelmed by the spirit of sharing who was perverting the idea of giving. What he said sounded both humanitarian and honorable, but for all his solicitude, it was actually an appeal for unconditional maintenance of the political status quo, whereas the whole point of the Polish effort was the positive rejection of the status quo. Following the German, there arose an Englishman of methodical cast of mind who asked the speaker whether he actually knew what the Poles really wanted, or was offering his compassion and generosity without consulting their wishes. The German theoretician ducked the question: he insisted good-naturedly on finding a solution whereby all parties would be reconciled and happy. I tried to say something myself on this sunny but dangerously naive proposition, but the sheer effort of

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describing the chasm between East and West made me sound in my own ears a trifle incoherent.

It is true that, *en masse,* the Poles, like everybody else, want peace, security, a decent living. But above all what they want is a modicum of purposeful and effective control over their own lives. For the individual, the central question of human existence in Communism is the all-pervading sense of the futility of *any* endeavor. It is not even political freedom that is at stake, but simply the freedom to exist on one's own terms, that rudimentary natural right established in 18th-century Europe and America as an immutable human privilege and accepted in all democratic societies as a given. This freedom to pursue individual happiness within the framework of agreed-upon laws is what Communism abolishes the instant it is installed in power. Yet the organic human claim to it will not be obliterated. Marxism-Leninism may have relegated this claim to the dustbin of history, but the Poles have dug it out again, whisked off the dust and filth, and polished it into a shining crucifix behind which they have already marched three times and will march again—regardless of settlements made among the reigning powers.

Along with the German *Ostpolitik* ideologist, I heard some engaging remarks at the conference from a high-powered West German banker, deeply enmeshed in the $30-billion Polish debt to the West. He gave an honest and detailed account of past mistakes and miscalculations, as well as present options, and closed his statement with the astonishing assertion that the one thing the German bankers had not anticipated was the personal liking they had come to feel for the Polish banking officials in charge of doing business with the West. This was a moving confession, sentiment being so rarely invoked as a factor in financial catastrophes. Still, I remarked that *Stimmungspolitik* (mood politics) may be as unreliable as *Realpolitik,* and that the German bankers had found themselves in the same situation as Napoleon, who based his attitude toward the Poles on the lovableness of one Polish lady.

The Second Day

THE foreign-policy experts, diplomatic personnel, scholars, journalists, and economic activists around the table seemed preoccupied with two matters: penetrating the psychology and habits of top political leaders, and keeping abreast of all measurable data coming out of Poland. Everyone seemed amazingly well-versed in the nuances of the shifting power game wherein classic Polish imponderables play all the important roles: the Church and its acolytes, the junta and its neatly categorized lineup, the protagonists of KOR and Solidarity.

Yet the word most frequently heard at the conference was "Andropov." Had the delegates been polled, I suspect they would all have agreed that Andropov is the controlling element, the only real clue to what will happen in Poland. So often did Andropov's name come up that in my imagination he began to assume the attributes of the Sun King: perhaps, I thought, the world should watch the First Secretary at his morning ablutions, to divine his mood correctly.

I did not share in this assessment of Andropov's power. I tend to distrust the concept of history as a function of despots, and anyway I do not believe Andropov or anyone else is capable any longer of undoing what Solidarity has achieved in Poland. For the first time since Lenin invented it and Dzerzhinsky blueprinted it, the Communist infrastructure of power and terror has been broken —though at what great cost to themselves, only the Poles will ever really know. One who was never an object of such institutional violence will never understand its mechanism for reducing humans to animated particles. Thus, any damage done to the bedrock of Communist evil is a feat of historic dimension.

Yet it seems that in 1982, during an interview with the Voice of America, commenting on Solidarity's apparent defeat, I outdid myself with enthusiasm for its indestructible achievement. I lauded the glory of those who had shown the world the real face of socialism, even if they had now suffered a temporary setback and were too sunk in gloom to acknowledge their historic accomplishments. Many months later, I received a letter from a bright young journalist, a fierce and dedicated Solidarity man who had been badly scarred as a prisoner in the detention camps set up by Jaruzelski after the crackdown. He wrote: "I listened to you. My memory of your words still hurts me. You made some clever phrases about what a weird people we Poles are for grieving at this moment instead of rejoicing at the historic victory we had won. It was strange listening to your voice on that December night, from far-away, unreal America. Where did you ever find reasons for such euphoria, and what was all that talk about history? In the Poland of those days history was like outer space to us. . . . How could you of all people have addressed yourself to the inevitable logic of history—you, who were also trampled with dirty boots in the name of those same immutable historical laws?"

He was right. Reading his words, I suddenly felt myself in the same company as all the well-heeled Western sympathizers with the "oppressed," babbling about the new order from the safety of America's shores. There is such a thing as taste in the exercise of political conscience, and I had violated it, showing myself guilty of that moral tactlessness which is the besetting sin of the liberal mentality. But how could I possibly convey any of this to the conference without blatant exhibitionism?

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All over the West, an effort has already gotten under way to purge the Polish experiment of its anti-Marxian and anti-socialist substance. The energies of one important sector of the non-Communist Left have been harnessed to demonstrate through periodicals, books, and other channels that what Solidarity represented was a heroic attempt to salvage the Holy Grail of Marxian socialism from the paws of Communist brutes. The point is to convince the world that the Polish worker rejects Communism but still retains the socialist creed and hopes for a better life under the sun of a collectivized, bureaucratic system of governance and values. Many of the clichés of leftist melodrama have been taken out of storage for this purpose, turning the Polish shipyard worker into a proletarian hero out of Bertolt Brecht or Pete Seeger—all this on the shaky theory that Polish Catholicism is politically radical and Polish trade unionism is organically anti-capitalist.

When I keep proposing that what the Polish worker wants is capitalism, pure and simple, I routinely confront the most acrimonious disbelief. Small wonder, for to say such things is to spoil the reveries of the many nice people who spent some time in Solidarity's Poland and came back full of certainties about the new socialist dawn. Which Poles did they talk to, I wonder? Not the seamstresses who conduct semilegal business on the economic fringes of big cities, or the workers in small factories that produce marmalade or plumbing accessories, or the laundry operators, vegetable sellers, and street vendors of belt buckles and umbrellas. Nor, I imagine, did they ever go to the dingy bars where the Poles who try to work at three jobs during twenty-four hours drink their vodka, or sit with them on Sundays at their soccer matches in provincial towns. Had they done so, they would know that what those people want is the freedom to make a living, exactly as in America or West Germany; that capitalism is associated in their minds with a purposeful and effective life, while the very word "socialism," over recent decades, has acquired a connotation of utter hostility toward the most commonplace human needs and unlimited power to destroy lives.

The ordinary people of Poland have experienced the injustices and indignities that for forty years have been coterminous with the word socialism, and they know that these plagues are infinitely worse than anything capitalism could ever inflict upon them. Just give them a truly free election, and see what happens.

DURING the entire Solidarity saga, the Polish Church was treated with veneration by the Western Left, a puzzling attitude when one considers that some crassly reactionary elements are still alive and well within the Church and are still propounding their view that the Freemasons are conspiring with the Communists to erect a kingdom of godlessness on this planet. Indeed, until not so long ago it was this portion of the clergy which determined the Polish Church's direction. It fell to one man, Cardinal Adam Sapieha, Archbishop of Cracow before and during World War II, to achieve a qualitative change in the chemistry of Polish Catholicism and a redirection of its spiritual assets and energies.

This does not mean that notions of the rebirth of Catholic doctrines of social commitment had not already been floating around in the Polish Church: yet those ideas were usually parochial and reductive, tinged with the modish anti-Semitism of the 1930's, and confined to quasi-totalitarian visions of a homogeneous, autocratic, corporate society. Western observers of today's Poland are thus mistaken to think that the Church has always been the central repository of Polish national identity and ethos. During the war years the Church would not have been visible at all as a moral force had it not been for Cardinal Sapieha, who defied the Nazis by saving Jewish children, and Father Maximilian Kolbe, a prewar semi-fascist whose heroic behavior at Auschwitz was a desperately needed gesture of moral grandeur. In the postwar period, too, the influence of the Church on Polish life would probably have been modest had it not been, ironically enough, for Communism which, after 1945, forced it into the spiritual mobilization whose effect we see today.

Cardinal Sapieha grasped the unique chance that had come his way: he made his pact with the best Polish minds of the time, both religious and secular, and turned the spiritual call to arms into an intellectual challenge—quite a novelty in the history of religion in Poland. Under his aegis, a group of Catholic lay progressives began in 1945 to publish *Tygodnik Powszechny* ("Universal Weekly"), a sophisticated intellectual weekly which served as a platform for every prominent anti-Communist intellectual in Poland, from neo-Thomist philosophers to Jesuit dialecticians to rationalist-liberal men of letters. Protected over the years by the Cracow archbishopric (which the Communists were not too eager to take on), this publication developed a moral tone and a level of sociocultural, polemical commentary without which neither the practical heroism of Cardinal Wyszynski, nor the fighting integrity of Cardinal Wojtyla (now Pope John Paul II), nor the political acumen of Solidarity's highbrow theoreticians would have been possible. If 1980 Poland represents perhaps the last authentic outburst of passion in the service of Western ideas of freedom and democracy, this possibility was tirelessly worked out over several decades in the editorial offices of this journal.

Thanks to Cardinal Sapieha, the meaning of Christian democracy as a political proposition was transformed. A concept which, before the war,

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had been redolent of petit-bourgeois obscurantism became, under Communism, the last refuge of the Polish intelligentsia. This was a magnificent victory for the Church, the more so since the intelligentsia had established itself as Poland's ruling class so securely in the last two centuries that without its support even the Communists could not rule Poland.

Progeny of the impoverished gentry, the Polish intelligentsia crystallized during the 19th century as a class, or caste, of professional patriots. Its leaders were scholars and poets, and its political ideas derived from the abortive Constitution of May 3, 1791, perhaps Europe's most advanced sociopolitical covenant at that time, which set forth such principles as universal suffrage, natural law, human rights, and parliamentary legitimacy. On these ideals Poland's intellectuals were nourished for generations.

Always reluctant to give the Church much say in matters of politics and culture, the Polish intelligentsia nevertheless maintained reverential ties with Catholicism as a system of weighty values. If the American press has a problem categorizing the current Pope—is he progressive or reactionary?—it is because he is in some ways more a product of the Polish intelligentsia than of the Church itself. Indeed, he is a telling example of the symbiosis between these two worlds.

The West has never really understood the makeup of the Polish intelligentsia as a coherent class or pursued any real attempt to win it over as an ally, despite the fact that this group, obsessed with independence and dignity, is anti-Communist to its core. To be sure, every Western journalist has done his share of marveling over how, in Poland, novelists, poets, and critics enjoy so much respect and social influence. But the underpinnings of this phenomenon have never been investigated.

During the 50's, some perceptive American diplomats detected the discrepancy between the stereotype of the Polish intelligentsia (romantic-religious-nationalist) and its nonconformist tendency to subvert Communism through offbeat behavior and manners (as by adopting Western clothes and music). This should have served notice of a serious demand for social and political influence, yet the opportunity was squandered when the United States turned its attention instead to a group of "revisionist" Communist functionaries who had embarked upon a mission impossible to reform Communism and give it a human face. Grants and fellowships were showered on these people, trips abroad were facilitated by the American embassy, to expose them to civilized democratic existence and, in turn, make them amenable to political compromise. In fact, some of them actually defected to America. Most, however, returned to the party fold in brand new Brooks Brothers blazers and with Zenith stereos, smilingly assuring the Americans (who were footing the bills) of their good intentions, and then going on to expedite any vile assignment handed down by Gomulka or his successor, Gierek. Two decades later, most of Poland's eccentric intellectuals ended up among Solidarity's strategists and theoreticians, while the prime representative of the revisionists, Vice Premier Rakowski—whom the State Department had wined and dined and brought together with President Kennedy for a friendly chat—became Solidarity's hangman.

All these things I did not say at the conference, somehow sensing that no one was really interested. My fellow conferees were inclined to think that the image of millions of Poles kneeling before their Pope provided all there was to say about what the Church means in Poland.

I LISTEN and listen, and the phrase, "Read your Gramsci," keeps coming back to me. Today, the answers are not in Lenin, Trotsky, Mao, or even Marcuse, all of whom made a study of methods of coercion. Gramsci knew more. He knew that Communism is best imposed not through physical coercion but subtly and insidiously by playing upon the impulse to social compassion that dwells in most of us.

The conference program posed the question: "Does the West, particularly America, have a clear-cut policy toward Poland?" My answer was prompt: certainly not. But this is just part of the problem; the rest is that we have never had a soundly worked-out policy toward Communism itself, our implacable, historical enemy. When a young American diplomat at the table ingenuously asked why we continually referred to Poland's interests but never to our own, my instinctive response was: "Brother, we don't even know what our interests *are* anymore." When the Poles make trouble for their Soviet overlords this would seem to be good for us, but the Gramscian moles in our society are already busily at work destabilizing this and all other such certainties. In plain terms, our paramount interest is to get rid of Communism just as we have (nearly) gotten rid of the bubonic plague, but we cannot do it by violence, and we will not do it by other means for complex reasons that go far back into the past.

The crux of Communism's superiority over us is that it has both a scenario for how to do us in *and* the faith that it can be done. Why bother to wage war if we can be brought to our knees by a combination of hard-core strategic harassment and subtle self-doubt implanted into the very fabric of our civilization and culture? No one in the West has given serious thought to destroying Communism since 1918, while the Communists, ever since the October Revolution, have been thinking both methodically and strenuously about how to liquidate democratic capitalism. After World War II, when the Communist expansion hit like the outbreak of a dangerous disease, the

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West had no choice but to resist Communism by force; yet even this decision was soon negated in Cuba, Vietnam, and Angola, and we are now witnessing its negation in Central America as well. Here again Gramsci offers a clue to the way our own liberal sentiments have induced in us a kind of ideological daze, so that the mere *wish* to destroy Communism is decried as a horrendous one, not just perhaps unfeasible, but abjectly improper, something no decent man ought even to think. Communism after all is an idea, a dream, a promise; it may be flawed, it may indeed have killed 60 million people, but is it not contemptible to think of killing an idea, of murdering a dream?

The Communists are free from this sort of philosophical agonizing. They picture capitalism quite straightforwardly as an obscene, fat slob with a repulsive cigar, which makes it quite easy to visualize killing him. Our own cartoonists, by contrast, have been forcibly restrained—by some invisible hand—from conceiving a graphic metaphor for Communism as evil. The best they can do is caricature its leaders and spies—rather benignly for the most part.

This is why we have never had a relevant policy toward Communism, Soviet Russia, or the satellite arrangement, and why all efforts toward such a policy seem, at least for the moment, futile. Many maintain that there is no need to worry since the Soviet Union needs our existence more than it needs our destruction. Perhaps they are right. In any case, nothing our enemies may do to us could equal what we have done to ourselves.

Soon after my arrival in America, a woman of great wealth and venerable genealogy (statesmen, Senators, corporate chieftains) asked me about Communism. "Communism is hell," I answered. "So is America," said she. Said I: "Perhaps, but Communism is a worse hell, and if you Americans tinker too much with your own hell, you'll end up in the Communist one, and then you'll cry your eyes out for the American one you lost." Said she: "You have a lot of nerve to tell us what to do with our country that we created out of wilderness and endowed with a civilization that turned into garbage, oppression, and a broken promise."

This dialogue had a curious sequel at another dinner table not long after, where the same woman served as hostess to one of my fellow émigrés, a radical scholar known for having rendered base service to the Communists in Poland. He held forth: "America stinks. The Constitution stinks. You Americans had a chance to materialize utopia and botched it. You founded a kingdom of greed, racism, and exploitation. Not until you tear everything down and start from scratch is there hope for America." Said the woman: "We need people like you. America is blessed by your presence. We can be proud that we are still a haven for minds so penetrating and noble as yours."

THAT is why, with the memory of those two conversations, as well as my knowledge of Gramsci, I tend to behave nicely at conferences which are concerned with the plight of nations under Communism. If only Americans knew how desperately Eastern Europeans crave what they have, we all could look to the future with confidence. But apparently that knowledge is incommunicable.

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Le Carré's Fantasies

Walter Laqueur

MANY years ago Jacques Barzun noted that the representative figure of our age was not the statesman, the soldier, or the divine, but the spy. I doubt whether he was right at that time, and the observation seems even less true today. The public image of the spy is largely a product of fantasy; there are, needless to say, real spies among us, but their methods of operation are quite different from the way they are popularly depicted. In contrast to, say, pop musicians or other entertainers, spies are not role models or trend setters of any kind. Their exploits, to the extent that they become known, provide grist for the newspaper and television mills, and inspiration to thriller writers, but on the whole they are less newsworthy than movie stars, members of royal families, or natural disasters. Barzun may have had the traitor rather than the spy in mind when he made his comment, but even so the proposition would be debatable.

The notion of the spy as a contemporary prototype, riddled with anxieties, dissatisfied with his work and with life in general, neurotic to the point of masochism, has been popularized by a school of writers unhappy with the limitations of their genre. Most are simply looking for a new angle or two as a way of holding on to their readers; others, on a higher level of sophistication, have made a conscious effort to transform the spy story from its legitimate function of providing entertainment into a cultural and moral critique of our time. In pursuit of this aim they have violated one of the cardinal rules of mystery writing: never complicate the story unnecessarily. Raymond Chandler's advice to colleagues—when in doubt, bring in a man with a gun—has been disregarded by a new generation of spy-story writers who, when in doubt, bring in not just another triple agent, but a whole host of extraneous elements—psychological, cultural, technological—thereby retarding the action and confusing the reader to the point where he can barely follow the story. This is not to say that the spy story has lost its appeal—it seems to be virtually indestructible—but as a result of trying to turn it into something it is not, the quality has deteriorated. Today's bestsellers will certainly be long forgotten when vintage thrillers like John Buchan's *The Thirty-Nine Steps* are still being read.

The most successful and most interesting practitioner of the contemporary spy story is John le Carré. His novels have not quite reached the ten-million-plus level achieved by such runaway bestsellers as *The Godfather, The Exorcist, Jonathan Livingston Seagull,* and *Jaws,* but they have sold millions of copies and received critical acclaim far in excess of what is usually accorded to bestsellers. Most often this acclaim takes the form of praising one or another of Le Carré's books as "more than" just a novel of espionage.

Thus, one critic observes that Le Carré's characters pursue moral absolutes "in a dangerous world mined with ambiguities." A second notes that his literary qualities and moral sensibility place him in the tradition of Balzac, Stendhal, Conrad, Maugham, and Graham Greene. A third has called him the Solzhenitsyn of the genre. Since no such praise has ever been bestowed on the works of Ian Fleming, Len Deighton, Ken Follett, or Frederick Forsyth, one wonders what this "stellar spymaster" (*Newsweek*) has that his fellow practitioners are lacking. Can it really be that he does not belong in their company at all but towers above them in lonely splendor? Or have the critics built up an author of some talent out of all proportion to his real significance, detecting hidden meanings and genuine depth of feeling where none exists?

TO UNDERSTAND the problematical character of the contemporary spy novel one should go back to its beginnings in the last quarter of the 19th century. The spy novel came into being in England and has largely remained a British preserve. There was nothing devious or complicated about the early spy stories. The heroes were loyal Englishmen, called in to retrieve purloined admiralty plans or render the Crown some other service; the spies were usually foreign nationals of whatever country England was having trouble with at the time. Thus, up to the late 1890's when France was still considered a threat to British security, the villains in the stories of William le Queux (an Englishman, despite his name) tended to be French; following the Entente

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Cordiale of 1904, they became Germans. Similarly, in the stories of John Buchan, dating from a somewhat later period, the villains started out being Germans, but were often replaced by Russians (mostly of Jewish origin) later on.

Most of the conventions that we still associate with the genre date from this period. They are already to be found, for example, in the stories of E. Phillips Oppenheim, with their silky female seductresses, double and even triple agents, motifs of impersonation and blackmail, and infatuation with newfangled technology. While there was little violence and less sex in Oppenheim's novels, there was almost as much high living as there is in Ian Fleming. Another motif of these early stories was the race against time (with Buchan in particular a master of the climactic chase): unless the designs of certain villains could be thwarted within a brief period, some horrible disaster would take place. This convention too is still with us today, except that the consequences of failure have become even more nightmarish: the outbreak of world war, nuclear catastrophe, mass extermination. Even where the tools of the trade are concerned, there have been fewer innovations than one might expect: the cigar bomb and remote-control device can already be found in Le Queux and Edgar Wallace, and a camera bomb was used by Alfred Hitchcock in his film *Foreign Correspondent* (1940).

Where there is a difference between the early spy story and the contemporary version is in the matter of motivations. The early English spies and spymasters believed wholeheartedly in the rightness of their cause. These heroes of clubland were patriots, not cynics, idealistic amateurs, not mercenary agents, and no doubts disturbed their sleep at night. Like Carruthers, the agent-hero of Erskine Childers's *Riddle of the Sands* (1903), they believed that an Englishman who betrayed his country was the "vilest creature on God's earth." They also believed that British intelligence was by far the best in the world, though Buchan, himself a Scot, would note from time to time that the Scots were probably even better suited than Englishmen to dangerous assignments in foreign parts.

With the publication of W. Somerset Maugham's *Ashenden* (1928), the secret agent became a shadowy figure for the first time. (Conrad's Verloc in *The Secret Agent* does not count, since he was merely an *agent provocateur*, not an intelligence agent, and furthermore a foreigner.) Maugham made a point in *Ashenden* of highlighting the seamy side of the profession: the *wrong people* get killed, the difference between good and evil is blurred, guilt and innocence are seen to be relative terms, and the value of intelligence activity itself is called into question. Whether Maugham himself made a success as a British agent is a moot point. But he did know more about the actual business of spying than the earlier authors, and his cynicism was a welcome antidote to the unabashed hero worship in the stories of Buchan and others.

The new realism in spy writing coincided, not by accident, with the appearance of the realistic detective story. But whereas new-style detectives like Raymond Chandler's Philip Marlowe and Dashiell Hammett's Sam Spade were still at bottom old-fashioned men of honor, the anti-hero spy was a figure fraught with ambiguity. Espionage writers, particularly of the more intellectual sort, no longer approved quite so wholeheartedly of their heroes. And their attitude became more complicated still with the advent of the cold war. While even the most politically "progressive" writers had found nothing reprehensible in espionage so long as the target was Hitler, there was a definite change by the 1950's when the Russians became the main adversary of the West.

Eric Ambler touched on this question in an interesting interview some years ago in which he described how he became a spy writer: "Having failed at playwriting, having failed as a songwriter, failed as an engineer, I looked around for something I could change and decided it was the thriller-spy story. I would do something different. The detective story had been worked over and worked over, but no one had looked at the thriller. It was still a dirty word. So I decided to intellectualize it insofar as I was able. . . . I changed the genre and couldn't write the books fast enough."

Farther on Ambler described the political evolution of his work: "Well Sapper [the pen-name of H.C. McNeile, the author of the Bulldog Drummond stories] was writing solid right-wing. He was an outright fascist. He even had his heroes dressed in black shirts. Buchan was an establishment figure, so club and fuddy-duddy, and I decided to turn that upside down and make the heroes left-wing and popular-front figures."

Another change which directly affected the "realistic" spy story was the increasing mechanization of intelligence-gathering techniques, starting in the late 50's. Real practitioners of intelligence in the contemporary period are far less likely to be Indonesian belly dancers and far more likely to be graduates of science institutes or at least political-science departments, which makes for greater precision, perhaps, but less colorful stories. Indeed, to be truly realistic, a spy novel by now should have as its heroes not people at all, but NSA supercomputers or reconnaissance satellites; unfortunately, these do not offer much in the way of intrigue and suspense, let alone sex.

What then is a spy writer in the realistic mode to do? One possibility today might be novels exploring treason and its motives. This is a fascinating topic for a serious novelist, and one which has the added advantage—thanks to Messrs. Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt, *et al.*—of not requiring

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too much invention. Surprisingly, or perhaps not so surprisingly, there seems to be some reluctance to deal with this theme. Graham Greene, who knew Philby well, finally got around to writing about a Soviet mole (not modeled on Philby) in *The Human Factor* (1978). But except for one of the British agents in Le Carré's *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* who turns out to be a traitor—he is in fact the white-haired boy in the "Circus," as the British Secret Intelligence Service is called throughout Le Carré's novels—he has avoided the issue, preferring instead to write about the cynical old spymasters assigning younger operatives to dirty jobs (and almost certain death) abroad.

WHEN John le Carré's first spy novel, *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold*, was published in 1963, James Bond (Agent 007) was coming to the close of his career. *On Her Majesty's Secret Service* appeared in 1963, and a year later, in August 1964, Fleming died. His last two books were published posthumously.

On the surface at least, Le Carré's novels are the very antithesis of Fleming's and their protagonists could not be more different. If the luxury-loving Bond is never without his gray Bentley, the austere George Smiley, Le Carré's veteran operative of the Circus, either walks or takes taxis. If Agent 007 has at his disposal as many Tiffany Cases or Pussy Galores as he could want, Le Carré's lamplighters and babysitters have to be satisfied with the virgins of Brixton or Acton and the occasional fantasy about an art-school graduate. If Fleming's heroes hop from one Caribbean island to another, Le Carré's live in dreary houses in suburbia with ugly wives who are often alcoholics or faithless nymphomaniacs, and sometimes both. Almost all of them are profoundly unhappy people who feel that their lives have been wasted and who harbor the gravest possible doubts about their profession.

There are, however, similarities, or rather continuities. Though his world is in most respects the very opposite of Smiley's, and though he has a lot more energy than Le Carré's hollow men, Bond too expresses a desire to leave the service altogether. Espionage may be a great game full of excitement and adventure, but it is basically a dirty business, cruel, brutal, and cold. Villains and heroes change roles so often that by the end of the day, Bond remarks, it is no longer obvious why he should continue taking the risk of being blown up by time bombs, being eaten by sharks or giant squids, or undergoing other equally unpleasant treatment for England's sake.

Such doubts are of course far more pronounced in Le Carré's novels, written during the Vietnam period and its aftermath when all the certainties of national allegiance were called into question. As Leamas, the protagonist of *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold*, explains to his Communist librarian girlfriend: "Spies are not priests, saints, and martyrs, but a squalid procession of vain fools, traitors too, pansies, sadists and drunkards, playing cowboys and Indians to brighten their rotten lives."

Leamas, to be sure, is a mere pinch-hitter in the British espionage lineup, but even Smiley, the conscience of the Circus and its father figure, is not free of such feelings. He too has reached a dead end. As he writes in a letter to a friend: "During the war the enemy was someone we could point at and read about in the papers. Today all I know is that I have learned to interpret the whole of life in terms of conspiracy. . . ."

What the tone of this letter suggests is that Karla, Smiley's Soviet counterpart and his antagonist throughout Le Carré's novels, is not really the enemy at all but another unhappy man beset by self-doubt and frustration. There may once have been a quarrel between Karla's masters and Smiley's, but the reasons for it no longer matter and they now continue the fight mainly through inertia. Indeed, as between their Russian enemies and their American allies, some of Le Carré's heroes seem to believe that the Americans are worse. The CIA in particular is an object of loathing. Made up either of idiots or "fascist puritans," it is so hateful that even "Control" himself, the head of the Circus, is said "to despise them and all their works which he frequently seeks to undermine."

Still, it would probably be wrong to make too much of these opinions. They were, after all, a standard element of the *Zeitgeist* during the late 60's and early to mid-70's. It was open season on the CIA during those years, and anti-Americanism was an essential ingredient in the production of quasi-political bestsellers. One might even say that compared to some other spy novels and movies of that period, Le Carré's books were a model of restraint. Even Fleming's books, so different from Le Carré's in other respects and written when anti-Americanism was not yet quite so fashionable, are very condescending toward the "cousins" across the Atlantic. The attitude is so widespread in Britain, Left, Right, and Center, and its roots so well-known, that it hardly needs comment.

Politics aside, perhaps the most striking similarity between Fleming and Le Carré is the fact that their creations are at bottom equally implausible. No one, least of all himself, has ever taken Fleming as anything but an entertainer. ("My books," he wrote to Raymond Chandler, "are straight pillow fantasies of the bang-bang-kiss-kiss variety.") Le Carré, on the other hand, has been praised for all sorts of literary and moral virtues, including most especially his "absolute verisimilitude" and the subtlety and depth of his characterizations. Yet the fact is that Karla, the presiding antagonist of the Smiley series, is actually no more "real" a character than Dr. No or Goldfinger—he is just given the trappings of psychological depth. But investing fantasy characters with psychological in-

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terest does not make an unreal world real. On the contrary, it is a kind of confidence trick. As Jacques Barzun wrote in the 1960's (of the detective story), replacing clues with psychology does not turn a spy story into literature, it simply results in a new mongrel form. Le Carré is at the moment the most skillful practitioner of this new form, but it remains a dubious one. For real characters, as Barzun noted, one still should turn to Balzac; and for real *Angst*, one might add, to Kierkegaard and Kafka. Nor is the thriller the ideal locale for a discussion of the moral burden of our times.

LE CARRÉ's most recent novel, *The Little Drummer Girl*,* was preceded by a major publicity build-up, and is clearly the publishing event of the year, if not the decade. The subject could not be more topical: Lebanese refugee camps, and the war going on in the shadows between the PLO and Israeli counter-terrorist units. The book is not really a spy novel as such, but deals with one specific aspect of intelligence: covert action or, to use the Russian term, "active measures."

Seldom if ever have so many laurel wreaths been distributed in advance. Yet even as the rave reviews were piling up in his agent's files, the author, in a series of pre-publication interviews, struck a somber note: he was very much concerned that by telling the truth he had invited attacks. He was pretty sure, he said in an interview with *Time*, that he was going "to attract a great deal of flak particularly in the States for even suggesting there is anything to put in the Palestinian balance." But before "they" (by which he meant, as he made clear in another interview, "the Jewish lobby in America") "claw[ed] him apart," he wished it to be remembered that of the nine novels that preceded *The Little Drummer Girl*, six had been written with "unqualified sympathy" for Jews.

Now, since novels in which Jews are described with "unqualified sympathy" must be utterly boring to read, it is reassuring to discover that the author's memory may have played a trick on him. In the six novels Le Carré mentions, there are only three characters who can be presumed to be Jewish, or rather of Jewish origin. (There are also several with German names; if they are meant to be Jewish there is nothing to indicate it.) About one of the three, a Mrs. Aaronsohn in *Tinker, Tailor*, all we learn is that she is old and ugly. That leaves two others: one is Connie Sachs, a long-time member of the Circus, now retired. Like Mrs. Aaronsohn she too is grotesquely ugly, and also frequently drunk and half mad; when George Smiley leaves her place after the first visit in many years, he reflects that the meeting was even more awful than he had anticipated. Connie Sachs, whose original name had been Salinger (the name change is not explained), is the daughter of a don, and the sister of academics; though impoverished, the family is almost landed gentry. In common with so many of Le Carré's characters, she behaves like a product of one of the more prestigious public schools who has never quite grown up. She calls her colleagues "my darlings" and is still something of a patriot—which is to say, a dear old fossil belonging to a prehistoric period. In short, Connie Sachs is another English eccentric whose Jewishness is no more significant than her arthritis.

The third Jew is Fiedler, the senior East German secret-police official in *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold*. Fiedler, a fanatical Communist, is also a Jew only by accident of birth. He is described as a "savage little bastard" and a loner, disliked and mistrusted by his own people, the "acolyte who will one day stab his boss in the back." He has almost killed one British agent during an interrogation, and would put a bomb in a restaurant "if it brought us farther along the road." Some redeeming features: Fiedler, the Stalinist, is not a traitor to his cause and, therefore, is preferable to Mundt, his superior, an ex-Nazi and now a British mole.

These, then, are the three Jewish characters about whom Le Carré has written with "unqualified sympathy." By enumerating them I do not mean to accuse Le Carré of anti-Semitism—he simply does not seem to like people very much, whatever their ethnic background. But why should this kind of bookkeeping have been introduced into the discussion in the first place? No one has ever argued that all Jews are saints, or that in literature every Jewish villain must be counterbalanced with a Jewish hero. And if, as Le Carré has told the (London) *Observer*, he feels "deep and sad misgivings about where Begin and those who identify eagerly with him are taking their country," that is not exactly a minority view these days either in London, New York, or Jerusalem. In the present intellectual climate, it is surely a lot riskier to defend Israel than to attack it. Why then all this smoke about being clawed apart for his views?

The Little Drummer Girl begins with a Palestinian terrorist attack in the town of Bad Godesberg on the Rhine, in the course of which a small child, the son of the Israeli Labor attaché, is killed. Several other attacks follow. The leading anti-terrorist experts of Mossad, Israel's secret service, appear on the scene, headed by Schulmann, "a broad-headed, bustling veteran of every battle since Thermopylae, aged beween forty and ninety, squat and Slav and strong, and far more Europe than Hebrew, with a barrel chest and wrestler's wide stride and a way of putting everyone at his ease." He is accompanied by a seething acolyte, Shimon Litvak, "not Cassius,

* Knopf, 429 pp., $15.95.

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perhaps, rather your archetypical Dostoevsky student: starved and in conflict with demons."

Schulmann's real name is Kurtz. But though literary comparisons are clearly intended here, they are out of place, for Conrad's Kurtz was "hollow at the core," like some members of the Circus, while the Israeli Kurtz is anything but hollow: "He wheeled and dealed and lied even in his prayers but he forced more good luck than the Jews had had for 2,000 years."

On the whole Kurtz is not a bad man. He is also something of an intellectual, saying things like, "Maybe if Wagner had left that fellow Siegfried in peace, we might have had a better world of it after all." But the main thing about him is that he is out of tune with the Mossad establishment, with its polygraphs and computers, its abiding faith in American-style power ploys, behavioral psychology, and crisis management. If he does much of the dirty work, it is "for love of Israel, for peace, for moderation." True, his emaciated sidekick Litvak is a less savory character (though he plays the piano wonderfully, especially Brahms). Litvak lacks Kurtz's humanity; when the going gets rough, he turns brutal. But Kurtz always cools him down: " 'Go take a bath, Shimon,' he ordered quietly, 'a bath, a nice rest, some coffee. Come back around midday. Not before.' "

So far so good: the first forty pages of the book are among the best ever written by Le Carré, who usually needs a longish time to warm up. He knows Bonn and its suburbs, has probably met the German counterterrorist experts described here, and conveys it all very well. Never mind that types like Kurtz and Litvak do not exist, and that the Mossad, if it has had any successes at all, owes them not to adopting American methods but rather to ignoring them. None of this matters very much. If Kurtz does not exist, neither does Smiley, and if Le Carré's Mossad bears little resemblance to the institution known by that name in the real world, the same is presumably true of the Circus's relation to the real British SIS. The author makes it sound plausible, and up to a point, at least, entertaining to read about.

That point arrives when Kurtz decides to recruit a young English actress, "Charlie," to penetrate the most dangerous terrorist network in the world and above all to liquidate Khalil, the Palestinian who is the mastermind of the attacks in Europe. Charlie, who belongs to a far Left Trotskyite or anarchist group, would seem an unlikely candidate for this assignment. But on the island of Mykonos she is brought together with Joseph, a handsome Mossad seducer—a mixture of Svengali, Siegfried, and Parsifal—and falls in love with him. Charlie is then abducted by the Mossad, and after a protracted siege of friendly but relentless brainwashing she agrees for love of Joseph to play the role assigned to her: she will become Khalil's mistress and lure him to his death.

This idea has been used before, for instance by Richard Condon in *The Manchurian Candidate*, but perhaps never on such a high level of sophistication. For Charlie, the little drummer girl, falls in love not only with Joseph but also with the Palestinian terrorists and their cause—even as she is betraying them. Charlie plays her role to the bitter end. The Israeli counterterrorists get their man, and eventually, against all odds, Charlie also gets Joseph, for the Mossad agent has by this time developed his own strong reservations about Israél ("What are we to become? A Jewish homeland or an ugly little Spartan state?"). And so we take leave of the two of them, walking alone together in a strange city.

THE plot of *The Little Drummer Girl*, in other words, is perfectly idiotic. No more so, perhaps, than the plot of *The Boys from Brazil*, *The Holcroft Covenant*, or *The Eye of the Needle*, but Le Carré presumably is to be measured by a different yardstick. After all, it is unlikely that Messrs. Levin, Ludlum, or Follett will ever make the cover of *Newsweek* or *Time*, or be asked to comment on intelligence matters by the New York *Times*. Nor will the cardboard heroes and villains of their bestselling novels ever be taken seriously.

Le Carré's characters *are* taken seriously, not just because they are portrayed as moral seekers but because they are said to have real feelings and to be highly cultivated. In this novel, Arab gunmen and Israeli spymasters have lengthy discussions about Bakunin, Sartre, Marcuse, Debray, Fanon, Guevara, and Marighela; only Gramsci is missing, perhaps because he was preempted by John Fowles in *Daniel Martin*. There are also references to, among others, Aldous Huxley, Thomas Mann, Bishop Berkeley, Brecht, Fellini, Emil Nolde, the columns of Baalbek, and the mosaics of Augustus and Constantine. Even the little drummer girl's female prison warden is so busy reading Thomas Hardy she forgets to keep an eye on her ward.

What makes *The Little Drummer Girl* so awful is not Le Carré's suggestion that the Palestinians have a "case"; not even Menachem Begin would contest this. Nor is it the fact that Israeli agents are shown cold-bloodedly killing Palestinian terrorists (and vice versa). Far worse things have happened in the Middle East than occur in this novel. What is objectionable about *The Little Drummer Girl* is the fraudulent air of authenticity hovering about all those impossible situations, which derive less from the real world than from various conflicting literary traditions.

For if Le Carré's work betrays clear literary debts to Conrad and Graham Greene (not to mention the *Boy's Own Paper*, that sturdy embodiment of unabashed colonial values), *The Little Drummer Girl* seems to have yet another source of inspiration, the hallowed British-Oriental romantic tradition leading from *The Garden of Allah*, *Beau*

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Geste, and *The Sheik*. Charlie looks suspiciously like a granddaughter of the oft-ravished Miss Mayo, heroine of *The Sheik*, who found both pain and unbearable pleasure in the arms of her desert lover.

Writing about *The Sheik* some years ago, Claud Cockburn noted that what gave the book its appeal was the attraction of pre-modern dream countries still unspoiled by politics. The observation seemed astute at the time but turns out to have been quite wrong. Both the sheiks and their antagonists have since been modernized and politicized, and some of them have even read Marcuse and Frantz Fanon, but this does not seem to have lessened their sex appeal: "I am not afraid of anything with your arms around me," Miss Mayo murmured at the end of *The Sheik* to her desert lover. In exactly the same way Charlie finds fulfillment with *her* desert lover, in spite of all he has inflicted on her. (Of course, while *The Sheik* and *Beau Geste* were enormous successes, no one thought of comparing their authors with Stendhal or Balzac, as Le Carré has been, nor were these books read as comments on the moral dilemmas of the time.)

LE CARRÉ's popular success is not hard to understand. Apart from the intrinsic fascination of suspense stories, such novels are now read by many people as actual descriptions of the hidden manipulations behind world events—in contrast to the boring stuff that gets reported in the newspapers. And Le Carré is indisputably a talented writer. Were it not for his intellectual pretensions, he might have become the English Simenon.

Le Carré's critical success is somewhat harder to explain. One factor here is certainly his sensitivity to political fashion. Le Carré was anti-American and anti-German at the right time, and the line he took vis-à-vis the British secret service—"progressive" but not too much so—was also perfectly in harmony with the *Zeitgeist*. The same can now be said of his pro-Palestinian Arab line. But if such positioning has undoubtedly been helpful, it is not the main explanation for the awe in which he is held—greater in the United States, incidentally, than in England.

Indeed, the difference between British and American reviews of *The Little Drummer Girl* is quite striking. The New York *Times Book Review* called it "a wonderful achievement. . . . The most mature, inventive, and powerful book about terrorists-come-to-life." In the Washington *Post* it was hailed as "a work of enormous power . . . fiction on a grand scale." And the reviews in the *Wall Street Journal* and the Los Angeles *Times* were almost equally enthusiastic. In his own country, by contrast, the *Daily Telegraph* described the book as "a failure" and remarked that Le Carré "takes himself . . . much too seriously." The *Times Literary Supplement* invoked the term "*kitsch*." And the London *Times* daily edition all but dismissed it as "a romance, and not of a grand poetic kind like the books of Conan Doyle and Buchan, but more like Mary Stewart solidified a bit with technical and geographical expertise."*

Perhaps American critics are peculiarly susceptible to the intellectual pretensions of foreign writers, particularly when they work in a genre not normally associated with a high degree of literacy. Whatever the cause, Le Carré has benefited handsomely from the inflation of this honorable, modest genre to an absurdly high status. The spy may not be a representative figure of our age, but Le Carré seems to have become one. Considering that he can be read profitably neither for verisimilitude, nor as great literature, nor for moral edification, this is no small achievement.

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* Reportedly at Le Carré's insistence, advertisements for *The Little Drummer Girl* in the British press quoted only American laudatory comments (not a common practice in London). This in turn inspired British satirical papers like *Private Eye* to devote considerable space to imaginary American reviews even more fulsome than the ones I have cited here: "The greatest writer of all time"; "not only the greatest writer, but also the greatest thinker of all time"; "every page, every sentence, every word in this immortal masterpiece glows with the fire of divine creation and resonates in the soul with the luminosity of genius"; and so on and so forth.

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The Politicized Oscar

Richard Grenier

I HAVE a friend, a member of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, who maintains that attending the annual Academy Awards ceremony is a humiliation. I had attended it exactly once, and think he has a point. Dressed in evening clothes, you arrive in the middle of the afternoon in the blinding California sunshine at the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion in Los Angeles's new civic center. By the entrance are temporary bleachers filled mainly with teenagers dressed as if for a day at the beach, bused in, perhaps, from the San Fernando Valley. This is the claque for the famous. You approach the entranceway on a series of carefully laid out red carpets which lead, ineluctably, to the Fork of Destiny. There stands a man, also in evening clothes, a kind of secular Saint Peter, who reads your invitation to determine whether you are a Celebrity or an Ordinary Person. Being, alas, an Ordinary Person, I was directed to a red carpet that led quite rapidly to the pavilion entrance. But I lingered to watch the treatment accorded to the great.

Celebrities are led down a quite different red carpet where they are paraded in front of the thirteen-year-old cheering section by a man with the manner of a sideshow barker: "Hey, you remember Jon Hall! When he wrestled with sharks and Dorothy Lamour a few years back in *Hurricane*? Let's give him a big hand! How ya feelin', Jon? Looking forward to the Awards? Who do you think's gonna win?" Having observed and participated in the rituals of both the entertainment world and the prize ring ("In this corner, wearing white trunks, at 146 pounds, from San Jose, California . . ."), I would have to say that those of the prize ring have incomparably more dignity. There is a sense of grim endeavor about boxing which has never lost its seriousness, at least for me. It is a quality far from lacking in the entertainment world, but it is totally absent from the Academy Awards.

The Paul Newmans and the Meryl Streeps are given somewhat more deferential treatment by the barker as they are led up the carpet of the great before the cheering bleachers. But, even with the local television crews grinding away, it does not look like an experience one would enjoy. In fact, as I was told, and observed myself, the great luminaries of Hollywood would not dream of subjecting themselves to this embarrassing exhibition unless they or a film they were connected with had been nominated for a major award. Otherwise, they simply stay home in comfort in Bel Air, Brentwood, or Beverly Hills (sometimes gathered in viewing parties) and watch the awards on television like everyone else. So unless a Hollywood celebrity is actually involved with a nominated film, or unless of course he is a "presenter," he is rarely to be seen at the Academy Awards. As for the nominees themselves, the Hollywood joke is that if you win, friends crowd around you; the night is a whirl of lights, flowers, show-business kisses; limousines await. If you lose, you stand alone in the lobby and can't even find a taxi to get home. And, indeed, the one time I attended, I saw a world-famous actress, who had lost, standing totally abandoned after the ceremony. Whether she ever found a taxi I will never know.

Inside, on the night of the awards, the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion is turned into a vast television sound stage, with camera cranes rearing and swiveling and blocking the view, and even if you are sitting in the first row of the balcony—ordinarily choice seats—you find that you are watching the show on a nearby TV monitor and wishing you were home. The show that you see on the monitor is the same one everyone else outside is seeing, and has by now been mocked by television critics the world over: a large number of adult, famous people fawning over one another, telling one another what a wonderful business they are in, making embarrassing little asides to show they are relaxed and then returning again to the orgy of mutual congratulation, thanking their producers for having faith in them, their studio, their directors, their co-stars, their parents for early encouragement, their wives. Most of the speeches this year seemed to thank Sir Richard Attenborough for having discovered India, or for having allowed the speaker to win the prize for the best-folded loin cloth. Attenborough thanked the Indians for having given the world Gandhi. The Indians thanked Attenborough for having given the world India. All eight prize winners connected with *Gandhi* (with the dignified exception of Ben Kingsley, the actor) seemed to be congratulating the Academy as a whole for its loftiness of vision and concern for the future of mankind in having given them all these awards. Audiences, I have always suspected, watch these really quite repellent spectacles in order to catch some famous person they know from films in a moment of true emotion, stunned, tremulous, speechless, perhaps even in tears. But this time there was only selfless virtue. For the triumph of

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Gandhi was not a triumph for Sir Richard Attenborough, you see, but a triumph for peace, mankind, and the survival of the planet. Sir Richard said so himself.

The truth of the matter is that the Academy Awards have always been exquisitely vulgar and sentimental. There is nothing new about that. Ingrid Bergman, it was generally agreed, was voted an Academy Award in the 50's to make amends for the vilification that the American press had heaped on her a few years earlier when she abandoned her husband and ran off to Italy to live "in sin" with Roberto Rossellini, the film director. (Times have changed.) Elizabeth Taylor, as she laughingly recounts herself, won an award in 1961 "for not having died" the year before when she underwent a serious operation. Until very recently, no one stood a chance for an award unless the movie involved had been a big commercial success. So the Academy Awards have always been vulgar, sentimental—and above all commercial. But it was this commercialism, after all, which kept the movies (or at least the Academy Awards) anchored firmly in the popular culture and in national attitudes.

I HAVE been arguing for some years that, with the real mass market lost to television, the movies have been edging steadily into the class of an elite art, becoming the "art of preference" for many students at the nation's universities, for instance. Whenever I am with even novelists and literary editors these days, they always seem to be talking about movies. And now the vulgar old Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences has begun to take on airs. Those who remember the debate of some years ago about the National Book Award (elite) as opposed to the Pulitzer Prize (where a novelist or playwright had about as much chance of winning without a solid commercial success as a candidate for an Academy Award), and who have followed the progress of the Pulitzers (the fiction and drama prizes this year going to *The Color Purple* and to *'Night, Mother*), might be entertained to learn that Hollywood, too, has begun to move in the same direction. For several years now members of the Academy have exhibited an entirely new scorn for "bourgeois" taste by occasionally nominating for awards films or actors which have been resounding failures at the nation's box offices. After all, the Academy's members are growing younger. And some "children of the 60's" are now Hollywood producers. I must stress that the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences has a long way to go before it starts behaving like the PEN Club, but the process seems to have begun.

And a giant step was taken at the latest Academy Awards. An unwritten law of these ceremonies—generally even more effective than the rule that only commercially successful films should be granted prizes—is that the ceremonies should not be used as a political platform. There have been some exceptions to this, varying from the eccentric to the blatant. In 1973 Marlon Brando sent an American Indian woman, in full regalia, to accept his award, but although this same woman was normally to be seen about Hollywood dressed more like the White Woman Who Speaks With Forked Tongue, the costumed emissary was taken as a statement on Brando's behalf in favor of "Native Americans." In 1977 Lillian Hellman appeared at the ceremonies as the "presenter" of a documentary award and was warmly received—but while many saw this as the return in victory of old-time Hollywood Stalinism, it was probably as a nonsectarian martyr to McCarthyism that Miss Hellman was being honored. For a real triumph of present-day political obfuscation is the prevalance of the view among the semi-educated that liberals, left-liberals, Socialists, Trotskyists, Communists, or whatever, were all brothers in arms, fighting the true Beelzebub of the early 50's, Joseph McCarthy.

Vanessa Redgrave, the following year, in a state of true hysteria, ranted against "Zionist thugs" in her acceptance speech and hailed her own award as a "final victory," presumably for the PLO cause. But the late Paddy Chayefsky stepped forward promptly, both contesting her remarks and reminding her that, in the course of history, an actress winning a prize was not an event of world importance.

Perhaps the most repugnant of these eruptions, however, was when Jane Fonda, in a period when she was still proclaiming, "If you only understood Communism you'd be down on your knees begging for it!" and when she went to Hanoi and giddily sat in the gunner's seat of an anti-aircraft battery normally occupied in shooting down her compatriots in the United States Air Force, accepted her Academy Award dressed in the black pajamas of the Vietcong.

All these events, however, were to an extent aberrations. For even in 1979 when Michael Cimino's *The Deer Hunter* won the award for best picture, and Jane Fonda the award for best actress in *Coming Home* (as good an example of a divided nation as you are likely to find), both acceptance speeches were apolitical.

BUT the latest, 1983 awards have perhaps brought us into a new era, in which the awards ceremony itself might be as ideologically oriented as many of the films. The viewers of this televised monstrosity are surely aware that the movements of the dancers and singers have been carefully choreographed and rehearsed, and it should come as no great surprise that the words of the celebrated "presenters" who come forward to announce the winner of each award—after first summarizing the substance of the movies of each of the competitors—have all been written for them. The show was not shy, moreover, about who did the writing. The credits proudly listed the show's "writer": someone named Hal Kanter. Now the violently anti-American film *Missing*, which was a sobering commercial "disappointment" in this country (although it did much better in anti-American countries abroad), received no fewer than four major award nominations: best leading actor (Jack Lemmon), best leading actress (Sissy Spacek), best screenplay based on material from another medium (Costa-Gavras and Donald Stewart), and best film. So when John Travolta, the actor, announcing one of the nominees, de-

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clared that *Missing* was the story of a man struggling against an "evil system," I am not even certain he was aware that the key part of the "evil system" according to *Missing* was the government of Travolta's own country, the United States. Carol Burnett, the actress, reading lines for another *Missing* nominee, spoke piously of a "search for truth and freedom in a land where they no longer exist." But these lines, presumably also written by Mr. Kanter, totally endorse the thesis of *Missing*, directed and co-scripted by Costa-Gavras, a citizen of France—where, since there is no penalty for such beliefs, he has never hidden his Communist sympathies. Costa-Gavras, when confronted concerning the evidence for his allegedly "true" story, reluctantly admitted that he had no conclusive proof and that he was basically proceeding on instinct. Why the writer of the Academy Awards ceremony should hew to the instincts of a career-long Communist sympathizer regarding events that happened in Chile in 1973 is an interesting question.

The central thesis of *Missing* is that the U.S. government ordered or at least condoned the murder of a young American named Charles Horman because he had twigged to the fact that the CIA had been behind the Pinochet coup.* Whether the CIA had anything to do with the plot or not, the notion that the United States would favor murdering one of its young citizens who persuaded himself he had evidence of U.S. involvement in the coup is a simple absurdity, since there were a thousand young American radicals in Santiago at the time who were as strongly persuaded as Horman, and, plainly, they were not all murdered. In fact, I had dinner with one of them the other night.

When the co-author of *Missing* stepped forward to receive his statuette (the film won for best adapted screenplay), he took it in honor of Charles Horman, saint and martyr. Since the Horman family's lawsuit in behalf of the late Charles Horman has been dismissed in federal court, one might consider this acceptance speech both partisan and political. But at the Academy Awards ceremonies, suddenly, anything goes. At least anything anti-American goes.

For the ceremonies' official endorsement of *Missing*'s anti-U.S. thesis was a mere preface to even more strident manifestations of anti-Americanism during the evening. The award for the year's best short documentary was given to *If You Love This Planet*, a Canadian production based on the standard speech of Dr. Helen Caldicott, the well-known nuclear disarmer, and the statuette was accepted by Terri Nash, a director-producer of the film and a Canadian citizen. Now when foreign film-makers—even such anti-American personages as Volker Schloendorff of West Germany—have won Academy Awards in the past, they have, absolutely without exception, confined their acceptance speeches to expressing their heartfelt gratitude for the honor accorded their country by such an august distinction. Miss Nash, on the other hand, like Schloendorff the citizen of a foreign country, felt it appropriate to sneer at the Justice Department of the United States. Since *If You Love This Planet* was produced by the National Film Board of Canada, and perhaps also because the film is an unrestrained attack on the Reagan administration's arms policy, the Justice Department has required it to carry a label identifying it as foreign propaganda. Miss Nash found this the occasion for sardonic raillery. "You really know how to show a foreign agent a good time!" she jeered. To be perfectly accurate, this taunting was not greeted by a great outburst of applause. It was applauded moderately, normally. But there was not a whisper of protest, and I can only conclude that it has suddenly become acceptable for foreigners to jeer at the U.S. Justice Department during the Academy Awards.

For those unacquainted with Dr. Caldicott's good works, and who are thinking that, after all, roughly half the voters of California had recently expressed themselves in favor of a verifiable nuclear freeze, I should point out that Dr. Caldicott is not for a verifiable nuclear freeze at all. She is for an *unverifiable* nuclear freeze. And, pressed in debate, she goes even further. She is a unilateral disarmer. Under pressure she becomes quite shrill and begins preaching the Sermon on the Mount as the basis of foreign policy. I have heard her declare many times, in so many words: *We must learn to love the Russians!* When questioned, not even about nuclear matters, but about Afghanistan, Poland, Southeast Asia, South Yemen, she continues to exhort us to love the Russians. To which I have also heard her add, on several occasions, her assurance *as a doctor* that it is medically contra-indicated to do anything that might alarm those poor, fearful, old men in the Kremlin. Since there is hardly anything we could do in the area of national defense that could not be interpreted by this eminent doctor (she is a pediatrician) as possibly alarming those poor, fearful, old men in the Kremlin, I think it fair to conclude that Dr. Caldicott's position could only result in a preemptive capitulation to the Soviet Union. Such is the heroine of the movie which the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences has chosen to honor as the best short documentary of the year.

Another area where the secret steering committees which choose the nominees for certain awards had a field day this year was in the best foreign-language films. One of the five nominees was the first feature-length movie ever made in Nicaragua. Its politics is about what you might expect, having, even, according to the New York *Times*, a "strong pro-revolutionary bias." Another foreign-language nominee (of which more later) was a Soviet film proudly announcing the rehabilitation of Joseph Stalin. Both of these selections might have been a bit too strong for the stomachs of even those 500 Academy members who qualify to vote for the best foreign-language film, and the award went instead to *Volver a Empezar* ("To Begin Again"), a quite remarkably fatuous Spanish film whose anti-American touches are of an almost

* For a fuller discussion of Costa-Gavras and of *Missing*, see my article, "The Curious Career of Costa-Gavras," COMMENTARY, April 1982.

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refined delicacy. I will only say that it is about a Spanish Nobel-Prize winner who during his forty years of exile from Spain has found a new spiritual home at the University of California at Berkeley. Another, highly obnoxious, Spaniard in the film is pro-American in a distressing, uncouth way. We meet, or hear of, refugees from the present regimes in Chile and Argentina (who might be responsible for their exiles?, one wonders). And when our Spanish Nobel-Prize winner finally returns to Berkeley (where he lives in the most absurd luxury), we hear on the sound track a black voice singing that his "sin" is the "color of his skin." So the young Spanish film-makers who made *Volver a Empezar* are clearly very knowledgeable about our American culture.

BUT even the main prizes at the latest Academy Awards represented a major swing compared with those given over the last few years. Hardly anyone now denies that the cinema in America is a highly ideologized medium. But it has now come to the point where, given the lead time necessary to get a film into the movie houses, the mood of a certain segment of the population can be read as clearly in some of the country's movies as in a public-opinion poll.

The neonationalist wave that swept the country following the Teheran hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and even revisionism on Vietnam, gave us *The Deer Hunter*, Clint Eastwood's *Firefox*, and more recently Sylvester Stallone's *First Blood* and *An Officer and a Gentleman*. All those films are not only patriotic but ardently pro-military. I was in Hollywood during this period and cannot count the number of top-rank screenwriters who received calls from studio story-department chiefs beseeching them to think of a story for a *patriotic* movie. At last year's Academy Awards, Warren Beatty's *Reds*—which calls upon us to admire John Reed for his illusions about the future of a Communist society and which was favored by many to sweep the top prizes—was almost shut out, bested by a Cinderella movie which came out of nowhere, *Chariots of Fire*, in which two Englishmen (a Christian missionary and a Jew), clearly representatives of the Western world, race in the Olympics, not for equality, not for economic redistribution, not for a utopian reorganization of the state, but for one grim thing, both for themselves and the society they stand for: victory. What's more, they win.

From 1982 on, however, the "peace" movement in the West has made great strides, and its progress is vividly reflected in this year's state of the Academy Awards. The big winner, of course, was *Gandhi*. To date only a mediocre commercial success, it was nonetheless granted eight awards, including: best film, best director (Sir Richard Attenborough), best leading actor (Ben Kingsley), and best original screenplay (John Briley). I have already written at great length about *Gandhi*, which I consider a pure pacifist film and a pious fraud from one end to the other—Gandhi, among other details, never having been a pacifist. I was concerned, in writing my article, that lovers of the film would say that it did not, after all, pretend to be historically accurate, but Attenborough gave the game away completely in his acceptance speech at the Academy Awards by proclaiming that the person who was really being honored by all these prizes was "Mahatma Gandhi himself"—which necessarily implies (since Hollywood is not a center of independent Gandhi scholarship) that all these Academy members who voted for his film had been given, by Attenborough's movie, an essentially true picture of Gandhi

Within weeks of the awards, the triumph was to blow up in Attenborough's face, with historians from London to Delhi to Capetown beating him about the head and shoulders for the film's gross falsifications, with boycotts in India, demonstrations in South Africa, the London *Sunday Times* going so far as to run a huge feature article with a banner headline: GANDHI: HOW THE TRIUMPH TURNED SOUR. In America as well there has been an explosion of hostile criticism in major newspapers across the country. In any event, I am prepared to accept Attenborough's assessment that the prizes his film won were voted in honor of Gandhi himself (as presented in his movie). Even a close competitor, Sidney Pollack, director of the vastly successful *Tootsie*, granted that the prizes awarded Attenborough's film were a "vote of confidence in the philosophy of Gandhi" (as shown, again, obviously, in the movie).

THE rest of the major awards voted by the Academy this year were somewhat more ambiguous—as much in the film industry often is. When a movie is a hit, it is rarely 100-percent clear whether it was the star who brought in the crowds, or the director, or the story, or the critics, or an excellent advertising campaign, or a first-rate distribution network, or what. So I can only offer my own interpretations.

Jessica Lange, who won the award for best supporting actress for her role in *Tootsie*, is a particularly shadowy case. First of all, if Jessica Lange is a supporting actress in *Tootsie*, who is the leading actress? Hollywood has been criticized before for this kind of flim-flammery—nominating a leading actor as a supporting player to increase his chances of winning—but it is still at it. *Tootsie*, it must be said, is a highly successful transvestite comedy in direct lineal descent from the ancient *Charley's Aunt*. To be up to the minute, however, it is loaded to the gunwales with feminist propaganda, most embarrassingly when Dustin Hoffman—an unemployed actor who to secure employment has played half the film in drag—declares in the final scene, brimming with emotion, that having been "a woman" he can now love Jessica Lange better as "a man." In interviews, Hoffman has said that when he first saw pictures of himself as "Dorothy," and realized that he did not want to go to bed with himself, he understood "at last" the humiliation of being a woman. He did not make clear why this was any worse than the humiliation of being a man that women do not want to go to bed with. (In all, a record-breaking four performers received nominations for transvestite/transsexual/homosexual performances

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this year: Hoffman for *Tootsie*, Julie Andrews for *Victor/Victoria*, Robert Preston for *Victor/Victoria*, and John Lithgow for *The World According to Garp*.) The injustice of giving the best-supporting-actress award to Jessica Lange, in my judgment, was that Teri Garr, who played the true "supporting actress" in the same *Tootsie*, and was also nominated, turned in a far better, sharper, and funnier performance. I should make clear that I do not for one second believe that the great commercial success of *Tootsie* was due in any way to the Gloria-Steinem-type feminism ladled into it so dutifully, but I think the explicit feminism probably played a part in winning the film its numerous nominations.

BUT Jessica Lange had another factor operating very powerfully in her favor. In the first such simultaneous nomination in almost forty years, she had also been nominated for the best *leading* actress in a completely different film: *Frances*, the heavily fictionalized story of a late-30's movie star named Frances Farmer. In this role, I confess, I found Miss Lange excellent. The film, however, still another egregious distortion of history, is quite another matter. Now I have read both the biography and the autobiography of Frances Farmer, who made only two major Hollywood pictures in her entire career, and it is clear to me beyond any reasonable doubt that she was a Communist, a lesbian, and a psychopath. In the film the lesbianism, of course, is totally effaced. The question of Communism is barely even hinted at (she has a love affair with Clifford Odets, who has a bust of Lenin on his mantle), only to be denied. And her plainly psychopathic behavior is presented as evidence of a free, independent, spunky spirit. The movie version of the story is so laden with fiction that a "true love" (Sam Shepherd) is invented for Miss Farmer, and he loves her with a true, understanding, selfless love all through her trials and vicissitudes and, above all, through the horror forced on her by our repressive society.

It should be recalled that prefrontal lobotomies were very much in fashion at the time of Frances Farmer's crack-up, and were performed by many of the country's most respected brain surgeons. One was performed on Miss Farmer. Afterward the Frances Farmer of the movie is shown as some kind of zombie (while the real-life Frances Farmer became a successful television talk-show host in Cincinnati). Is it outlandish to speculate that the film was deliberately concocted to serve as an "answer" to the stories of how the Soviet Union treats its dissenters in psychiatric hospitals? *Frances*, although it was a thumping failure at U.S. box offices, plainly spoke to the hearts of a great number of people in Hollywood.

But my interpretation of the film could not be better put than by a man in his thirties, casually dressed, in a mixed group of four, who confidently explained to his companions as we all left a special "qualification" screening of *Frances* last winter on Manhattan's East Side: "Oh, no. There's going to be nothing as vulgar as gas chambers this time! The least little bit of independent thinking and they'll just call it 'anti-social behavior' and we'll all be lobotomized!" One would think that with such a dark view of the imminent future, the four would have emerged from the theater gloomy and depressed, expecting the streets to be filled with brown shirts already perhaps, but they were jolly, garrulous. I followed them. On a side street, they climbed into an old car and drove off in a surprising state of good humor, considering that the lobotomist, for all they knew, might already be on his way. But I suspect that many Hollywood lovers of *Frances*, knowing that Jessica Lange stood no chance for the leading-lady prize against Meryl Streep, voted for her in *Tootsie* for her showing in *Frances* as well.

MERYL STREEP's award for best leading actress for her performance in *Sophie's Choice* was more straightforward in that I think it was voted purely on the basis of her acting. Furthermore, in my view, in comparison with her four competitors, she was by a large margin the best and consequently "deserved" her award. *Sophie's Choice*, nonetheless, once again, is based on a gross falsification of history, and a falsification that might just possibly have sinister ramifications. Drawn from an astoundingly mediocre novel by William Styron, *Sophie's Choice* brings the novel's falseness and mediocrity to the screen with exemplary faithfulness. The "front story," as they say in Hollywood, takes place in Brooklyn in the period immediately following World War II among a *Gentile* survivor of the Holocaust (Meryl Streep), an insane American Jew (Kevin Kline), and a Southern observer-writer-narrator (Peter MacNicol) whom one could easily confuse with William Styron. The Southerner finds such things as Jews and Holocausts tinglingly exotic and perhaps, who knows, commercially marketable for an ambitious young writer.

BUT it is the "back story," tediously revealed to the spectator mechanical step by mechanical step, that really counts. Now I believe it is a matter of historical record that many hundreds of thousands of Gentile Poles died in Nazi camps: of malnutrition, exposure, disease, overwork, beatings, even torture. They were considered by the Nazis to be inferior, and they were treated the way the Nazis treated inferior races. But they were not destined, like the Jews, for extermination. While two million Jews were gassed at Auschwitz, as well as several thousand Gypsies and large numbers of Russian POW's, to my knowledge Gentile Poles were not as a matter of policy sent to the gas chambers. To suggest that small Gentile (not even Gypsy) Polish children stood in lines at Auschwitz waiting to be gassed is an absurdity. Yet such a scene is the center of Styron's novel, and it is the center of the movie. Sophie's traumatic "choice," you see, is when she is forced by a sadistic Nazi officer to select which of her two beautiful young children will live and which will go into the gas chamber.

This atrocious distortion of history is not without its consequences. In the view of many scholars, there

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is nothing that so discredited the Nazi regime as its rabid belief that the Jews must be exterminated, that Europe must be *Judenrein* ("Jew-free"). The very idea seems demented, an offense to the rational mind. If we slur over the difference between Jew, Gentile, Russian, Pole, Communist, Catholic among the Nazis' victims, we are banalizing Hitler, making him much more like the other great conquerors of history—all of whose soldiers killed, raped, looted, massacred combatants and noncombatants alike. And if, perchance, some Central American soldiers armed with U.S. weapons should kill some hundreds, or thousands, or tens of thousands of other Central Americans, then we too—Americans—are almost as bad as the Nazis. If the reader cares to examine the petitions that William Styron has been signing lately concerning Central America, and much else in the world, he will see that his thinking has been drifting decidedly in this direction.

Meryl Streep, in the press room at the Academy Awards after she had received her prize in front of the audience, was asked if her role had given her a deeper understanding of Jewish suffering in the Holocaust, to which she answered firmly, "No." She had played a *Gentile* woman who suffered in the Holocaust, she said. Her remark was broadcast coast to coast the next morning over the country's television networks. And if Meryl Streep told the American people from the Academy Awards press room itself that the Holocaust had been directed at Gentiles as well as at Jews, what greater authority could there be?

THE "spin" given *An Officer and a Gentleman* at the awards was also highly peculiar. *An Officer and a Gentleman* was one of the giant moneymakers of the year. Its gross film rentals were over five times those of *Victor/Victoria*, for example, and if the films were budgeted at the same figure, the profits of the military movie could easily have run to 25 times the transvestite one. So the patriotic, pro-military film is still in style, at least as far as moviegoers are concerned. Half of *An Officer and a Gentleman* is antique soap opera—which probably contributed a great deal to its popularity. But the other half shows the training of a U.S. naval air cadet with what for most young Americans must seem blood-chilling harshness. There are countless moments when the black Marine drill instructor (Louis Gossett, Jr.), berating a platoon of cadets standing at rigid attention, snarls: "You've been out bad-mouthing your country, but that's all over now. You're going to learn to love the flag!" Or, to an individual cadet: "You look like the kind of pussy who'd fly an American plane to Cuba!" The answer (the cadet rigid): *"No! Sir! Never! Sir!"* Or, to another cadet: "And *you* look like the kind of pussy who wouldn't drop napalm because there *might* be women and babies down there!" The answer: *"No! Sir! I will napalm women and babies! Sir!"* And platoons of cadets are seen jogging about, in formation and in cadence, chanting about how they're going to napalm women and babies. Another friend of mine, who remembers well the carnage of World War II and the way combat soldiers were trained for that war—and with universal public approval—mused, "My God. It's the old *'Kill! Kill! Kill!* I never thought I'd hear it again."

Now these lines from *An Officer and a Gentleman* did not offend movie audiences one little bit, but, when I repeat them, I find that they are almost unfailingly shocking to refined members of the country's educated classes who, after more than thirty years of peace interrupted only by Vietnam, seem to think that our armed forces should be operated something like a university faculty. When I point out to these people that the duty of men who bear arms for their country is, in the hallowed words, to "close with the enemy and destroy him," which in plain language means killing, I am given to understand that this is an extremely ugly principle indeed, and that the country might be better off if we had no young people devoting themselves to such an inhumane profession.

Writer Kanter's way of dealing with *An Officer and a Gentleman*'s fervidly pro-military spirit was to finesse it completely in the awards ceremony, referring to the film in his written commentaries only as an "old-fashioned love story." Louis Gossett, Jr., who won the award for best supporting actor for his superb performance as the Marine drill instructor, perhaps won—it is an embarrassing possibility—because he was black. Certainly every single question asked him by the show-business press was about how long it had been since a black actor had won an Academy Award, how few opportunities there were for black actors, for black actresses, etc., etc. Not a single reporter asked him his feelings about playing a patriotic, combat-ready, Marine sergeant, which—since this line of questioning is otherwise invariably followed—I consider an offense to both the Marine Corps and to black Marines. As it happens, about 20 percent of the Marine Corps is now black, and black Marines are among the most patriotic Americans I have ever met. They achieved their position in the Marine Corps without the benefit of any affirmative-action program, and the senior black general in the Marine Corps said recently, smiling, "We don't hire the handicapped. We're a fighting outfit. We're the world's best fighting organization, and if we go to war, I want to go to war in the U.S. Marine Corps." This is a familiar kind of talk in military circles, and similar sentiments, uttered about Navy pilots, are all over *An Officer and a Gentleman*. But they are banned from the Academy Awards.

IT is not widely realized that the nominations and winners in the best documentary and best foreign-film categories—this year among the most outrageous selections—are not arrived at by the same process as in the Academy Awards' other departments, but in a far more secretive manner. The system is in need of reform, but I am assured by members of the Academy that reform will not come about unless the situation is first exposed in the public prints.

All the Academy Awards are determined in a two-round election. In the first round, for the selection

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of the best director, let us say, only directors vote, the top five names thereafter qualifying for the final round, in which all members of the Academy participate. But the process for best foreign-language film and best documentary is entirely different. Documentary film-makers are not considered important enough to have a department of their own—and who is to vote in the first round for foreign-language films? Foreigners? The heads of France's *Centre National du Cinéma*? The USSR's Mosfilm? So it was decided, perhaps in perfect innocence, that the first round of the election in these categories—the selection of the five "nominees"—should each be handled by a special, secret committee.

I have asked Academy authorities for the names of the members of these committees. My request was refused (to protect them from corruption). I have asked for their number, and have been refused. And I have tried to ascertain at least who appoints them, and have been refused a third time. It is to such a secret committee that we owe the nomination as best foreign-language movie of a straight Sandinista propaganda film, *Alsino and the Condor*, made in Nicaragua, about the making and "political commitment" of a Sandinista rebel. I need not explain the opportunity that such a secret committee offers for political manipulation.

BUT even the final round of voting for best foreign-language film and the best documentaries (both short and feature-length) does not take place in the manner of the Academy's other branches. An oddity of even the original submissions for the foreign-language category, for example, is that they are made by national officials from all over the world and the films have rarely even had commercial openings in the United States. It would be unreasonable, therefore, to expect Academy members even to have seen these foreign movies, so special, limited screenings have to be arranged for them. In order to be allowed a ballot for the final round of the vote, an Academy member must have signed a certificate of attendance for all five of the foreign-language films that have been nominated by the secret committee. Since Hollywood's lack of interest in documentaries is notorious, the same system is followed for the final round of the vote for the best documentaries.

The result is that for the best foreign-language film, for instance, only about 500 of the some 4,000 members of the Academy vote in even the final round—or about 12 percent. The Academy gives this no publicity. I would expect that a *far* smaller percentage than this took part in the vote that gave the Helen Caldicott *If You Love This Planet* its award as best short documentary of the year. Regarding which I can only say that any politician who can't stack an election with such a microscopic voter turnout should really quit. And I suppose we should take heart from the fact that—with approximately 12 percent voting for the best foreign-language film—the Academy still couldn't stomach the straight neo-Stalinist and Sandinista selections offered it by the secret committee (although the Sandinista film later got a favorable review in the New York *Times*), spurning them in favor of the bland if fatuous Spanish entry.

OF *Private Life*, the Soviet film, I can only say that its selection as even one of five official nominees for best foreign-language movie—engaging as it does the full prestige of the Academy—is almost a greater disgrace than the unqualified triumph of *Gandhi*. Sergei Abrikosov, the hero of the film, is a high official in Soviet industry who has a bust of Joseph Stalin among his most cherished possessions. A picture of Lenin is on the wall, but the bust of Stalin is kept lovingly in his desk drawer and, one must think, in his heart. Like many men who dedicate themselves selflessly to the service of the state, Abrikosov passes a brief period in the wilderness. He learns, during this period, that so relentless has he been in pursuit of the welfare of the people that he has lost human contact with his own family. For the mighty and powerful are often lonely, you know. He learns that, though the needs of the state are great, he has been perhaps a little too driving, a little two brusque (just like Stalin). But Abrikosov gains from all this. Because Soviet Man always improves; he never gets worse. And Abrikosov's reacquaintance with his family *humanizes* him. At the end of the movie, a telephone call comes from the Minister. The government limousine is on its way to pick him up. Sergei Abrikosov, now a Stalinist With a Human Face, is called to serve once again in the high councils of the Soviet state.

Private Life was made under Brezhnev, but released almost as if to celebrate the ascension of Yuri Andropov. This is also true of the new one-volume edition of the Soviet Encyclopedia. As recently as the 1979 edition, Joseph Stalin was still guilty of such serious mistakes as mass purges, murders, jailings, and mock trials (all "serious violations of socialist legality"). In the brand-new edition, however, all this nastiness is gone and Stalin suddenly seems to have done nothing bad at all. Between the new edition of the Soviet Encyclopedia, and the new film, *Private Life*, all Soviet experts I have consulted agree that there can be no doubt about it: Joseph Stalin is being rehabilitated. Since the identities of the members of the Academy Awards selection committee have been kept secret from us, I have no way of knowing whether they even recognize a bust of Stalin when they see one. (Rest assured, it is a detail that no Soviet citizen will miss.) But that the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences should have lent itself in any way at all to approving the rehabilitation of Joseph Stalin is a fact that must give a student of that Academy pause.

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A Record of Failure

POWER AND PRINCIPLE: MEMOIRS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, 1977-1981. By ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. *Farrar Straus & Giroux. 571 pp. $22.50.*

Reviewed by EDWARD N. LUTTWAK

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI's book is an honest and well-written account which will be valuable to historians and attractive to many readers. Inevitably, it is also a record of failure—not his own personal failure, of course, and not necessarily the failure of the nation's foreign policy either (for it is only in the retrospect of decades that the ultimate results of the doings and undoings of a world power can truly be known) but certainly the political failure of the Carter administration, in whose 1980 defeat at the polls foreign affairs played a most unusually large part.

The National Security Adviser's major role is to protect the President's interest in the conduct of external affairs. What may seem desirable to the State Department, the Arms Control Agency, the Pentagon, or to an "inter-agency" committee of all three may still be damaging to the President, and it is the National Security Adviser who is supposed to protect him in such circumstances; in addition, the National Security Adviser can also attempt to protect the President from himself—as Henry Kissinger apparently did with some frequency especially in the last phases of Richard Nixon's Presidency.

Brzezinski as National Security Adviser obviously failed to protect Jimmy Carter. Without manifesting a resentful disloyalty to the man who placed him so high, without perhaps being fully conscious of doing so, Brzezinski explains throughout the book why Carter could not be protected from the departments, notably State, and why above all he could not be protected from himself.

A classic example of a very clever but basically unintelligent man, Carter was incapable of understanding the fundamentals of international affairs even while acquiring much detailed knowledge of their mechanics and surface manifestations; and since he never realized how much he was in need of help, he would not let Brzezinski guide him, either. Nixon, when driven by violent emotions, would sometimes want to do foolish things; but if his orders were simply ignored for a brief interval by Kissinger, no harm would follow because his rational judgment would reassert itself as soon as he calmed down. Carter was much better at controlling his emotions but unwisdom was his permanent condition, revealed in foreign affairs as soon as he chose Cyrus R. Vance as his Secretary of State and finally exposed in full view by the Iranian crisis.

One example will suffice. On November 10, 1979, there was a meeting (without the President) at the National Security Council to discuss the possibility of expelling the Shah from the United States. Vance and Vice President Walter Mondale favored expulsion, while Defense Secretary Harold Brown suggested that the Shah be prevailed upon to announce his intention to leave once he recovered from his illness. Brzezinski opposed this concession to the "students" who had seized the U.S. embassy and its staff in Teheran the week before. He quotes himself at the meeting: "A month ago we backed down to the Soviets and the Cubans after declaring that we found the status quo [the presence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba] unacceptable. Now we shall back down again. What will this mean for our international role as a global power? Who will find us credible hereafter?" When the question was referred to the President, he "flatly" pronounced against expulsion.

In making this decision Carter had apparently showed that he understood the foreign-policy content of the issue—that is to say, the worldwide loss of American authority which an expulsion would entail. But not at all. In a matter of days (on November 14) Carter reversed himself, and decided that Mexico should once more be asked to receive the Shah. The Mexicans, reflecting in their conduct the very loss of American authority which Carter's decision brought about, naturally refused to accept the Shah (who was eventually consigned to the extortionist Omar Torrijos of Panama).

Brzezinski does not report why Carter had earlier "flatly" rejected expulsion. It cannot have been because he truly understood what was at stake, for then he could not possibly have changed his mind so soon (no new relevant facts had intervened). Carter's reasons must have been of a lesser order, perhaps personal pique at being bullied by the Teheran "students" or misplaced optimism concerning the early release of the hostages.

In any event, in a pattern that was repeated incessantly in his administration, Carter made himself an expert on all the details of the hostage question, while failing to grasp the fundamentals, namely, that a world power must always consider the worldwide effects of its action in any particular setting. In the circumstances, this meant that the Teheran anti-Americans had to be confronted, not appeased.

IN ONE CASE, to be sure, the peculiar defects of Carter and his foreign-policy team had a most productive outcome: had it not been for the evident intention of the Carter administration in 1977 to reconvene the Geneva conference on the Middle East under joint American and Soviet sponsorship, President Sadat would never have decided to go to

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Jerusalem. The Egyptian president had risked his neck to get the Soviet Union out of Egypt; he had built his entire policy on a deliberate rejection of the Soviet alliance and on a reassertion of Egypt's national identity (as opposed to Nasser's pan-Arab fantasies). When Sadat discovered that the Americans, of all people, wanted to cast Egypt back into the Arab fold, and under the patronage of the Soviet Union as co-chairman of the Geneva conference, he had the courage and inspiration to break out by creating his own context of negotiation, directly with Israel. The risks of going to Jerusalem were great, but the spectacular unwisdom of American policy entailed even greater dangers: at Geneva, Egypt could only expect to find itself outflanked by the Syrians and blackmailed by the Russians.

Then came the prolonged bilateral and trilateral negotiations which eventually resulted in the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Cyrus Vance's contribution to these negotiations, which Brzezinski generously stresses—his treatment of Vance spells out all their differences, but in a most gentlemanly fashion—owed a great deal precisely to the quality that made Vance unfit for his office. The kindly man who in dealings with Iran would not sanction the use of force to protect American interests, was kind to Egyptians and Israelis alike, infinitely attentive to all the nuances of their interests. As always he concentrated relentlessly on the single issue at hand, always searching for every possible avenue of accommodation, treating Egypt and Israel as if they were two well-paying clients of his law firm, and never as client-states of the United States of America.

As for Carter, he most certainly deserved a Nobel Prize for attending so assiduously to the negotiations which he had so strongly promoted. Both the Egyptians and the Israelis were astonished to discover that Carter was willing, over a very extended period, to immerse himself in the most minute negotiating details. It would be churlish to deny Carter's deep-seated commitment to peace, but it is also plain that his attitude to the negotiations owed much to the fact that once again he never understood the fundamentals. Carter saw himself throughout in the role of a mediator. Yet it was not his diplomatic abilities that the Egyptians and Israelis wanted but rather his commitment of American prestige and resources—which would greatly add to each side's "take" from the negotiations. Sadat and the Israelis could have made peace on their own, but they would have been foolish to do so: each impasse in the negotiation was resolved as much by American contributions as by reciprocal concessions.

Brzezinski writes a great deal in this book about the "policy process." Again we are reminded of the extent to which the elaborate machinery of policy-making, which is supposed to coordinate the large and undisciplined departments of the executive, produces paralysis or confusion as its most natural result. The Constitution calls for a separation of powers between the branches of government; it cannot be blamed for the "checks and balances" which have arisen *within* the executive as a consequence of luxuriant bureaucratic growth. Brzezinski notes, for example, that the normal consequence of overruling the State Department was a hostile leak, a very effective, if certainly improper, "check." Kissinger simply accepted that the "process" did not work, and that it had to be circumvented if serious initiatives were to be launched. Brzezinski could not or would not emulate his predecessor. Hence his impact on the making of policy was small.

One instance of confusion is worthy of special mention. In January 1979, with the Shah still in Teheran and the Bakhtiar government about to be formed, General Huyser was to be sent to Iran to make direct contact with the military chiefs. A meeting was convened on January 3 to decide what instructions Huyser should be given. Vance, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and Mondale insisted that the military chiefs should be warned against a coup. Brzezinski agreed, but argued that Huyser should also encourage them to stage a coup "in the likely event that Bakhtiar should fail." In practice, therefore, Huyser received directly contradictory instructions. The predictable effect was to paralyze the Iranian military, the one group that might yet have saved the situation.

The next day, Brzezinski met with the President in Guadeloupe, where a four-power summit was being held. The scene was characteristic: Carter in a bathing suit in his cottage, sitting on an icebox, Hamilton Jordan also in a bathing suit, sprawled on a sofa. (Such scenes, which occur frequently in the book, can easily persuade one that formal attire has its uses after all.) Vance was on the phone, in "considerable agitation" because the Iranian military had told U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan that they wanted to keep the Shah in Teheran and suppress the rebellion in full force, with as much bloodshed as it would take. Vance and Mondale wanted permission to tell the military chiefs that the United States would oppose their use of force. Brzezinski joined in the argument, which "lasted a long time." Finally, he records: ". . . much to my satisfaction . . . the President took a very firm line. He told Cy that he did not wish to change General Huyser's instructions."

This "decision," however, merely reaffirmed the earlier contradictory instruction, Huyser's yes/no to a coup. Obviously, the Iranian military chiefs had not approached Sullivan because they were in need of conversation. With mobs on the rampage and the Soviet Union in malevolent proximity, they were seeking a firm and unequivocal U.S. endorsement of a dangerous but potentially decisive act. To add the impact of military choreography to mere words, U.S. aircraft carriers could have been sent into the Gulf, military supplies (needed or not) could have been airlifted. Instead, there came from Washington only conditional statements, full of ifs and buts.

Even in retrospect, Brzezinski does not seem to recognize what had to be done to implement the policy which he so eloquently promoted. For after the Guadeloupe episode he notes, with apparent surprise, "Alas, nothing happened.

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Vance conveyed the instructions orally to Sullivan, and I have no doubt that he did so faithfully. At the other end, the military . . . simply procrastinated."

TOWARD the end of this book, Brzezinski produces a formal list of what he loyally defines as President Carter's accomplishments in the areas of foreign policy and defense. The list encapsulates the entire problem of the administration, and of this book. Naturally, it includes the Camp David peace agreements and the Panama Canal treaty, along with the post-Afghanistan "Carter Doctrine," and so on. But the first item on the list is the Carter human-rights policy, which as it happens left the Soviet Union more repressive than ever while doing in a number of friendly rulers, and the last item is the SALT II agreement, which remained unratified. In many ways, and not only in its honesty, this is an innocent book.

Money & Mysticism

BOLLINGEN. By WILLIAM MCGUIRE. *Princeton University Press. 361 pp. $18.50.*

Reviewed by JULES COHN

IN THE summer of 1938, as Hitler was mobilizing Germany, a wealthy American couple attended a small seminar in the village of Ascona, Switzerland, held in honor of another charismatic figure, C.G. Jung, the psychologist of the collective unconscious. They listened to lectures on visions and enigmas, ancient Mithraic rituals, syncretistic symbols, and other timely issues, at the annual Eranos (Gr.: "shared feast") meetings of an elite group of Jungian devotees.

Paul and Mary Mellon had been drawn into the Jungian orbit a few years earlier. The visit to Ascona heightened their belief in Jung's

JULES COHN, *a new contributor, is professor of political science at the City University of New York and a member of the adjunct faculty at the Graduate School of Management of the New School. He once worked part-time at the Bollingen Foundation.*

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wisdom, and the value of his work. Before returning home to New York, Mary put her question: "Dr. Jung, we have too much money. What can we do with it?"

Thus the Bollingen Foundation came into being, named for the Swiss village near which Jung kept his "tower," a retreat where he could be alone to ruminate on myths and archetypes. Thanks to the Mellon fortune, Bollingen developed into an imposing American institution, a costly and elegant monument to the esoteric interests of Mary's idol. It was also a monument to the innocence and isolation of a powerful American family.

The Bollingen story is a fascinating episode in the history of private philanthropy in America. This book, by William McGuire, Bollingen's editorial director for many years, and published under its auspices, is in effect an authorized account of the lavish spending enterprise of the Mellons. In its pages, colorful characters pursue exotic interests in fashionable settings—an "adventure in collecting the past."

Mary Conover, born in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1904, was introduced to Jungian concepts soon after coming to New York in the mid-1930's, after four years at Vassar and a short sojourn at the Sorbonne. Married briefly, and divorced, she worked in a gallery of modern art on Madison Avenue and moved in a sophisticated set whose members kept up with the latest fads in art, photography, ideas, and parlor games. From some of her friends, who were captivated by them, she heard about the mystical and occult elements in Jung's writings.

Without any other explanation than that a few "spirited" women whom she knew were doing it, McGuire reports that in this period Mary began seeing a Jungian therapist. He passes over the possibility that the young divorcee wanted help, perhaps unwittingly, with an emotional problem. Since childhood she had suffered from severe attacks of asthma; her father, a physician, was interested in psychosomatic medicine, and she may have suspected an underlying cause. But whatever her reasons, Mary Conover got caught up in methodology more abstract than clinical. Although she brought a real symptom to her Jungian therapist, she came away mainly with speculations about the collective unconscious. Instead of stressing the role of individual biography in character formation, and the resolution of symptoms through the acknowledgment of individual responsibility, the Jungians promised her "psychic wholeness" through some mysterious, transcendental process: an "adventure."

Her asthma, by the way, was never cured, and when she died, in 1946, it was from a heart attack, in the aftermath of a severe asthma seizure which she suffered while on the way home from a fox hunt.

It was at the time of her immersion in Jungian doctrines that she met Paul Mellon, on a sleigh ride in Central Park. He was as attracted to her as she was to the collective unconscious. Before long, they were married, and Paul joined her in Jungian therapy. Their transferences to the husband-and-wife team who saw them must have been strong, for they commuted a long way to their sessions in New York, first from Pittsburgh, while Paul's powerful father was alive, and then from Virginia, once Andrew W. died and they were free to move to an estate in Paul's beloved horse country.

In New York, the young couple, at the top of American society, "obtained entree," in McGuire's words, to a private talk by Jung on symbols and medieval alchemy, a favorite and typically far-out topic of the sometime recluse of Bollingen. McGuire's straight-faced report of Jung's effects on the Mellons is revealing: Paul was "staggered" when the renowned psychologist described the Tao symbol, for he had seen it in his dream the previous night. Mary was equally overcome. Later she wrote to Jung: "I was sitting directly beneath the platform under a large black hat. You began to talk, and I understood not one word, but I thought. 'Though I don't know what he means, this has something very much to do with me.' "

Ingenuous, and admittedly entranced, the Mellons evidently made their own impression; they were ushered, rather swiftly, into the inner circle of Jung's admirers, with an invitation to the private meetings in Ascona. Not long afterward, along with Paul's other, more conventional philanthropies, they began picking up the tab for certain Eranos activities (both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Index of Christian Art at Princeton had turned down requests for funds) and doling out payments to devotees of the psychologist of transformation.

The Bollingen Foundation, Mary's dream project, was incorporated in January 1942. It was devoted to the support and perpetuation of the Jungian mystique, and for more than twenty years published books and financed projects meant to show "how the archetypes and the collective unconscious manifested themselves in dreams, fantasies, art, and literature." Bollingen commissioned and published translations of Jung's collected works (with his close participation) and numerous writings by his followers. A few highly regarded works of literary scholarship, only vaguely related to Jungian themes, were also published, and the reputation of Bollingen books was similarly enhanced by the inclusion of the A. W. Mellon Lectures in Fine Arts, a more sober family philanthropy.

Mary was a true believer, and with her husband's assistance and vast resources they created a structure that glorified her beliefs. No expense was spared on design and production. The most trivial products were packaged in award-winning formats, all bearing the same decorous but obscure emblem—a mandala, in the form of a stylized wheel, based on an ancient Gnostic sign. Paul provided a stately home for Mary's dream in three brownstones on New York's Upper East Side whose uniform façades, meticulously described by McGuire, resembled a "private hotel in London." In the library of these "unassuming . . . quite unornamented" buildings, hung Mary's portrait; her costume, a cape designed by Valentina, "could be taken for an academic gown," for Mary wanted to

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be "painted as a woman of serious concerns."

FROM the beginning, Bollingen's policies were made by a small circle of friends and acquaintances of the Mellons—including some who had begun on Mary's private payroll—along with advisers chosen through family or Jungian networks ("the few who are concerned with consciousness"). Only for staff or technical jobs was appointment based on professional rather than social (or mystical) criteria.

Formal declarations of policy, according to McGuire, "were not much in the scheme of things." Instead, "decisions came . . . by procedures that evade description. There was a prevailing sense, a consensus, of what belonged and what did not." Bollingen, in its exclusiveness, shunned peer-review procedures or other practices commonly employed in the outside world to encourage competition and the free exchange of ideas. Throughout Bollingen's history, decisions about publications and awards remained in the same hands; a core group of beneficiaries was carried for many years.

An example: Natacha Rambova, née Winifred Shaughnessy, of Salt Lake City, had as her credentials for her Bollingen grant a "fascination" for museums and myths, and a talent for reading astrological charts and hand prints pressed into sand. She happened to be the niece of a famous interior decorator (Elsie de Wolfe), stepdaughter of a "wealthy perfumer" (Richard Hudnut), once married to Rudolph Valentino, and a sometime actress, dancer, and clothes designer, who also dabbled in theosophy and the occult. Miss Rambova received awards (for an unspecified number of years) for a project "involving the mysteries of initiation of the Atlantean past."

In 1963, as McGuire tells it, when the retirement of the few members of the original "Bollingen wheel" was on the horizon, Paul announced plans to terminate the foundation and its fellowship program altogether rather than risk diminution at the hands of newcomers. The Bollingen imprint was transferred to Princeton University Press, publishers of McGuire's book. By the time of the announcement, an average of $1 million was being given away annually, and many millions more, in a spirit of "realistic liberality," had been spent on overhead.

MCGUIRE'S book is an archetypal offshoot of Bollingen. In it, even major historical events are treated as abstractions, their significance blurred, as though seen in visions. Thus in the early 1930's Jung, in dealing with the Nazis, was "trying to coexist with all realities." World War II, Nazism, anti-Semitism are alluded to tactfully, as if to hold them at bay, and not offend "the exalted temper of Mary's undertaking." In 1942, when Bollingen abandoned a plan to publish H.W. Hauer's lectures on "the self in Indo-Aryan mysticism," it was

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

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because the author, leader of the German Faith Movement, "had been drawn into the Nazi net," and publication might "endanger the . . . purpose of our undertaking and keep us from having any cultural function at all."*

What *was* the foundation's cultural function? Bollingen paid its own bills and existed on its own terms, managing most of the time to insulate itself from competition or scrutiny from the outside world. It could have been an illustrious example of responsible philanthropy, an alternative to the bloated and often meddlesome agencies in the nonprofit and public sectors today. Despite the considerable attention to ornamentation rather than substance, Bollingen never fell prey to the temptation to divert its energies from its initial goals. Unlike so many organizations, philanthropic and otherwise, it eschewed bureaucratization of its functions, and succeeded in maintaining the small scale of its original design.

But Paul and Mary Mellon could meet neither the challenge nor the attendant obligation of their immense resources. When the world was facing tumultuous and tragic change, they retreated into the Great Mother, synchronicity, ancient ceremonies, and primordial symbols. And thus a substantial portion of Andrew W. Mellon's fortune—amassed, after all, through that shrewd moneymaker's boundless ambition and his appreciation of the opportunities inherent in free enterprise—was disposed of in service to an ideology that enthroned amorphous collective forces, celebrating mystical rather than rational paths to understanding. To the clear-thinking individualism that had made it possible for Mary's dream to become a reality, Bollingen was, in effect, a rebuke.

* Incidentally, Bollingen's *bona fides* as an affirmative-action patron is painstakingly established by McGuire. In the fastidious biographical sketches of members of the inner circle and various other recipients of support that fill the book, his record-keeping is diligent: Max Raphael "was born in a Polish ghetto," Paul Radin was the "son of a rabbi," Hermann Broch was "born in a Jewish industrial family," and so forth.

Scholar and Collector

CECIL ROTH: HISTORIAN WITHOUT TEARS. By IRENE ROTH. *Sepher-Hermon Press. 257 pp. $14.95.*

Reviewed by CHAIM RAPHAEL

As ENGLAND is the land of eccentrics, it is wholly in character that the outstanding historian Cecil Roth, who adored being English, brought a special kind of eccentricity to his lifelong devotion to Jewish history. He died, sadly, at the age of seventy-one in 1970, the year in which the first volume of the massive, 16-volume *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, which he had been editing with great élan, began to appear. Yet one sees his legacy less in this magisterial work than in writings that reflect his love of elegance and oddity, expressed with particular charm in his books on the Jews of Italy. He covered everything in Jewish history, but this is where his heart lay.

The memoir which his widow Irene has produced catches the flavor of the man to perfection. As her subtitle indicates, her aim is not to expound his scholarship but to offer a picture of her husband "as a very human being possessing a keen sense of humor and a knack of attuning himself to the interests of minds less brilliant than his own." Some of the many friends who appear anecdotally in the book may raise their eyebrows slightly at this last phrase. Perhaps it is more revealing of Roth's style than she intended. But that would be equally true of the amusing stories she tells of their travels and social life, which indicate a pervading sense of fun behind the scholarship that is so abundantly attested elsewhere.

In his last lecture Roth himself asserted, perhaps tongue in cheek, that "fun" was his motivation for writing Jewish history:

> It is frankly for the pleasure of the thing . . . the pure detective work . . . the discovery of historical byways hitherto unexpected or unexplored, the revealing of unknown characters and personalities—heroes, scholars, saints, charlatans, adventurers, scoundrels.

A learned professor, carrying the weight of Jewish history on his shoulders, once complained to me bitterly about Roth's daring to use the word "fun" in this context. But there is more than one way of being serious.

This memoir gives an authentic picture in another respect, too. It documents an impression, already to be had in Roth's writings, that although he had been born in England into a plain Ashkenazi background, something drew him very powerfully to the Sephardi side of Jewish life. One sees something of a parallel here with Evelyn Waugh, born into a plain Protestant background but surrendering (as in *Brideshead Revisited*) to an exotic dream world he located in England's Old Catholic families. It would be easy to push this parallel further: Irene Roth tells many stories of the fabulous encounters with aristocracy that were always coming the Roths' way in their travels around Europe, and almost always through links with Sephardi history. On a visit to Sardinia, they drop in on the Count and Contessa Boscoli, who promptly put their Venice palazzo at the Roths' disposal, apologizing for the guards hovering in the background to protect a priceless Giorgione painting. At a pensione in Florence, one of their fellow guests is a cousin, "several times removed," of Disraeli. Another is "a member of a prominent Jewish family in Livorno who had married the ne'er-do-well grandson of the Duke of Richmond." Even the cook turns out to be "one of the few remaining descendants of the Portaleone family, which had played a leading role among the Jews of Renaissance Italy."

BUT if Roth wrote books and articles on what might have seemed snobbish subjects—the Sassoon family, or the dynasty of Joseph Nasi who was created Duke of Naxos by the Sultan in 1566—this was largely bread-and-butter work that left him free to get on with research and his tireless art collecting. And there were cogent reasons

CHAIM RAPHAEL's *most recent book is* The Springs of Jewish Life (*Basic Books*).

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behind his becoming a specialist on the glamorous side of the Sephardi background. He had done his first graduate work, in general history, on Italy. The European languages he knew gave him access to the ample raw material in the Sephardi field—in the form of manuscripts, marriage contracts, community records, tombstone inscriptions, and the like. It would have been very different if he had tried to go deeply from original sources into the Jewish history of Eastern Europe which demanded, as in the work of the great Salo Baron, Slavic languages, Yiddish in all its guises, and a deep personal knowledge of yeshivah life and Talmud studies. Nor could he have got very far in opening up the even more arcane history of ordinary Jews in the Near East, demanding among other things medieval Arabic, *Geniza* studies, and *responsa* literature, a field exploited so brilliantly by S.D. Goitein and his disciples.

Roth was lucky, too, in that, for almost the first time since the Bible, history as we know it began to be written by Jews after their expulsion from the Iberian peninsula at the end of the 15th century. In the new countries of their settlement around the Mediterranean, they soon became part, especially in Italy, of a sophisticated society which Roth was able to write about marvelously not merely because he was at home in the archives but also because he had good taste in art and antiquities. He and his wife soon built up a personal art collection, not through expensive purchases but through flair and guile, as is told most amusingly in this book.

A memoir of this kind is particularly interesting when it brings back to mind, through "fun" stories, characters one knows about in more serious guise. A good example in Mrs. Roth's fund of lighthearted anecdote is the English collector/historian Elkan Adler, who was a son of the English Chief Rabbi Nathan Marcus Adler, and who died in 1946 at the age of eighty-five. He was in the English tradition of wealthy bachelor-amateurs, amassing a splendid collection of art, books, and manuscripts, including some 25,000 frag-



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

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ments from the Cairo *Geniza* before it was opened up by Solomon Schechter in 1896. One can sense Roth's slight envy in the brief biography of Adler he contributed to the *Encyclopaedia Judaica,* where he wrote: "He was a lawyer by profession and had unusual opportunities to travel under favorable conditions, and build up a remarkable library." But the two were close friends; and in the same piece, Roth revealed the touching story of how the Adler treasures, including the *Geniza* fragments, later found their way into great institutional collections. A business colleague, apparently, had been an embezzler; and Adler, to make good the losses, sold his library in 1923 to the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York, and much else to the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, "thus helping to raise both of these libraries to positions of significance."

In this memoir, Adler is simply beloved Uncle Elkan, and in one anecdote we see how collectors really have to work. At Sabbath lunch one day, Mrs. Roth admired a fine pair of antique gold filigree earrings which, according to Uncle Elkan, came from Spain before the expulsion of 1492. "It's a good thing your ears aren't pierced," he said, "otherwise I'm sure you would want to put them on." "As it happens, my ears *are* pierced," she replied; whereupon, of course, he gave them to her. And this, she says in wifely fealty to Cecil Roth, is how these 15th-century earrings "joined his collection of Judaeo-Spanish Judaica."

A disarming story, and characteristic of this effervescent book.

Etiquette for the 80's

MISS MANNERS' GUIDE TO EXCRUCIATINGLY CORRECT BEHAVIOR. By JUDITH MARTIN. *Atheneum. 745 pp. $19.95.*

Reviewed by TOD LINDBERG

A LITTLE more than a hundred years ago, Clara Sophia Bloomfield-Moore, alias "Mrs. H.O. Ward," wrote in *Sensible Etiquette of the Best Society*: "It is the duty of American women to do all in their power toward the formation of so high a standard of morals and manners that the tendency of society will be upward instead of downward. . . . Manners and morals are indissolubly allied, and no society can be good where they are bad."

In some quarters, no doubt, Mrs. Bloomfield-Moore's book was funny even in 1878. But it did nicely articulate the issue every etiquette writer has faced, and that none has passed over in silence—how to explain why good manners are important. Mrs. Bloomfield-Moore's answer is that the society of the best people, desirable for its own sake, is also morally uplifting; if one learns to act like them, one will be allowed to keep their company. Similarly, in her *Book of Etiquette* (1922), Lillian Watson wrote: "To know [the] rules of good conduct is to be admitted to the highest circles of society."

Being admitted, of course, may turn out to be rather more complicated than Mrs. Watson's simple notion would lead one to believe. For one thing, the "highest" circles are under no compulsion to maintain their rules of good conduct unyielding over time. For another, there is some question as to whether the "right" people abide by any code of rules at all. As Margery Wilson noted wistfully in the 1947 edition of *The New Etiquette:*

> Rules apparently were made to be broken by the right people. One great difference between those who belong and those who do not belong lies in which rules or set of rules they break. . . . The whole matter is puzzling to a well-meaning onlooker. Just where is this line between the caring and the indifference of smart people?

But the women who have written these books—Mrs. Bloomfield-Moore, Mrs. Watson, Mrs. Wilson, Emily Post, Amy Vanderbilt, Letitia Baldridge, even Ann Landers and "Dear Abby"—have not really set themselves to the improvement of the character and manners of the "best people," who are by definition exemplary. Their books are addressed somewhat lower; what they appeal to is that sense of "uneasiness, self-consciousness, self-defensiveness, the sense that one is not quite real but can in some way acquire reality," which Lionel Trilling once called a defining characteristic of the bourgeoisie. If the condition of uneasy self-consciousness is what impels one to read etiquette books devotedly, the promise they hold out is nothing less than translation into a more elevated sphere, entry into those idealized "higher circles" where one "will lose all self-consciousness, all timidity" (Mrs. Watson).

Now comes Judith Martin, a journalist at the Washington *Post* known for her thrice-weekly column on etiquette and conduct, "Miss Manners," which is syndicated in more than 200 newspapers. *Miss Manners' Guide to Excruciatingly Correct Behavior* is a collection of those columns, organized thematically, in which the fictitious Miss Manners, who refers to herself only in the third person and who is described by Judith Martin as "a perfect lady," covers all the usual subjects—birth announcements, dinner parties, table manners, weddings, funerals, and so forth. The book, now in its eighth printing, has been lavishly praised in all quarters, from the New York *Times Book Review* and the *New Republic* to James Kilpatrick and George F. Will. Harvey Mansfield, Jr., a professor of political philosophy at Harvard, has even found in its pages valuable lessons on democracy.

This solemnity seems a curious response to an etiquette book—even *Time,* when it put Letitia Baldridge on its cover in 1978, did not forbear from poking a little gentle fun at her. And it is all the more curious since Miss Martin is herself a jokey writer (as is clear from the "excruciatingly" in her title). Indeed, while etiquette writers have often been unintentionally hilarious in their pedantry, Judith Martin seems to be the first who *means* to be funny.

Miss Manners offers serious guidance with a comic veneer. Her advice to a reader disturbed by people who talk in church: "You might even appeal, out loud, to a Higher Authority. 'O God, grant me the serenity of a peaceful place to wor-

TOD LINDBERG, *a new contributor, is assistant managing editor of the* Public Interest.

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ship, and the patience to bear with those who disturb it.'" A reader asks: "Am I wrong in thinking Roman numerals [following names] are reserved for royalty?" The response: "Yes, but not nearly so wrong as some royalty Miss Manners could name. A king who is the first of his line to bear the names of, say, Juan Smith (Miss Manners has disguised the name) should style himself King Juan Smith, not King Juan Smith I."

THIS mocking tone is something new in writing on etiquette; with it has come a new sensibility as well. Although there have always been people around to say that good manners are hypocritical, contrary to our natural, authentic, and true feelings, etiquette writers have ordinarily denied that this is so. Miss Manners is more sophisticated: she accepts the charge of hypocrisy, but goes on to praise it. We could do, she says, with more false cheer. At a time when "the national rudeness level has reached dangerous proportions," we should all be willing to act delighted to receive a present we do not like, or be willing to apologize even if it is not our fault. This may not make us better, but at least it will make life more pleasant.

Making us better is in any event not Miss Martin's ambition; this is one of the ways in which her approach is new. To traditional writers on etiquette, it has never been enough to say that one should behave well in the hope that others will behave well in turn. In order to take the Golden Rule personally, there must be some large, some moral justification. This Miss Martin will not supply. Morality is "an icky, messy subject, which fortunately is not Miss Manners' field." Unlike her predecessors, Miss Manners will not impose her own standards on what will make us good, or even happy. In the moral realm, we are on our own.

Nor, to turn to the other traditional justification of proper manners, will Miss Manners teach us how to get in with the best people. To a reader who asks, "If you had a single piece of advice to a couple who wanted to break into society, what would it be?" Miss Manners responds, "Don't bother." Judith Martin means to be disillusioning. For her, there is no idealized smart set.

BUT if nobody is really "in," then nobody is "out." And if morals are not an issue, then manners are a game anyone can play. In *Miss Manners' Guide* we find advice on the most effective and polite way for a married man to begin an affair with his secretary, and on the most effective and polite way for a woman to get revenge on her philandering husband and his mistress. There is advice on the old problem of others behaving badly: "When Miss Manners observes other people behaving rudely, she never steps in to correct them. She behaves politely to them, and then goes home and snickers about them afterward. That is what the well-bred person does." And on the old problem of gossip: "The question to ask oneself before indulging in gossip is not so much 'Is it true?' or 'Is there any useful reason for repeating it?' (no, and no again), but 'Is this likely to come around again and hit me in the face?'"

For Judith Martin, then, etiquette is a matter of tactics alone. "Good manners" put one in a position to plan one's liaisons and assignations, to gossip with impunity. This, Mrs. Bloomfield-Moore would have understood perfectly. She wrote:

> The third class of society is that in which the manners and breeding are perfect, and the morals bad; which is, at the same time, the least and most dangerous society. All vice is here gilded; it is made elegant and covered with a gloss of good breeding. Men and women have almost public reputations to keep up. All that is done is *sub rosa* . . . the "social evil" here takes its most elegant and destructive form. . . . Its vices, when known to you, assume a fashionable prestige and a certain delicacy which seem to deprive them of their grossness and make them the more tempting.

Although there can be little doubt of the seductive charm of this vision (including, it is obvious, to the disapproving Mrs. Bloomfield-Moore), no etiquette book be-

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fore *Miss Manners' Guide* has actively promoted it. But Judith Martin knows her audience. Her book speaks not to those beset by "uneasiness, self-consciousness, self-defensiveness," but to those already on the inside, our new enlightened class. She takes the morals of this class as she finds them, and proceeds to give pointers on the "polite" gratification of its desires. In this respect the lessons she offers on the current condition of our democracy are valuable indeed, if not necessarily the ones she intends.

The Era of Détente

DANGEROUS RELATIONS: THE SOVIET UNION IN WORLD POLITICS, 1970-1982. By ADAM B. ULAM. *Oxford. 325 pp. $25.00.*

Reviewed by NICK EBERSTADT

ADAM B. ULAM is one of the few living scholars of Soviet affairs who may fairly be credited with a masterful command of world politics. By wedding the local, the daily, and the tactical to the international, the historic, and the strategic, he has steadily extended the realm of the understandable in world affairs. And to the pleasure of his readers, Ulam has proved a master not only of substance but also of style: his writing is always graceful, and very often amusing.

In Soviet studies, Ulam has served as a pioneer. This is a field where distressingly little written material stands up over time, yet many of Ulam's books promise to be enduring points of reference. His first, *Titoism and the Cominform*, was a prophetic examination of the forces fracturing the heretofore monolithic Communist bloc. *The Unfinished Revolution*, first published more than twenty years ago, laid out many of the internal contradictions that we have come to recognize in Soviet foreign and domestic policy in its period of "mature socialism." *The Rivals* gave a brilliant account of Soviet-American conflict from the end of World War II through the middle of the war in Vietnam. *Expansion and Coexistence* was the definitive analysis of the first half-century of Soviet foreign policy—and as such, remains an indispensable guidepost for all students of international affairs.

Ulam's latest book, *Dangerous Relations*, picks up where *Expansion and Coexistence* left off, bringing us from America's debacle in Vietnam through the first year of the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan. An incisive reading of this period, which is rather loosely referred to by many contemporary writers as the "era of détente," would seem especially helpful today, and no one is better qualified than Ulam to deliver such an account. Unfortunately, despite its many merits, *Dangerous Relations* is something of a disappointment.

For the disinterested observer of foreign affairs, the "era of détente" was a time of both tragedy and farce. During this period both the United States and the Soviet Union made astonishing mistakes on the world stage, the repercussions of which were to cost each more dearly than the plans devised by its adversary. *Dangerous Relations* gives us the outlines of this bizarre tale.

For the United States, a humiliating retreat from Vietnam was followed first by a bout of geopolitical catatonia, and then by four years of exculpatory and self-tormenting foreign policy under President Carter. The denouement of *Carterpolitik*, the Iran crisis, was, if not entirely a problem of the President's own making, then at least a situation that was handled about as badly as was possible at every single turn. Yet for all its importance, the Iran crisis was only the icing on a cake of American initiatives whose practical consequences were to reduce American influence in many regions of the Third World, to estrange nervous allies in Western Europe, and thereby in effect to increase the likelihood of armed conflict in an increasingly insecure world.

The USSR, for its part, managed against all odds in this same period to lose its Egyptian foothold in the Middle East, and found itself reduced to a fruitless marriage of convenience with the terrorists and irredentists among Israel's enemies. Its ill-concealed obsession with China made it all the easier for statesmen in Peking to extract benefits and concessions from their American "friends" (or as the Chinese themselves put it, "to fight the near barbarian with the far barbarian"). And in invading Afghanistan, the men in Moscow not only shocked the American public out of its inattention to Soviet expansion but also helped set the groundwork for the election of Ronald Reagan, the American President with the most uncompromising attitude toward the USSR since Harry Truman.

DESPITE the wealth of blunders on both sides, however, Soviet and American setbacks were neither symmetrical nor equivalent. As Ulam explains it, the 1970's saw the emergence of a Soviet apparatus with global abilities that more nearly matched its global point of view; Soviet leaders talked and acted as if their state had achieved the full status of a superpower, and as if the "correlation of forces" were shifting in their favor. There was reason for confidence. The governments of Western Europe, whose combined strength could certainly be made to match the Warsaw Pact's on any avenue, were beset by an enfeebling attitude to Soviet overtures, beguiled by a vision called the "relaxation of tensions." The Third World was the scene for a number of unresolvable and debilitating dramas of Western disintegration. The United States, once the preeminent military power in the world, had *volunteered* nuclear "parity" in its arms-control agreements, and was not assured of holding on even to this in protracted negotiations with sophisticated, and less harried, Soviet envoys. At the same time, domestic pressures were reducing America's conventional military forces; the shift from a "two-and-a-half war" to a "one-and-a-half-war" army was interpreted as a sign not only of diminished capacity but also of diminished resolve.

Ulam implies, however, that the USSR's policies of détente have been in some measure a self-liquidating proposition. From the Soviet

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perspective, the point of détente was not simply to take the charge out of the atmosphere between East and West; it was to reduce the risks attendant on international expansion. But reduced risks seemed to embolden the Soviet leadership to the point of recklessness—and reckless behavior is inimical to even the most forbearing Western conceptions of "peaceful competition."

In his concluding counsel, Ulam warns that the next generation of Soviet leaders, instead of being "liberalized" by the experiences of the 1960's and 1970's, may instead favor *more* expansionist policies, since their own expectations have been shaped during a period of growing Soviet power and prestige. He also suggests that Soviet decisions in the coming years may be affected less by Western policies *per se* than by the Kremlin's assessment of the condition of the West. "For, as we have seen during the past twelve years, it has been Moscow's reading of the strengths and weaknesses, and especially the degree of cohesion, of the entire community of democratic nations that has been mainly instrumental in shaping the USSR's foreign policy." He cautions that "arms limitations and summitry cannot basically change the present and increasingly menacing picture of world politics." What is needed in the West, he states, is a "recouping [of] strength and vitality, as measured by much more than military criteria."

Not all of *Dangerous Relations* matches its magisterial finale. For one thing, the text is marred by a number of factual errors quite out of keeping with Ulam's breadth of reading and characteristic command of detail. Thus, Cambodia's capital did not fall to the Communists after Saigon, but rather two weeks beforehand: the Khmer Rouge's frenzied drive to reach Phnom Penh before General Giap's forces completed their conquest of South Vietnam, and the Angka's seeming disregard for the enormous losses their troops were suffering in the process, were a portent of things to come. The invasion of Zaire's Shaba province, executed by armies operating out of Angola, took place in 1978, not 1977: it came as a sort of counterpoint to President Carter's decision to "postpone" deployment of neutron bombs in Europe rather than as a follow-up to the USSR's rejection of American SALT proposals in the previous year. Mistakes like these are by no means fatal, but they suggest that global perspective and current events are being decoupled.

By the same token, *Dangerous Relations* makes insufficient effort to trace the domestic considerations constraining the USSR's use of power and influence abroad. In the past, Ulam has been impatient —and rightly so—with Sovietologists caught up in the "closet dove/closet hawk" guessing game. But there are forces which restrict Soviet expansion from within and that are more solid than those phantoms of the Politburo.

In an age of nominal peace, a superpower's actions must be informed by its assessment of its own economic strengths and weaknesses. In the case of the Soviet Union, expansion is partly limited by the internal weaknesses of its economic system. These weaknesses, in turn, account for much of the importance of economic contacts with the West. Other things being equal, Soviet leaders would presumably like to underwrite their empire—including the failed economies of their satellites—with capital, technology, and credit from "hostile" regimes. Yet in making use of capitalist economies, and thereby seemingly sparing their own economy additional burdens, the men in Moscow also limit their own freedom to maneuver, and in unexpected ways. The USSR's contrivance to have Poland borrow massively from the West, for example, introduced a new set of concerns into Soviet calculations about invasion and the imposition of "martial law," and may have had something to do with the lengthy delay and the intricate formalities observed before Solidarity was crushed.

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

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The Soviet economy is no longer a hermetically sealed operation. From a material—though not a political—standpoint, it may now be as dependent on imports and exports as some Western economies. Understanding this may or may not give Western governments a lever with which to affect specific Soviet *policies*, but it would seem to suggest ways in which to affect Soviet *power*.

IF *Dangerous Relations* is vague about Soviet economics, it seems excessively specific about the USSR's military forces. Ulam states that the USSR has been increasing its military outlays over the past decade by 4-5 percent a year. This may indeed be so, but it seems adventurous to take it as fact. As Ulam himself writes, American estimates of Soviet strength have suffered from failures of intelligence in the past. From the Berlin blockade to the Cuban missile crisis, American officials seemed consistently to overestimate Soviet military might. On the other hand, in the mid-1970's, according to the famous "Team B" report, CIA planners were *under*estimating the USSR's military expenditure by as much as half. Ulam's 4-5 percent figure apparently comes from a "revised" CIA estimate of the Soviet military build-up. It is a plausible but not conclusive figure. (One researcher who has reworked the statistics argues that the growth in Soviet procurements has been more like 9 percent a year; a new CIA assessment proposes that since the mid-1970's, the build-up has only been about 2 percent a year.) Undue precision about the Soviet military effort does not help us assess the actions of a superpower that prefers to do its bargaining under the threat of force.

Without knowledge about the Soviet economy or the Red Army, we must principally rely, in any evaluation of Soviet overseas initiatives, on our understanding of the nature of the USSR as a power-seeking entity. Under these handicaps, Adam Ulam can be expected to perform better than his peers. Yet in *Dangerous Relations* his analytical abilities are needlessly confined. Admirers of his writings may hope that in future books he will have more to say about the recent course of the USSR.

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